Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2006

Ty Eldridge and Marina Eldridge v. James L.
Farnsworth, David Farnsworth, and Gregory
Farnsworth : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Alvin R. Lundgren; attorney for appellant.
unknown.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Eldridge v. Farnsworth, No. 20060333 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6422

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

ALVIN R. LUNDGREN (#5506)
ALVIN R. LUNDGREN, L.C.
5105 W OLD HWYSTE 200
MOUNTAIN GREEN, UT 84050

TEL (801) 876-4422
Fax (801) 876-4411
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF Ui
TY ELDRIDGE AND MARINA
ELDRIDGE

t

APPELLANTS BRIEF
ADDENDUM

Plaintiff and Appellants
v.

CASE NO 20060333-CA

JAMES L. FARNSWORTH, DAVID
FARNSWORTH and GREGORY
FARNSWORTH

District Court Case #04Q1P0079

Defendants and Appellees
HUM

UTA?
rffflF

ALVIN R. LUNDGREN (#5506)
ALVIN R. LUNDGREN, L.C.
5105WOLDHWYSTE200
MOUNTAIN GREEN, UT 84050

TEL (801) 876-4422
Fax (801) 876-4411
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
TY ELDRIDGE AND MARINA
ELDRIDGE
Plaintiff and Appellants

APPELLANTS BRIEF
ADDENDUM
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

v.
CASE NO 20060333-CA
JAMES L. FARNSWORTH, DAVID
FARNSWORTH and GREGORY
FARNSWORTH

District Court Case #0408000079

Defendants and Appellees
CERTIFICATION
I certify that I am over age 18 and that true and correct copy of the Brief of Appellant ADDENDUM was sent by US Mail, postage prepaid, on October 24,2006 to the following
persons(s):
Clark Allred
363 East Main St Ste 201
Vernal, Utah 84066

ADDENDUM
1.

U.C.A. § 78-40-2

2.

§78-40-2.5;

3.

Rule 8

4.

Rule 15

5.

Rule 56

6.

Cowley v Porter

7.

Complaint

8.

First Amended Complaint

9.

Answer to Counterclaim

10.

REPC

11.

Lease Option

12.

Orders of the Court
a.

January 11, 2006

13

b.

March 29, 2006

a

c.

May 15, 2006

&

d.

June 26, 2006

August 16, 2006
it, e.
vs./?' Deposition of Jim Farnsworth
J<. 1$ Plaintiffs Answers to Defendants' First Discovery

Tabl

78-40-2. Lis pendens.
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property the
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and the defendant at the time of
filing his answer when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at any time
afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the county in which the property or
some part thereof is situated a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the names
of the parties, the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that
county affected thereby. From the time of filing such notice for record only shall a
purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby be deemed to have
constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against parties
designated by their real names.
No Change Since 1953
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78-40-2.5. Motions related to a notice of the pendency of an action.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Claimant" means a person who files a notice.
(b) "Guarantee" means an agreement by a claimant to pay an amount of damages:
(i) specified by the court;
(ii) suffered as a result of the maintenance of a notice;
(iii) to a person with an interest in the real property that is the subject of the notice;
and
(iv) if the requirements of Subsection (6) are met.
(c) "Notice" means a notice of the pendency of an action filed under Section
78-40-2.
(2) Any time after a notice has been recorded pursuant to Section 78-40-2, any of the
following may make a motion to the court in which the action is pending to release the
notice:
(a) a party to the action; or
(b) a person with an interest in the real property affected by the notice.
(3) A court shall order a notice released if:
(a) the court receives a motion to release under Subsection (2); and
(b) the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the
evidence the probable validity of the real property claim that is the subject of the notice.
(4) If a court releases a notice pursuant to this section, the claimant may not record
another notice with respect to the same property without approval of the court in which
the action is pending.
(5) Upon a motion by any person with an interest in the real property that is the
subject of a notice, a court may require the claimant to give the moving party a guarantee
as a condition of maintaining the notice:
(a) any time after a notice has been recorded; and
(b) regardless of whether the court has received an application to release under
Subsection (2).
(6) A person who receives a guarantee under Subsection (5) may recover an amount
not to exceed the amount of the guarantee upon a showing that:
(a) the claimant did not prevail on the real property claim; and
(b) the person seeking the guarantee suffered damages as a result of the maintenance
of the notice.
(7) A court shall award costs and attorney fees to a prevailing party on any motion
under this section unless the court finds that:
(a) the nonprevailing party acted with substantial justification; or
(b) other circumstances make the imposition of attorney fees and costs unjust.
Enacted by Chapter 366, 2004 General Session
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Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of
several different types may be demanded.
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to
each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party
relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly
meet the substance of the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny
only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and
material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith to
controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make his denials as
specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the
averments except such designated averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but,
when he does so intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial
subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk,
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of
consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release,
res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated
a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice
so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in
the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is
required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms
of pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two
or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently

would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or
more of the alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or
defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable
grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in
Rule 11.
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial
justice.
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Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may
so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall
be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days
after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the
court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may be
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does
not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits.
The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet
such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be
set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original
pleading.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable
notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading
setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date of
the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the
original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court
deems it advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so
order, specifying the time therefor.

Tab 5

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary
judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and
the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file
such a response.

(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order
the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
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78-40-2.5. Motions related to a notice of the pendency of an action.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Claimant" means a person who files a notice.
(b) "Guarantee" means an agreement by a claimant to pay an amount of damages:
(i) specified by the court;
(ii) suffered as a result of the maintenance of a notice;
(iii) to a person with an interest in the real property that is the subject of the notice;
and
(iv) if the requirements of Subsection (6) are met.
(c) "Notice" means a notice of the pendency of an action filed under Section
78-40-2.
(2) Any time after a notice has been recorded pursuant to Section 78-40-2, any of the
following may make a motion to the court in which the action is pending to release the
notice:
(a) a party to the action; or
(b) a person with an interest in the real property affected by the notice.
(3) A court shall order a notice released if:
(a) the court receives a motion to release under Subsection (2); and
(b) the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the
evidence the probable validity of the real property claim that is the subject of the notice.
(4) If a court releases a notice pursuant to this section, the claimant may not record
another notice with respect to the same property without approval of the court in which
the action is pending.
(5) Upon a motion by any person with an interest in the real property that is the
subject of a notice, a court may require the claimant to give the moving party a guarantee
as a condition of maintaining the notice:
(a) any time after a notice has been recorded; and
(b) regardless of whether the court has received an application to release under
Subsection (2).
(6) A person who receives a guarantee under Subsection (5) may recover an amount
not to exceed the amount of the guarantee upon a showing that:
(a) the claimant did not prevail on the real property claim; and
(b) the person seeking the guarantee suffered damages as a result of the maintenance
of the notice.
(7) A court shall award costs and attorney fees to a prevailing party on any motion
under this section unless the court finds that:
(a) the nonprevailing party acted with substantial justification; or
(b) other circumstances make the imposition of attorney fees and costs unjust.
Enacted by Chapter 366, 2004 General Session
COWLEY v. PORTER, 2005 UT App 518
127 P.3d 1224
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Tracy COWLEY, Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-appellant, v. Slone PORTER,
Defendant, Appellant, and Cross-appellee.
No. 20040827-CA.
Utah Court of Appeals.
December 8, 2005.
Appeal from the Fourth District Court, Heber Department, Donald
J. Eyre, Jr., J.
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[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]
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Darrel J. Bostwick, Jeffery R. Price, and Christopher C. Hill,
Bostwick & Pricem Salt Lake City, for Appellant and
Cross-appellee.
E. Craig Smay, Salt Lake City, for Appellee and
Cross-appellant.
Before Judges GREENWOOD, McHUGH, and ORME.
OPINION
McHUGH, Judge:
Tf 1 On appeal from a bench trial, Slone Porter (Porter)
challenges the district court's ruling that he breached a
contract with Tracy Cowley (Cowley). Porter argues, first, that
the district court's judgment should be reversed because it is
based on claims not asserted in Cowley's complaint, and second,
that several of the district court's factual findings relating to
the terms of the contract are clearly erroneous. Cowley
cross-appeals, asserting that the district court erred in
dismissing Veralynn Porter, Slone Porter's wife (Veralynn), as a
defendant. Cowley also argues that he should have been awarded
attorney fees because Porter's defense was asserted without merit
and in bad faith. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (2002). We
affirm in part and reverse in part.

BACKGROUND
f 2 The district court set forth detailed findings of facts in
its ruling after trial. Thus, "we relate the facts granting due
deference to the trial court's resolution of factual disputes."

Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, ^ 2, 44 P.3d 742.
Tf 3 Porter had been employed by 7-Eleven, Inc. (7-Eleven) for
over fourteen years, beginning in February 1981 and ending when
he was laid off in November 1995. At the time Porter was laid
off, Cowley was employed as the Area Facilities Manager for
7-Eleven and had responsibility for approving all outside
maintenance contracts for stores in Utah, as well as the
responsibility to oversee that maintenance work. As a matter of
corporate policy, 7-Eleven published a Code of Business Conduct
that prohibited employees from engaging in conflicts of interest,
which expressly included business relationships between any
outside companies and any current employees or former employees
for a certain restricted time period.
f 4 Despite the clear prohibition on such arrangements, Porter
and Cowley, then both current 7-Eleven employees, and Bill Berg,
a non-7-Eleven employee who was already doing 7-Eleven landscape
work, formed Advanced Maintenance Services (AMS).[fnl] The
company was incorporated in Utah on December 6, 1994, for the
purpose of entering into contracts with 7-Eleven for general
maintenance of its stores. Berg, Cowley, and Porter had equal
ownership in AMS, although no stock certificates were ever
issued.
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The participation of Cowley and Porter in AMS was intentionally
concealed from 7-Eleven, and Berg served as the contact between
the two companies. AMS was successful in obtaining a number of
maintenance contracts with 7-Eleven.
If 5 AMS acquired Straight Line Striping, Inc. (SLS), a
pavement-marking business, in 1997. In June 1997, following
arbitration among the three owners of AMS, Berg relinquished his
interest in the company in exchange for cash, the landscaping
contracts with 7-Eleven, and two vehicles. Thereafter, Porter and
Cowley each owned fifty percent of AMS. Without Berg, AMS could
no longer conceal its noncompliance with 7-Elevenfs Code of
Business Conduct. Consequently, Porter requested permission to
own and operate AMS as a contractor with 7-Eleven, despite the
fact that the time period during which transactions with former
employees were prohibited had not yet elapsed. Jim Craig, the
Division Facilities Manager for 7-Eleven, waived the remaining
time period and agreed to allow AMS to contract with 7-Eleven,
despite Porter's involvement. Although Craig was Cowley's direct
supervisor at 7-Eleven, neither Porter nor Cowley informed Craig
that Cowley had a fifty percent ownership interest in AMS.

f 6 During the next few years, the contracts with 7-Eleven
proved lucrative and AMS operated successfully. Porter received
compensation from AMS and, although Cowley continued to work for
7-Eleven and provided no direct services to AMS, Cowley also
received compensation from AMS. To equalize their compensation
under this arrangement, Cowley's payments from AMS were reduced
to account for his 7-Eleven salary. Porter and Cowley were each
receiving between $10,000 and $14,000 per month for their
ownership interest in AMS.
f 7 In 2000, Porter and Veralynn (collectively, the Porters),
together with Cowley and his wife Kerin Cowley (Kerin)
(collectively, the Cowleys), formed a new Utah corporation called
Listo, Inc. (Listo). Listo was a holding company that owned title
to two pieces of real property purchased with funds from AMS. One
property was located in Midway, Utah, and the other in St.
George, Utah.
f 8 Subsequently, Johan de Besche replaced Craig as the
Division Facilities Manager for 7-Eleven and became Cowley's
direct supervisor. He began to scrutinize the AMS invoices. In
February 2001, de Besche confronted Cowley about a family
vacation to Hawaii that the Cowleys and the Porters had taken
together because he was concerned that AMS may have paid the
Cowleys' travel expenses. Fearing that de Besche would discover
his connection with AMS, Cowley resigned from 7-Eleven effective
March 31, 2001. He then began working directly for AMS and
drawing the same salary as Porter. Although de Besche learned of
Cowley's employment with AMS, he still was unaware that Cowley
owned fifty percent of the company.
If 9 Ann Atkin was hired by 7-Eleven to replace Cowley as the
Area Facilities Manager. In connection with those duties, she
began a detailed review of all of the AMS invoices. Atkin
discussed her concerns about the invoices with Porter. At this
point, the Porters became concerned that AMS might lose the
7-Eleven contracts if Cowley remained involved with the company.
f 10 On June 22, 2002, the Porters arranged a meeting with the
Cowleys at the AMS offices in Midway, Utah. At that meeting, the
Porters offered to buy Cowley's interest in AMS for $600,000, to
be paid over five years at $10,000 per month, without interest.
As part of this offer, the Cowleys also would receive SLS, and
Cowley would be given his choice of either property owned by
Listo. The Porters tape-recorded this meeting. The Cowleys were

"stunned" by the offer and left the meeting without accepting it.
Later that evening, Cowley called Porter and suggested that if
Porter thought the offer was fair, then Cowley should retain AMS
and buy Porter out for the amount offered. Porter refused this
counter-offer and warned Cowley that AMS would lose the 7-Eleven
contracts if Cowley's ownership in AMS became known to 7-Eleven.
Cowley indicated that he was confident he could keep the 7-Eleven
work.
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U 11 After participating for over seven years in a scheme to
deceive 7-Eleven about Cowley's ownership interest in AMS,
Veralynn suddenly decided to inform 7-Eleven of the true nature
of the relationship. On June 22, 2002, without first notifying
the Cowleys, Veralynn informed Atkin, Cowley's replacement at
7-Eleven, that Cowley had been an owner of AMS since its
formation. Veralynn also told Atkin that Cowley had threatened a
hostile takeover of AMS that would interfere with the work it
performed for 7-Eleven. On June 23, 2002, at a meeting with the
Porters, Atkin indicated that she would have to inform her
supervisor, de Besche, and 7-Eleven's legal department about the
situation. Atkin was unsure whether 7-Eleven would continue to
contract with AMS.
f 12 On the evening of June 23, 2002, the Cowleys and the
Porters met again to discuss the future of AMS. The Porters told
the Cowleys about Veralynn's conversation with Atkin, which
effectively negated any possibility that the Cowleys could
purchase AMS from Porter. The meeting was tape-recorded by the
Porters.
% 13 After the meeting, the Cowleys agreed that they should
accept the buyout terms previously offered by the Porters, with
certain changes. Because Kerin was accompanying a youth group on
an out-of-state trip leaving early the next morning, Cowley
arranged to meet with the Porters alone.
f 14 On the morning of June 24, 2002, Cowley met with the
Porters. That meeting was again tape-recorded by the Porters.
Cowley identified additional terms that he wanted to be included
in the buyout, and Veralynn Porter typed up a new agreement that
incorporated Cowley's changes. Veralynn then printed two copies
of the agreement, which was entitled "Partnership Buy-Out."
Porter executed one copy of the agreement and placed it on the
desk. Veralynn did not execute the agreement and Cowley did not
request that she do so. Cowley indicated that the terms of the

agreement were acceptable to him, but that he wanted to read it
to Kerin before signing. Cowley attempted to contact Kerin by
cell phone, but was unsuccessful. The Porters left, taking the
copy of the agreement Porter had signed with them. Cowley never
signed the second copy of the agreement. Instead, he left it on
the desk with a note stating: "Vera — Call me. T.C." The Porters
retained both copies of the agreement.
Tj 15 On the afternoon of June 24, 2002, Cowley called Atkin to
confirm that SLS could continue to do striping work for 7-Eleven.
Atkin informed Cowley that 7-Eleven would not do business with
any company associated with Cowley.
T| 16 At the direction of Atkin, the Porters formed a new
company, Quality Maintenance Systems (QMS), on June 25, 2002. QMS
performed the work previously done by AMS. 7-Eleven agreed to
work with QMS as long as Cowley was not involved.
f 17 On June 27, 2002, de Besche and Atkin held separate
meetings with the Porters and Cowley. Both the Porters and Cowley
independently informed de Besche that Cowley had agreed to sell
his interest in AMS to the Porters and would have no further
involvement with the company. The notes of the meetings kept by
Atkin indicate that the Porters showed de Besche a copy of the
June 24,2002 agreement signed by Porter. After the meetings, de
Besche agreed that QMS could continue to provide the same
services to 7-Eleven that had previously been performed by AMS on
a time-and-materials basis, so long as Cowley had no involvement
with the new company.
H 18 The Cowleys and the Porters then began performing the
terms of the June 24,2002 agreement. Specifically, Cowley
vacated the AMS offices and delivered the previous AMS employees,
equipment, stock account, books, and premises to the Porters.
Porter and Cowley divided equally between themselves the $50,000
in an AMS investment account and the accounts receivable. SLS was
transferred to the Cowleys and the logos on the premises and
equipment of AMS were changed to those of QMS. In addition, one
of the properties held by Listo and some vehicles were
transferred to the Cowleys. During this time period, the Cowleys
asked the Porters for copies of the tape-recorded meetings, which
Veralynn agreed to provide.
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1f 19 On July 19,2002, the Cowleys and the Porters met to
discuss an inventory of equipment and supplies belonging to SLS

and AMS. At this meeting, the Porters stated that because the
contracts with 7-Eleven were on a time-and-materials basis until
QMS could potentially enter into new contracts with 7-Eleven in
the fall, they could not afford to pay the Cowleys $10,000 per
month. Instead, the Porters offered to pay the Cowleys $4000 per
month, pending QMS's rebidding of the 7-Eleven contracts. Unlike
the previous meetings, this meeting was not tape-recorded. When
the Cowleys again asked for copies of the tape recordings of the
previous meetings, Veralynn stated that she had destroyed them.
1f 20 Porter testified at trial that Cowley called him on the
evening of July 19, 2002, and accepted his offer of $4000 per
month over five years, or $240,000 total, as a final agreement to
purchase Cowley's share of AMS. In contrast, the Cowleys
testified that they agreed to accept $4000 per month as an
accommodation to the Porters and only until QMS was able to enter
into new contracts with 7-Eleven. At that time, the Cowleys
understood that the original provision mandating payment of
$10,000 per month over five years, or $600,000, would be
restored.
1f 21 On July 21, 2002, Porter filed Articles of Dissolution for
AMS, indicating that no agreement of shareholders was necessary
because AMS did not have any shareholders.
U 22 In October 2002, the Cowleys learned that QMS had obtained
the new 7-Eleven contracts. Although these contracts were not
identical to those held by AMS, they were substantially the same
and had a similar monetary value. On October 21, 2002, the
Cowleys demanded that the Porters begin paying $10,000 per month,
as originally agreed. The Porters agreed to consider bringing the
payments up to $10,000 per month. Upon further consideration, the
Porters responded that their attorney had advised them that they
had an enforceable oral agreement to pay only $4000 per month
over five years. The Porters paid the Cowleys $4000 per month
from August 2002 to the time of trial.
f 23 On May 15, 2003, the Cowleys filed the complaint in this
action, claiming that the Articles of Dissolution had been
improperly filed. The Cowleys asked the district court to
judicially dissolve the company and divide the value of AMS
between the two parties. The Porters answered by asserting, among
other defenses, that AMS had already been properly dissolved.
T| 24 During the proceedings, the Cowleys changed their legal
theory and asked the trial court to enforce the June 24, 2002

agreement executed by Porter, in which Porter agreed to pay
Cowley $600,000, at the rate of $10,000 per month over five
years. The Porters denied that the agreement of June 24, 2002,
was binding and instead argued that the buyout agreement was for
a total of $240,000, to be paid at the rate of $4000 per month
over five years, as agreed on July 19, 2002.
125 After denying a series of motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment, the trial court ordered that the trial would be
bifurcated. The first trial was to determine whether the parties
had entered a binding contract to buy out Cowley's interest and
the terms of any such contract. If the court concluded that there
had been no agreement, it would then proceed to the second phase
of trial to determine the value of AMS for purposes of judicial
dissolution. The parties were notified that the second phase
would not be necessary if the trial court found an enforceable
buyout agreement. A bench trial on the existence of and terms of
a buyout agreement between the parties was held on June 1 and 2,
2004.
f 26 After trial, the Cowleys again changed their position and
asked the court to judicially dissolve AMS and set its value as
of June 22, 2002. They selected that date because it was prior to
Veralynn's disclosures to 7-Eleven about Cowley's ownership
interest in AMS. On July 7,2004, the court granted the Porters'
motion to dismiss Veralynn as a defendant and Kerin as a
plaintiff.
Tf 27 The trial court entered detailed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on September 10, 2004, in which it determined
that the parties had entered into an oral buyout agreement on
June 24,2002. The
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court found that Porter agreed to purchase Cowley's interest in
AMS for $600,000, to be paid at the rate of $ 10,000 per month
over five years. Although the agreement was never reduced to a
binding written agreement, the court concluded that it was
enforceable despite the statute of frauds because it had been
partially performed. In reaching that conclusion, the trial court
found that the credibility of both the Cowleys and the Porters
was suspect, expressly finding that both sides had made
conflicting statements in affidavits, depositions, and trial
testimony. In particular, the court noted in its findings of fact
that although Veralynn told the Cowleys at their July 19, 2002
meeting that she had already destroyed the tape recordings of
their previous meetings, she testified at trial that she threw

them into the Jordanelle Reservoir on July 24, 2002. The court
also determined that both parties had participated in a scheme to
deceive 7-Eleven as to the actual ownership of AMS over a span of
many years.
<[f 28 With respect to the $4000 payments made from August to
October of 2002, the trial court found that the Cowleys agreed to
accept reduced payments as an accommodation to the Porters. The
trial court further found that the payments were to be raised to
$10,000 per month as soon as 7-Eleven renewed maintenance
contracts with QMS. These contracts were renewed in October 2002.
The court concluded that Porter was in breach of the June 24,
2002 oral buyout agreement as of October 2002 when, although QMS
had entered into new contracts with 7-Eleven, Porter refused to
increase the monthly payments to $10,000. Finally, the court
determined that the Porters' interaction with 7-Eleven
representatives coerced the Cowleys into selling Cowley's
interest in AMS and constituted a breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing to the company and Cowley.
Tf 29 In accordance with its findings and conclusions, the trial
court ordered Porter to pay Cowley $10,000 per month until the
entire $600,000 obligation is paid in full. The court also
ordered each party to bear its own costs and fees incurred in the
litigation.
If 30 On appeal, Porter alleges that the trial court erred by
fashioning a remedy not pleaded by either party. He also
challenges paragraphs 33, 36, and 37 of the trial court's
findings of fact as being clearly erroneous. Cowley cross-appeals
claiming error in the trial court's dismissal of the claims
against Veralynn and in its decision not to award attorney fees
to Cowley.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Tj 31 Porter's claim that the trial court erred in entering
judgment against him on a theory not raised by the pleadings
involves a conclusion of law that we review under a
correction-of-error standard. See Farr v. Brinkerhoff,
829 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah Ct.App. 1992).
Tf 32 Porter also challenges several of the trial court's
findings of fact.
While we accord no particular deference to a trial

court's conclusions of law, a challenge to findings
of fact must show that the evidence, viewed in a
light most favorable to the trial court, is legally
insufficient to support the contested finding. The
challenging party must marshal all the supporting
evidence and demonstrate its insufficiency.
Utah Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193,1197 (Utah
Ct.App. 1991) (citations omitted).
f 33 Cowley argues in his cross-appeal that it was improper to
dismiss Veralynn as a party because she was necessary to the
proceedings. Whether it was error to grant the motion to dismiss
is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Canyon
Meadows Home Owners Ass'n v. Wasatch County, 2001 UT App 414, ^
6-7,40P.3dll48.
% 34 Cowley also challenges the trial court's failure to award
him his attorney fees under Utah Code section 78-27-56, which
provides for the award of fees when a claim or defense is
asserted without merit and in bad faith. See Utah Code Ann. §
78-27-56 (2002). "Whether the trial court properly interpreted
the legal prerequisites for awarding attorney fees under section
78-27-56 is a "question of law' that we 'review . . .
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for correctness."' Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen,
2005 UT 46,1[ 8, 122 P.3d 556 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted). "In contrast, it is within the discretion of the trial
court to determine whether an action is asserted in bad faith,
and we therefore review such a determination under the clearly
erroneous standard." Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, |
21,20P.3d868.
ANALYSIS
I. Failure to Amend Pleadings
Tf 35 Porter first argues that the judgment in favor of Cowley
should be reversed because the pleadings were never amended to
include a claim for breach of contract. Porter further contends
that even if the trial court could properly consider the contract
claim, it went beyond the matters at issue when it entered
judgment against Porter according to the terms of the contract it
determined existed. We disagree.
If 36 Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth

the general pleading requirements, stating that a complaint
"shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Utah R. Civ. P.
8(a)(1). The rule is designed to provide notice of the nature of
the claims asserted against a defendant and an opportunity to
meet those claims. See Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). Rule 8(f) provides that "[a]ll
pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice."
Utah R. Civ. P. 8(f). "Pleadings" include both the complaint and
the answer. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a) (emphasis omitted). "When issues
not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as
if they had been raised in the pleadings." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b).
An amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence can be
made by either party at any time, even after judgment is entered.
See id. Yet, the failure to amend "does not affect the result
of the trial of these issues." Id. Finally, rule 54(c)(1) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "every final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor
it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
such relief in his pleadings." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(1); see
also Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1, 8 (Utah 1989)
(stating principle that a court can enter judgment reforming a
contract where the pleadings sought declaratory judgment); Clark
v. Second Circuit Court, 741 P.2d 956, 957-58 (Utah 1987)
(holding that the failure to amend a petition for an
extraordinary writ did not affect the fact that issues were tried
by consent of the parties); Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp.,
Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Utah 1983) (holding that if plaintiff
was able to adduce the necessary evidence at trial, she could
claim punitive damages without formal amendment to the
pleadings); Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 829 P.2d 117, 119-20 (Utah
Ct.App. 1992) (rejecting defendants' argument that, because the
relief had not been sought by the pleadings, the trial court
erred by setting aside a sheriffs sale).
f 37 The fundamental purpose of these rules is to "liberaliz[e]
both pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are
afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute." Cheney v.
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963). In Cheney, the
Utah Supreme Court held that the failure of the defendants to
plead a subsequent agreement as an affirmative defense was not
fatal to the trial court's consideration of that agreement. See
id. In rejecting the plaintiffs argument to the contrary, the
court explained:

What [a party is] entitled to is notice of the issues
raised and an opportunity to meet them. When this is
accomplished, that is all that is required. Our rules
provide for liberality to allow examination into and
settlement of all issues bearing upon the
controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other
party to have a reasonable time to meet a new issue
if he so requests. Rule 15(b) [of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure] so states.
Cheney, 381 P.2d at 91 (footnote omitted); see also Armed
Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, % 24, 70 P.3d 35
(holding that the failure to plead fraud with particularity was
not fatal where the defendant had
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notice and an opportunity to respond); Motivated Mgmt. Intfl v.
Finney, 604 P.2d 467,468 (Utah 1979) (holding, under rule
54(c)(1), that the plaintiffs complaint was not defective, even
though it sought to foreclose a lien that on appeal the plaintiff
conceded was invalid, because the complaint also sought a
judgment for money damages against the defendants); PLC
Landscape Constr. v. Piccadilly Fish 'N Chips, Inc.,
28 Utah 2d 350, 502 P.2d 562, 563 (1972) (holding that the trial court
properly allowed recovery on the basis of quantum meruit, even
though the complaint sought relief on the basis of an express
contract, because the defendant was not "denied a fair
opportunity to meet the change in theory of recovery"); Buehner
Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 517, 519-20 (1957)
(holding that the trial court properly considered the issue of
partnership, although it was not formally raised by the
pleadings, because both parties presented evidence on the issue
at trial); Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, f 6 n. 2,
19 P.3d 1005 (holding that the trial court properly ordered the
appellant to repay funds misappropriated from his children's
custodial accounts, even though that issue was not raised in the
pleadings, because he "had the opportunity to prepare and meet
the issue"); Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter,
Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 275-76 (Utah Ct.App. 1996) (rejecting
argument that the trial court impermissibly granted relief on a
theory not pleaded where the defendant had notice and an
opportunity to respond); Henderson v. For-Shor Co.,
757 P.2d 465, 472 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) (holding that trial court properly
considered an overcharge claim, despite the fact that it was not
formally raised in the pleadings, because the appellant failed to
show it was prejudiced by consideration of the claim).

U 38 Rule 54(c)(1)
requires trial courts to be liberal in awarding
appropriate relief justified by the facts developed
at trial, as long as the failure to request a
particular form of relief does not prejudice a party
in the preparation or trial of the case. If there is
no prejudice, it is necessary only that the relief
granted be supported by the evidence and be a
permissible form of relief for the claims litigated.
Henderson, 757 P.2d at 472 (quotations and citations omitted).
Porter has not been prejudiced here and his reliance on Combe v.
Warreris Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984), is
misplaced. In Combe, a dispute arose between the two
shareholders of a closely held corporation. See id. at 734. The
corporation initiated an action against the minority shareholder
for, among other things, misappropriation of corporate assets and
an accounting. See id. at 734-35. Although neither party sought
dissolution of the corporation — let alone a partnership — the
trial court entered findings and conclusions that the entity was
actually a partnership, by their actions the parties had
evidenced an intent to dissolve the partnership, and the assets
of the de facto partnership should be distributed as set forth in
the trial couifs order. See id. at 735. The trial court also
ruled that the parties should "flip a coin" to determine which of
them could retain the trademark, trade name, and logo of the
business. Id. Not surprisingly, the Utah Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the trial court holding that rule 54(c)(1) "does
not go so far as to authorize the granting of relief on issues
neither raised nor tried." Id.
1f 39 This is not a case where the trial court granted relief on
a theory that was neither pleaded nor tried. Porter had ample
notice of the contract claim against him and was afforded the
opportunity to meet that claim. The Cowleys' complaint sought
judicial dissolution of AMS. In their answer, the Porters
asserted as an affirmative defense that "[AMS] was properly
dissolved." The Porters alleged that Porter entered into a
binding contract to buy out Cowley for $240,000, paid in
installments of $4000 per month over five years. In contrast, the
Cowleys argued that a binding buyout agreement had been reached
between Porter and Cowley, but that Porter was to buy out Cowley
for $600,000, to be paid in installments of $10,000 per month
over five years. From the record below, it is apparent that
Porter was on actual notice of the conflicting theories regarding

a binding buyout agreement.
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f 40 The Porters' memorandum in opposition to the Cowleys'
motion for summary judgment frames one of the disputed facts as
follows:
It is undisputed that [the Porters] have made
payments of $4,000.00 per month to [the Cowleys] in
accordance with the agreement reached on July 19,
2002. It is disputed, as properly noted by the
[cjourt in its prior two rulings[,] that there was
ever an agreement between the parties concerning the
payment of more than $4,000.00 per month, which issue
has been set for trial in June 2004.
That memorandum goes on to state that there are remaining "issues
of material fact concerning whether there was a meeting of the
minds sufficient to support an agreement, and the terms of that
agreement, and whether the agreement reached by the parties is
enforceable under the [s]tatute of [f]rauds." Thus, the Porters'
own submissions to the trial court reveal that Porter was on
notice that the existence and terms of a buyout agreement were at
issue.
f 41 Indeed, the first phase of the trial was for the specific
purpose of determining whether a binding buyout agreement had
been reached and the terms of any such agreement. The fact that
Porter understood that Cowley was seeking to enforce a buyout
agreement for $600,000 is expressly provided in the trial brief
the Porters filed, which states:
As stated by the [cjourt, presently before the court
for trial are essentially two issues: (1) whether the
agreement between the parties called for the payment
from . . . Porter to . . . Cowley in the total amount
of $240,000 or $600,000[,] paid in monthly
installments over five years for . . . Cowley's
portion of the capital assets of AMS; and (2) whether
there has been sufficient part performance by the
parties to bring the oral agreement under an
exception to the requirements of the [s]tatute of
[fjrauds, so that the agreement is legally
enforceable and binding.
The trial transcript reflects that each party put on evidence

supporting its version of the terms of the buyout agreement.
Because Porter had notice of Cowley's $600,000 contract claim and
the opportunity to refute that claim at trial, he cannot claim
prejudice from Cowley's failure to amend the pleadings.
II. Challenge to Findings of Fact
T| 42 Porter challenges paragraphs 33, 36, and 37 of the trial
court's findings of fact. In doing so, he undertakes a
significant burden.
[W]e review the trial court's findings of fact for
clear error, reversing only where the finding is
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if we
otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. To succeed in its challenge to findings of
fact, [an appellant] may not simply reargue [his]
position based on selective excerpts of evidence
presented to the trial court. Instead, [the
appellant] must first marshal all the evidence in
support of the finding and then demonstrate that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the
finding even when viewing it in a light most
favorable to the court below.
ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct.App.
1997) (quotations and citations omitted). Porter has not met this
burden.
f 43 In paragraph 33 of its findings of fact, the trial court
states that "[a]fter June 27, 2002, the parties began to perform
the terms of the written buy[]out agreement of June 24th." That
finding then goes on to identify the specific acts performed.
Paragraphs 36 and 37 of the trial court's findings of fact
provide that the Cowleys agreed to accept $4000 per month as an
accommodation to the Porters until the 7-Eleven contracts were
reissued to QMS. In his brief on appeal, Porter admits that there
was evidence presented from which the trial court could have made
these findings. He argues, however, that the weight of the
evidence was in favor of the Porters and that the Cowleys'
testimony was not credible in light of their prior contrary
statements. This "is nothing but an attempt to have this [c]ourt
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on a
contested factual issue. This we cannot do under Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a)." Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, ^ 28,
80 P.3d 553 (alteration in original) (quotations

Page 1234
and citation omitted), cert, denied, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004).
Furthermore, we must defer to the trial court on issues of
credibility because it is "in the best position to assess the
credibility of the witnesses and to gain a sense of the
proceeding as a whole. Where contradictory testimony is offered .
.., [t]he fact finder is free to weigh the conflicting evidence
presented and to draw its own conclusions." Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 314 (Utah 1998) (second alteration in
original) (quotations and citations omitted). In this case, the
trial court expressly noted that the inconsistent positions taken
by both sides at various stages of the litigation raised
questions concerning the credibility of each party.
f 44 Porter has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's
findings of fact are "against the clear weight of the evidence,"
or that the evidence was "legally insufficient to support the
finding[s]." ProMax Dev. Corp., 943 P.2d at 255 (quotations and
citations omitted). In addition, there is adequate evidence in
the record from which the trial court could have made the
findings. Therefore, we reject Porter's challenge to the trial
court's findings of fact.
III. Dismissal of Veralynn Porter
H 45 In his cross-appeal, Cowley argues that the trial court
improperly dismissed Veralynn as a defendant. Cowley's argument
is based on the assertion that Veralynn, although not an owner of
AMS, was a purchaser of Cowley's interest in the
company. [fn2] Because the trial court found an enforceable
buyout agreement in which Veralynn was instrumental, Cowley
argues that judgment should have been entered against both of the
Porters. We agree.
f 46 The appellate courts of this State have held that findings
of fact "must show that the court's judgment or decree follows
logically from, and is supported by, the evidence." Parduhn v.
Bennett, 2005 UT 22, ^ 24, 112 P.3d 495 (quotations and citation
omitted). Where the trial court's conclusions of law do not
properly follow from the findings of fact, those conclusions can
be overturned on appeal. See System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon,
669 P.2d 421, 429 (Utah 1983) (reversing conclusion of law that
an injunction should not issue because it was not supported by
the findings of fact); Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 312 (Utah
1983) (reversing conclusion of law that the plaintiffs
possession was not open and notorious to the extent required by

law because it did "not properly follow from the findings of
fact").
^147 Here, the trial court made numerous factual findings that
indicate that Veralynn, although not an owner of AMS originally,
was a joint purchaser of Cowley's share in the company. For
example, the findings of fact state:
20
At the [June 22, 2002] meeting, the
Porters indicated they wanted to buy o u t . . .
Cowley's interest in A M S . . . .

25. During the evening of June 23, the Cowleys agreed
among themselves that they would accept the buy[] out
terms submitted by the Porters, with certain
changes that Mr. Cowley would submit to the Porters
on June 24th....

31
Both Cowley and the Porters informed Mr. de
Besche that Cowley had agreed to sell out to the
Porters and would leave A M S . . . .

3 3 . . . . Cowley vacated the AMS offices in Midway,
delivering the previous AMS employees, equipment,
stock account, books[,] and premises to the
Porters....

41. On October 21, 2002, the Cowleys demanded that
the Porters bring the payments for the buy[]out of
AMS up to the $10,000/month level
The
Porters said they would consider starting to make
the $10,000/month payments and get back to them.

Page 1235
43. The Porters have paid the Cowleys $4,000/month
from August[] 2002 through the time of trial.

(Emphasis added.) These findings, combined with the undisputed
fact that Veralynn owned fifty percent of QMS when it made the
$4000 per month payments to Cowley and when Cowley transferred
the AMS assets to it as partial performance of the buyout
agreement, indicate that Veralynn, together with Porter,
purchased Cowley's interest in AMS.
If 48 Paragraph 1 of the trial court's conclusions of law
states: "There is no need to judicially dissolve AMS because the
parties entered into an enforceable contract wherein . . .
Porter agreed to buy[]out... Cowley's interest in
A M S . . . . " (Emphasis added.) While it may have struck the trial
court that the two wives should be treated identically, that
conclusion does not logically follow from the findings of fact
entered by the trial court. Consequently, the conclusion of law
that only Porter is in breach is incorrect. We therefore reverse
and remand for the amendment of the judgment to include Veralynn,
as well as Porter.
IV. Attorney Fees
1f 49 Cowley also claims that the trial court erred by not
awarding him attorney fees under Utah Code section 78-27-56.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (2002). We disagree.
U 50 Section 78-27-56 provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n
civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney[] fees
to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or
asserted in good faith." Id. § 78-27-56(1). To award fees under
section 78-27-56, the trial court must make two separate
findings: "that the claim[or defense] is (1) without merit; and
(2) not brought or asserted in good faith." In re Discipline of
Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, If 46, 86 P.3d 712; see also Still
Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46,ffl[9-16, 122 P.3d 556
(reversing award of attorney fees under section 78-27-56 where
trial court did not make separate findings that claim was brought
in bad faith and without merit); Paul deGroot Bldg. Servs.,
L.L.C. v. Gallacher, 2005 UT 20, f 15, 112 P.3d 490 (affirming
trial court's denial of attorney fees under section 78-27-56).
U 51 Despite Cowley's reliance on section 78-27-56, nowhere
does the trial court find that Porter asserted a defense or
brought a claim "without merit" or not "in good faith." Utah Code

Ann. § 78-27-56(1). Indeed, the record indicates that the trial
court rejected Cowley's request for a conclusion of law that
stated: "The defense herein has been without merit and in bad
faith, under [section] 78-27-56...."
]f 52 Furthermore, although the trial court ruled in favor of
Cowley and against Porter after the trial on the merits, that is
not enough to justify an award of fees under section 78-27-56.
See Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3 at f 46, 86 P.3d 712 (stating that
section 78-27-56 "is narrowly drawn and not meant to be applied
to all prevailing parties in all civil suits" (quotations and
citation omitted)). Most relevant to our review of the trial
court's refusal to award fees to Cowley is the trial court's
specific finding that the credibility of both parties was
difficult to ascertain because each had given inconsistent
statements throughout the litigation. Given this finding, and
because "it is within the discretion of the trial court to
determine whether an action is asserted in bad faith," Warner v.
DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, f 21, 20 P.3d 868, we cannot say
the trial court erred by declining to award Cowley his attorney
fees under section 78-27-56.
CONCLUSION
^f 53 Porter was on notice that Cowley claimed the agreed price
of the buyout agreement was $600,000, to be paid at the rate of
$10,000 per month over five years. Under rule 54(c)(1) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court could enter
judgment against Porter for breach of that contract, despite
Cowley's failure to demand such relief in the pleadings. In
addition, the trial court's findings of fact Porter challenges
are not clearly erroneous. The trial court's conclusion that only
Porter contracted to buy
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Cowley's interest does not logically flow from its findings of
fact, and therefore, we reverse and remand for an amendment to
the judgment to add Veralynn. Finally, the trial court did not
err by declining to award Cowley his attorney fees under Utah
Code section 78-27-56. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (2002).
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court in part,
reverse in part, and remand so that the judgment can be amended
to include both Veralynn and Porter.
If 54 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD and GREGORY K. ORME,
Judges.

[fill] When Porter was laid off by 7-Eleven in November 1995, he
became primarily responsible for the daily operations of AMS.
[fn2] Although the trial court did not issue a written decision
setting forth the reasons for dismissing Veralynn, the transcript
of the proceedings states: "I have not seen any evidence that
would indicate that either of the wives .. . had an ownership
interest in [AMS].... And[,] therefore[,][t]he [c]ourt is
going to grant the motion to dismiss
"
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Judge John Anderson

Defendant
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: As it relates to any conversation that either of the Plaintiffs had
with any of the Defendants provide the following:
a. The date of the conversation.
b. Parties to the conversation.
c. The method of conversation, such as to whether is was
telephone, e-mail, in person, etc.
e . What was said by each party.
ANSWER:
8/5/04 Ty Eldridge ("Ty") called Jim Farnsworth ("Jim") using the contact number from Jim's
internet ad about the ranch for sale, 801-404-1898. Ty told Jim that Ty was interested in the ranch.
8/7/04 Ty called Jim, discussed the ranch, Jim gave Ty directions to the ranch.
8/8/04 Jim faxed a map of the ranch to Ty. Ty called Jim to discuss details on the map.
8/9/04 Ty called Jim twice, spoke for about an hour, discussing the property, including water rights,
drinking water quality, taxes, utility costs.
8/10/04 Jessica Farnsworth ("Jessica") faxed Marina Eldridge ("Marina") information on the water
rights. Marina called Jessica and told her the fax was illegible. Jessica said she would mail copies to
the Eldridges.

33

8/12/04 Ty called Jim and made arrangements to view the interior of the ranch house. Ty asked Jim if
he could meet Ty on Sunday 8/15/04. Jim said he was the elder's quorum president and had to teach
a class. Ty asked if one of Jim's brothers could meet me. Jim said he thought they would have
similar problems with church commitments, and that one of his brothers was a bishop. Ty asked
about the realtor, who had a large sign posted at the entrance of the ranch. Jim said he was no longer
under contract to the realtor, and that the realtor was not reliable. Jim said he would give Ty a key to
the ranch house, so Ty could let himself in to inspect the house. Ty also talked to Jim about
genealogy. Ty told Jim that him mother's maiden name was Farnsworth. Jim and Ty determined that
they were related. One of their great grandfathers was Steven Martindale Farnsworth, who crossed
the plains with the Mormons in the 1800s.
8/14/04 Ty and Marina met Jim and Jessica at the Arby's in Heber. The Farnsworths gave the
Eldridges a key to the ranch house along with originals of the faxes Jessica attempted to send o
8/10/04. They discussed more genealogy. Jessica asked if the Eldridges were going to spend the
night in Neola. The Eldridges stated they were just going up for the day. Jessica offered to allow the
Eldridges to stay the night. The Eldridges decline as they had arrangements in Park City.
8/16/04 Ty called Jim. They spoke for about 45 minutes. Ty told Jim that they wanted to make an
offer and asked to include all of the personal property and farm equipment. Jim said that it would be
fine, but that Jim needed to check with his brothers to see if all items were for sale.
8/17/04 Jim called Ty and said that Ty would need to wait until Jim got back from a trip to Mexico
before Ty could make the offer. Jim said he had not spoken to his brothers, but should have an
answer by Saturday, 8/21/04. Jim told Ty he had turned down an offer for $325,000.
8/22/04 Jim called Ty who was at his grandmother's birthday party. Ty made a verbal offer for the
property and all of the personal property and equipment at $330,000. Jim countered with $340,000.
Ty agreed at $340,000. Jim said he would get the paperwork started. Jim said he would provide a
refrigerator because one of the brothers had taken the refrigerator from the ranch house.
8/23/04 Jessica emailed Marina letting the Eldridges know that they were starting on the REPC.
8/24/04 Jim called Ty and informed Ty that some of the items on the ranch would not be included.
Because our offer was for all of the personal property, Marina got upset that the riding mower was
being excluded. Marina called Jim and he verbally agreed to reduce the purchase price of the ranch
by $1000.
8/25/04 Jim faxed the REPC to the Eldridges. Marina called Jim about some minor changes. Jim
agreed to the changes, and amended the REPC.
8/26/04 Jim faxed the amended REPC to the Eldridges.
9/3/04 Ty called Jim and made arrangements to meet him at the property to go over the personal
property and equipment to confirm what would and would not be included.
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9/4/04 The Eldridges along with Aaron Thomson met Jim, Jessica and two of their children at the
ranch in Neola. Jim walked the property with Ty and pointed out a few items of personal property
not included, and explained how the water system worked. Jim recommended to Ty that he obtain a
fence repair tool.
9/9/04 Ty called Jim and informed Jim that the Eldridges were approved for financing of $340,000
through Washington Mutual, but that the funding was limited to the ranch house and one acre,
because the property was a working ranch the underwriter would not waive the acreage clause. Ty
told Jim that he would contact agricultural lenders to get the best rate for the 209 acres working farm.
9/13/04 Ty and Jim on the telephone. Ty told Jim the agricultural lenders would require a large
down payment. Ty said he had other property that could be used as collateral for loans. Jim told Ty
not to do that, as it could be risky. Ty and Jim talked about some form of owner financing, including
the Farnsworths carrying the note for the ranch; having Washington Mutual lend on the house and
acre with the balance on a note; and a lease - purchase option. Ty told Jim that he would rather pay
Jim interest than a bank.
9/19/04 Jim called Ty and said that he had been thinking about the owner financing and that he really
like the idea of the lease option. He compared the lease option to leasing a car. At this point they
discussed the details of how the option would work. Jim told Ty that he would structure it like
standard owner financing but without changing title to Ty name. Jim really liked the lease option
idea because it would not require foreclosure in the event of default. Ty asked Jim about the interest
rate he would give. Jim said he would give a rate better than a bank would charge me but more than
a bank would give Jim for a deposit account. Jim said he felt very comfortable about the lease option
because he knew I really wanted the ranch and that with Ty credit rating and assets we could easily
fulfill the lease option. Jim would be making a good rate of interest on his money. Ty liked the lease
option because it would allow him to do a 1031 exchange, possibly saving Ty tax liability.
9/20/04 Jim called Ty and they spoke for 16 minutes. Jim said he had talked to a friend who said that
with a lease option no portion of the lease payment could apply against principle. Ty told Jim that it
was possible for some of the payment to apply to principle. They agreed to do more research on the
topic and get back together.
9/21/04 Jim called Ty and they spoke for 54 minutes. Jim and Ty had learned that a portion of the
lease payment could apply to principle, and that they could structure payments like a loan. Jim
offered Ty a three year lease option at 5 7/8% with 10% down. Ty was not happy with the rate, and
stated he thought 5% would be fair. Jim said he would check with his brothers and get back to Ty.
9/26/04 Jim called Ty and gave him two more offers for the lease option. The first required 10%
down, $1500.00 per month with nothing going towards the principle; the second required 10% down,
$1725.00 per month with $250 going towards the principle. Each required that Ty pay the taxes,
water fees, utilities and insurance. Each allowed prepayment of the balance before the end of the
third year.
9/27/04 Jim called Ty to see which offer he preferred. Ty had calculated that both offers were for
more than 5%. Ty countered with an offer of 10% down, payments of $1675 per month with 25% of
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the payment going for principle, and the remaining requirements being the same as Jim's offer. Jim
agreed that they were very close, and was pleased with the higher payment amount over Jim's second
offer. Jim stated he needed to review this with his brothers and would get back to Ty.
9/28/04 Jim called Ty and accepted the offer. Jim said that since he was not getting his interest rate
that he wanted to make a side deal. Jim wanted to run 5 horses on the ranch while Ty was leasing it.
Ty agreed, stating that they like the idea of animals on the property. Jim asked Ty if Jim could draw
up the lease option agreement. Ty stated that he had a copy of such an agreement, and will fill it in
and Jim could revise it if needed.
10/5/04 Jim called Ty and asked if Ty had sent the lease option for him to review. Ty said he would
send it ASAP.
10/7/04 Jim called Ty. Jim said the lease option had not arrived. Ty told Jim that he had been very
busy and had not gotten it out yet. They talked about additional terms and agreed that the personal
property would be purchased separately. That way if there was a default, Ty could keep the
equipment and the Farnsworths would not need to worry about the condition of the equipment. Jim
stated that a friend who was going to help Jim review the lease option was going out of town on a
fishing trip. Jim wanted the friend to review the lease option and told Ty to hurry and send it.
10/9/04 Jim called Ty and left a message on Ty's phone and asked if the deal was off because he had
not seen any information about the equipment purchase. Ty called Jim and told Jim to check the
envelope. Jim found the agreement for the equipment in the envelope. Jim took some time to review
the documents. Jim called back and stated that the grace period for payment was only 3 days, and
that Jim though they should change that to 30 days. Ty agreed to the change. Jim also noted that the
start date was not until November 1, 2004. Ty said that was just a logical date to start the lease
option period, but that Ty wanted to complete the deal as soon as possible. Jim agreed. Jim stated
that he thought 10% of $339,000 was $39,000. Ty corrected him and said it was actually $33,900,
but that Ty rounded up to $34,000 on the lease option document. They agreed to make it $34,000.
Between 10/9 -16/04 Ty made a number of calls for Jim, who did not answer his phone. Ty left
messages for Jim to call Ty.
10/16/04 Jim called Ty and said that he had been in the hills for a few days. Ty asked Jim for a key
to the ranch house, as Ty's parents wanted to see the property Ty was buying. Jim said he would
leave the key under his planter for Ty, as Jim would be at stake conference. Jim gave Ty directions
to his house. Ty told Jim that he had not received any information from the title company yet. Jim
asked what Ty needed, and Ty responded with information about easements and other title
information. Jim said that Ty had not gotten anything from them because Jim had cancelled the
closing because they were doing the lease option. Jim told Ty he had an abstract on the ranch that his
father had acquired some years before. Jim said he would leave the abstract with the key, if he could
find the abstract. Jim also told Ty to contact an escrow company to handle the payments for the lease
option. Ty agreed. Jim asked if Ty had noticed the horse exercise equipment at the ranch. Jim said
his father had promised the equipment to a lady before he died, and Jim thought it might have been
removed from the ranch after his father had died, as Jim did not recall seeing it at his last visit. Ty
said he had seen it and would check on it at his next visit to the ranch. Jim said he was going to sell
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some of the horses on the ranch. Ty asked to purchase a horse, but did not have a way to care for it
over the winter. Jim said that a horse could live year around on the ranch without human care. Ty
was surprised by this information. Ty offered to buy one of the horses. Jim offered to sell Ty the
white horse for $500, and that the horse was well broken for riding. Jim asked if I wanted the paper
work for the horse, which Jim could get for an additional $1300.00. Ty responded that he did not see
a need for the papers. Jim said he would make up a bill of sale for the horse, put it in his wallet and
give to Ty the next time they met.
10/17/04 Ty called Jim from the ranch and asked how to turn off the porch light.
10/21/04 Ty left message on Jim's phone stating Ty needed the final lease option signed to get
escrow started.
10/22/04 Ty left message on Jim's phone that Ty needed the final lease option signed for escrow, and
that Ty wanted to work on the old homestead.
10/24/04 Jim called Ty. Aaron and Marina were with Ty at the ranch doing work on the old ranch
house. Jim said he hoped that they had gone ahead and gone to the ranch and had worked on the
ranch house and that he had been out of town that week in California. Ty told Jim that they were at
the ranch, and that they had been repairing the house. Jim said he would contact Ty during the week
to set up a date to close.
10/26/04 Jim called Ty and left a message that he had called. Ty called Jim back Jim said he was
going in to talk to his friend in St. George to finish the lease option agreement. Jim wanted to add a
few things to the agreement, including a clause prohibiting the removal of the corrals, adding detail
as to which bills Ty would be responsible for, and a clause allowing the Farnsworths to sell the note.
They discussed insurance, Jim wanted to be named as a beneficiary. Ty said he had talked to his
agent, who said that Ty could only qualify for renter's insurance. They agreed that Jim would insure
the property, but that Ty would make the payments. They agreed to sign and settle up on the least
option on 10/28/04.
10/28/04 Ty called Jim at 2:50 P.M. to get directions and time to close. Jim did not answer. Ty
called 4 more times over the next 4 hours. Jim called back at 10:23 P.M. Jim said there was a
problem with a realtor contract that they had come across earlier that evening. Jim said the property
had been colisted with Alan Wade. Mr. Wade used the MLS but Mr. Wilkerson, the realtor in
Duchesne did not. Jim said the contract with Wade should have been for 6 months, but that it
actually stated 12 months. Jim said he would just lease Ty the property until the contract expired if
the realtor would not honor the spirit of their deal. Jim told Ty to not worry, and that Jim would get
the problem solved.
10/29/04 Ty called Jim at 12:26, the phone was picked up, and then immediately hung up. Ty called
back and Jim answered, saying he was busy and would call back. At 12:56 Jim called Ty. Jim said
they had not made any progress with the realtor. Ty offered to pay half of the realtor's commission.
Jim said his brothers would not take any less than we had agreed upon. Ty then offered to pay the
full fee and close this day. Jim stated he did not feel the realtor should get any commission because
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the realtor's contract was supposed to be for 6 months. Jim said he wanted the realtor issue resolved
before he closed the deal on the lease option.
Ty told Jim that they had shut down their business on Saturday 10/30/04 and planned to
spend the weekend at the ranch. Jim said to go ahead, but no do much work. Ty asked since they
were willing to pay the entire realtor fee, why should they not feel free to do 'much work.' Jim
stated that he felt bad about all of the promises he had made and did not want to make any more. Ty
asked Jim if there were other problems of which Ty was not aware. Jim said there were not any other
problems. Ty then asked Jim if Jim had problems about their deal. Jim stated that there were none
he was aware of. Ty said if there are no other problems, we are ready to close today and pay the
extra money to the realtors. Jim said to just wait until the problem was resolved and just go to the
ranch and relax.
10/30/04 The Eldridges, Aaron Thomson, and Jim, David, David's son and Gregory' s son (all
Famsworths) were all at the ranch. David and his son removed the lawn mower, which was agreed to
be excluded from the sale. David and Ty discussed deer hunting and trespassing. David explained
about land owner permits. Jim came and loaded the pale horse. Ty asked about breeding the white
horse. Jim said he would breed it for free, if Ty brought the horse to Lake Shore. Ty offered a
check to Jim for the horse. Jim refused, and said that they could do it at the same time when they
closed on the lease, within the next 7 to 10 days.
While Jim was loading some personal property which was agreed to be exempt from the sale,
he asked Marina if she wanted a box of books. Marina declined, and Jim said he would take them for
a private library he wanted for his home. Jim told Marina that he was going to contact an attorney on
Monday the 1st of November about the realtor commission problem.
Ty asked Jim if he would show Ty how to turn off the water. Jim agreed, they took some
ATV's and Jim showed Ty how to shut down the water system. While showing Ty main valve, Jim
mentioned that the upper main pond valve would not shut off completely. He said the valve seemed
to be getting worse and that Ty should replace it in the next year or two. Jim recommended using a
planetary gear valve. Ty had earlier stated his intention to run some cattle on the ranch. Jim told Ty
to start them on Ty's Mountain Green property. Ty said that was a good idea, but that the Mountain
Green property was not fenced.
Aaron and Ty pointed out some personal property items to Jim which had been agreed to be
excluded which were still on the property. They helped load them. Jim thanked them. Jim asked Ty
if he liked the view. Ty said he did. Jim then asked if it was worth $400,000. Ty said he thought it
might be. As Jim was leaving, he commented that everyone was mad at him. Ty asked why. Jim
said that some guy wanted to make an offer on the property, but Jim told him it was already sold. Jim
stated he told the guy to hurry up and make an offer because the ranch sold two days ago. Ty was
confused at this statement, but thought it was why everyone was mad at him - because he said it was
already sold.
11/5/04 Ty called Jim, left message to call.
11/8/04. Jim called Ty. Ty asked Jim if he had any good news. Jim said no. Ty asked if he had any
news. Jim said he needed to call so he could sleep better. Jim said he received an offer for $400,000
after our contract had expired. Jim told Ty that if he had received the lease option before his friend
went on the fishing trip that he would have had the deal complete before this new offer came in. Jim
told Ty to just wait and see what happened. Jim said these deals fall through all of the time. Ty told
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him that he would do what ever it took to get the ranch. Jim was surprised by this statement. Jim
said it might be too late that he might have already signed the paperwork. Ty told Jim the ranch was
worth the extra money. Jim told Ty he would call his brothers and see what they could do. Ty asked
if the realtors were involved in the new offer. Jim said yes. Ty asked if he still had to pay 3% if Ty
bought the ranch. Jim said he had not checked. Ty offered $388,000, which was the difference
between the $400,000 and the amount of commission difference between Ty's offer and the new
offer. Jim hung up. Jim called back and said if Ty could come up with $390,000 cash within two
days, plus more for the personal property and equipment, that Ty could still buy the property.
11/12/04 Jim called Ty. They discussed the situation on the property. Ty told Jim that he was very
upset about what Jim had done to him. Ty told Jim that the paper work on the lease option was only
a formality, and that Ty considered that they had made a deal when they agreed to the terms weeks
before. Not only was the lease option a deal, but the right for Jim to run 5 horses, selling Ty the
white horse, and Jim breeding the horse. Ty told Jim that he felt betrayed. Ty explained that he
thought it was unfair for Jim to pull the rug out from underneath him, especially since they were
cousins. Ty also said it was unfair because he could have come up with the cash had Jim actually
wanted the cash. Ty explained that they had become emotionally attached to the property. Jim said
he was attached to the ranch, because it had been his father's. Jim then told Ty that he met the realtor
when he was leaving the ranch on October 30, 2004. Ty asked Jim how he felt about the situation.
Jim said he could see Ty's side. Ty repeated the question, but Jim did not answer. Ty told him that
he could see Jim's side, and that $61,000 was a lot of money. Ty said that a lot of people would do
the same thing Jim had done, but that it was the wrong thing to do. Jim told Ty that if he was not
going to come up with the $390,000 then Jim would sell the property to the other guy. Ty advised
him against doing so. Jim apparently realized Ty had consulted with an attorney and got mad, and
that Ty had been wasting Ty's time and that he was glad that he had not sold the ranch to Ty.
12/10/04 Ty called Jim. Ty told Jim that when he filed the complaint he also filed a lis pendens and a
temporary restraining order. Jim was surprised and asked what a lis pendens was. I told him that it
let the world know that there was litigation pending concerning the ranch. We discussed the lawsuit.
Jim denied making a sub-deal about the 5 horses. Jim promised to return Ty's weed eater. Ty asked
if he could get Jim's word on returning the weed eater. Jim said he would give his word. Jim also
stated that if he ever gave his word on a deal he would honor it. Ty asked who was buying the ranch.
Jim said that Ty would not believe who it was, but said he would not disclose until the sale was
closed. Jim then said Gerald Wilkerson was in on the deal.
Jim called back and threatened to sue Ty if he did not lift the lis pendens.

INTERROGATORY NO. 2: As it relates to your allegation in paragraph 6 of the First Amended Complaint, set forth in detail each and every demand that was made, including what
was said and the date of the demand.
Answer: See Interrogatory number 1, dates of 10/22, 10/24, 10/26, 10/28, 10/29/04.
On 11/9/04 Ty caused a demand letter to be sent to the Defendants.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Set f o r t h all facts that support your allegations in paragraph
14 of t h e First Amended Complaint.
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Answer: See Interrogatory number 1 beginning with 9/13/04. On 10/8/04 the lease
option consisting of three pages was sent via U.S. Mail to Jim.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4 : Set forth each promise and assertion you claim that was made by
the Defendants that was untrue and intentionally or knowingly misleading and any other facts
that support your allegations in paragraph 7 of the First Amended Complaint.
Answer: Plaintiffs respond that the untrue and misleading facts include the following:
Defendants promises that they preferred the lease option over regular financing; Defendants
promises that they would close on the lease option; that Defendants would provide a better
financing rate than available through a bank; that Defendants would close on 10/28/04;
Defendants implied promises that Plaintiffs no longer needed to obtain conventional
financing; that the contracts with the realtors were expired; that there were problems with the
realtors which prevented Defendants from closing; that Defendants would sell the white
horse for $500; that Defendants would provide a copy of an abstract on the property; that
Plaintiffs need not purchase the horse on 10/30/04 and that the parties could close all within
7-10 days; that Defendants would contact an attorney to resolve the problem with the realtor;
and that Plaintiffs could purchase the property after 11/8/04 for $390,000.
Regarding allegations of paragraph 7, see Interrogatory number 1, for 11/8/04.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: State forth in detail each and every contact you had with any
person or entity, other than the Defendants including title companies, real estate agents, and
other third parties regarding the real property in Neola, which is subject of this action. Identify
that party, the date of the contact and what was said or done in the contact.
Answer:
8/8/04 An unnamed Neola resident at a convenience store about water rights and shares;
and drinking water.
8/16/04 Plaintiff spoke to Carolyn at the water company regarding class F water rights,
fees and other information on the telephone. She stateed that BIA or Indian water was the best.
8/18/04 Uintah Basin Standard about area and information to subscribe to local
newspapers on telephone.
Prior to 8/23/04 telephone contact with Washington Mutual Bank regarding a loan on the
property.
About 8/23/04 telephone contact with Dava Jensen about other property we own that we
could sell for a 1031 exchange on purchase of the ranch.
About 9/9/04 Plaintiff called Fern at Basin Land Title, requested information on
easements and history of the ranch title.
9/9/04 Plaintiff called Century 21 realtor requesting information on Sundance Ranch.
9/9/04 Plaintiff called Duchesne County recorder to order plat maps of ranch surrounding
property.
9/9/04 Plaintiff called Washington Mutual, they informed Plaintiff that financing was
cleared for the amount of $340,000 but that they would only loan against the house and one acre.
9/9; 9/10 and 9/13/04 calls and visits to Zions Bank, Wells Fargo, Western Ag Credit,
and FSA regarding terms and rates on agricultural loans.
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9/15/04 Jennes Eldridge email about ranch that is cool.
9/15/04 Ty to Jennes sent pictures of Neola ranch.
9/18/04 Jennes email to Ty, "looks cool, good luck." referring to Neola ranch.
9/19/04 Plaintiffs talked to Joe Garfield, Aaron Thomson, Yvonne and Dave Kennison,
that Jim offered the lease purchase option, and that Ty wanted to help out with Joe's farm for
experience.
9/20/04 Marina called Jen at Washington Mutual to cancel loan.
9/20/04 Ty responded to email from his brother Jennes Eldridge about ranch in Neola,
referring to internet link to ranch. "Looks like I will be getting it."
10/8/04 Ty talked to Wilkinson Fabrication for metal roofing to reroof the old milk barn
on the ranch. Aaron Thomson helped load the roofing and store it on Mountain Green property.
Joe Garfield and Aaron help load foam insulation for the ranch house.
10/17/04 Dave & Yvonne Kennison, Gretchen Kalie, Mekel, Lindsey Richards and
Plaintiffs were all at ranch to show it off.
10/18/04 Ty called Escrow Specialists concerning payments on the lease option for the
ranch.
10/18/04 Plaintiff spoke with Debbie Weaver in person at a title company about doing
lease options.
10/24/04 Plaintiffs spoke in person with Kent and Treena Bastian regarding history of
ranch; allowing 5 horses on the ranch, about ranch equipment. Bastians stated that Jim told them
to have their cattle off the ranch by November 1, 2004 because the ranch was sold. Plaintiffs told
the Bastians they could leave their animals on the ranch, and they could work out the details the
following week. Discussed the terms of the Bastian lease with Defendants. Discussed land
prices, hunters and trespassers.
10/22/04 Plaintiff Marina talked to Yvonne Kennison about getting a fence mender for
the ranch as a birthday gift for Ty. Marina and Yvonne went to CAL Ranch Supply to get stuff
for the ranch for Ty's birthday.
On or before 10/26/04, Plaintiffs spoke with Jim Manning, AMP AC Insurance about
insurance on the ranch and dangers of haunta virus.
10/27/04 Jenness called Ty to wish him a happy birthday. Ty told Jenness the details on
the lease option and that it would be closing the next day on 10/18/04.
10/28/04 Plaintiff spoke with Larson Saw Mill, Turner Lumber and Basin Building
Supply to get lumber and materials to repair the ranch house.
10/28/04 Plaintiffs spoke with Debbie Weaver and Adam Phillips at American Secure
Title regarding the things needed to protect themselves when signing the lease option agreement.
10/28/04 Plaintiff spoke with Jolene Carter, 1st National Bank of Morgan, regarding
notarization of the lease option agreement.
10/28/04 Plaintiffs cancel annual snowmobile trip to McCall, Idaho and invite Jennes and
Natasha Eldridge to spend time with Plaintiffs at the ranch.
10/29/04 Plaintiffs spoke with Jeremy Kopp, a realtor, to check the MLS to see if the
ranch had been listed on the MLS.
10/30/04 Plaintiffs visited a furniture store in Roosevelt looking for a refrigerator for the
ranch, also spoke with R.C. Willey about delivery to Neola.
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10/30/04 Plaintiffs visited JP Saddle in Neola about ordering western saddles, bits and
tack for the white horse. Also talked about Wilford Farnsworth's ranch.
11/8/04 Plaintiffs spoke in person with Brian Gunn about financing for the ranch.
11/9/04 Plaintiffs spoke in person with Alvin R. Lundgren about the problems regarding
the ranch purchase.
11/12/04 Plaintiffs visited Duchesne County recorder for maps of the ranch area, file the
complaint and lis pendens.
11/22/04 Plaintiffs telephoned American National Bank president Ted Ware about
financing on the ranch.
11/22/04 Plaintiffs telephone Western Agricultural Credit for long term rates on loan for
ranch.
12/10/04 Ty telephoned Basin Land Title. They said John would call back about the
ranch matter.
12/20/04 Ty called John at Basin Land Title.
INTERROGATORY NO 6: Set forth all facts showing that the Plaintiffs followed the
requirements of the Real Estate Purchase Contract to close the transaction on or before
October 24, 2004.
Response: On 8/22/04 Plaintiff made an offer on the property; Defendants countered,
and Plaintiff accepted the counter offer. On 8/23/04 Plaintiffs applied for a loan with
Washington Mutual. Defendants prepared the REPC, which was signed by Plaintiff on 8/23/04.
9/9/04 Plaintiffs contacted Zions Bank, Wells Fargo, FSA and Western Ag Credit for financing.
Then on 9/19/04 Defendant told Plaintiff that they preferred a lease option agreement. In
reliance on Defendants assertions, Plaintiffs ceased seeking conventional financing. Plaintiffs
contacted Defendant several times seeking to close on or near October 24, 2004 (see
Interrogatory number 1).
INTERROGATORY NO 7: As to any request to admit that has been denied, set forth in
detail the facts that support the denial of that request.
Admission Number 2. Plaintiffs tendered the purchase price in their letter of about
November 9, 2004 to Defendants; and have repeated that offer in court on or about
November 29, 2004.
Admission Number 3. Plaintiffs had a line of credit sufficient to purchase the
property through the American National Bank. Plaintiffs could have and would have
obtained conventional financing had Defendants not opted for the lease option on the
property.
Admission Number 4. Plaintiffs and Defendants agreed to change the terms and
conditions of the August 24, 2004 contract. Plaintiffs at all times wanted to acquire the
property, either by purchase or lease option, or other terms as may have been agreeable
between the parties. At no time did Plaintiffs desire or intend to abandon their interest in the
property. Plaintiffs repeatedly told the Defendants that they wanted to acquire the property
by any means necessary.

42

Admission Number 5. The parties discussed various terms of the lease option
agreement. Defendants agreed to close on the negotiated terms of the lease option on
10/28/04.
Admission Number 7. Plaintiffs did not demand the return of the earnest money
check.
Admission Number 8. Plaintiffs received the earnest money check, but it was not sent
to them at their request.
Dated:
Ty Eldridge

Marina Eldridge

REQUEST TO PRODUCE
1. Copies of all telephone records including cell phone and facsimile showing any contact
between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants, or any other party regarding the real property that is
subject to this action.
Plaintiffs object to this request as being vague, overbroad, and unclear. Without
waiving those objections, see attached Bates Stamp numbers 000001 - 000052; 00010000130.
2 . Copies of all e-mails, letters, or any other form of communication between the Plaintiffs,
the Defendants, and any other party regarding the real property that is the subject of this
action, or the issues raised in the First Amended Complaint.
Plaintiffs object to this request as being vague, overbroad, and unclear. Without
waiving those objections, see attached Bates Stamp numbers 000053 - 000100; 000131140
3. Copies of all documents submitted to or received from lending companies regarding
obtaining financing for the real property that is the subject of this lawsuit.
Plaintiffs object to this request as being vague, overbroad, and unclear. Without
waiving those objections, see attached Bates Stamp numbers 000101 - 00109
4 . Produce any tape recordings, notes, diary entries, computer entries or any other information
or documentation supporting any of the claims in the First Amended Complaint or regarding
any of the conversations between the parties.
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Plaintiffs object to this request as being vague, overbroad, and unclear. Without
waiving those objections, see enclosed CD labeled Audio; Audio 2; and DVD labeled Ranch
B-Day 10-17-04 10-27-04
Dated March 23,2005
Alvin R. Lundgren
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5105WOLDHWYSTE200

JOANNE McKEE, CLERK
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DEPUTY
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BY

TEL (801) 876-4422
Fax (801) 876-4411
Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH
TY ELDRIDGE and MARTINA
ELDRIDGE
Plaintiffs

COMPLAINT
BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR SALE
OF REAL PROPERTY

v.

CASE NO O^OtOOcTtf

JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY
FARNSWORTH

JUDGE ^S'^-.fCnJjUt^Y^^

Defendant
Plaintiffs Ty and Martina Eldridge appear through counsel Alvin R. Lundgren and allege
as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs are husband and wife, residents of Morgan County, Utah.

2.

Defendant James L. Farnsworth is a resident of Weber County, Utah.

3.

Defendants David Farnsworth and Gregory Farnsworth have unknown residences.

4.

The parties entered into a contract for the purchase of real property located in Duchesne
County, Utah on August 24,2004 ("Contract"). The property is described as 280 acres
with 120 shares of water located at approximately 4143 West 6885 North, Neola, Utah
("Property").

5.

The Contract by its terms (paragraph 24) requires that "time is of the essence."

6.

The time set forth in the Contract to close, October 24,2004, has passed.

7.

Demand was made but Defendant refused to close on the property.

8.

Defendant repudiated the Contract and advised Plaintiffs that he had entered into an
agreement to sell the property to another buyer.

9.

Plaintiffs at all times were ready willing and able to consummate the Contract.

10.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction against Defendants from selling the property,
because of the unique nature of the property, and because the property cannot be replaced
and money damages may not be an adequate remedy.

11.

Plaintiffs are entitled to their damages as proven at trial, including attorney fees and costs.

WHEREFORE
Plaintiffs pray this Court enter an order mandating Defendants to sell the property
pursuant to the terms in the Contract; enjoining them from selling the Property to any other party;
for their damages as proven at trial; for their attorney fees and costs; and such other relief as this
Court deems reasonable and fair.
Dated: November 12,2004
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30.

Plaintiffs were damaged in their reliance on Defendants through the loss of the right to
acquire the property.

31.

Defendants profited from their misrepresentations by obtaining a significantly greater
purchase price, all to Plaintiffs' detriment.

32.

The doctrine offraudprovides that a perpetrator of afraudshould not benefit from his
misrepresentation, and the Defendants should be ordered to perform under the original
agreement or the lease option.

33.

The doctrine of waiver provides that the Defendants waived their right to conventional
financing by telling the Plaintiffs that they preferred a lease option. The Defendants
should be ordered to complete and perform the lease option.

34.

The doctrine of estoppel provides that the Defendants cannot refuse to complete the lease
option when Plaintiffs reasonably relied on their promises.

35.

The doctrine of promissory estoppel has been extended to those cases concerned with the
statute offrauds,where the promise as to future conduct constitutes the intended
abandonment of an existing right of the promissor.

36.

Here the Plaintiffs relied on the abandonment of the right of the Defendants to a
conventionally financed sale for the lease option. The Defendants cannot refuse to
complete the lease option because they received a second offer so long as the Plaintiffs
are desirous and capable of completing the transaction as contemplated.

37.

Based on these principles the Plaintiffs are entitled to close on the property on the terms
and conditions set forth in the lease option. Although the Defendants did not execute the
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lease option, the terms are sufficiently complete to form an enforceable agreement. Any
missing or incomplete terms can be supplemented or reformed by this court.
38.

Wherefore this Court should order the Defendants to enter into, complete and honor the
lease option agreement or alternately allow the Plaintiffs to complete the purchase
agreement with conventional financing.

39.

Plaintiffs are entitled to their attorney fees and costs.
ALTERNATE RECOVERY

40.

Alternately, it is unconscionable for the Defendants to profit from their intentional deceit.

41.

Plaintiffs should be awarded damages of not less than the difference between the
purchase price the Defendants agreed to acceptfromthe Plaintiffs and the purchase price
accepted with the second buyers.

42.

Defendants should be punished for their deceit by not only surrendering their ill gotten
gains, and by a grant of punitive damages against Defendants.

43.

Plaintiffs have been required to retain counsel to protect their interest. Defendants should
be ordered to pay Plaintiffs' attorney fees and costs.

WHEREFORE
Plaintiffs pray this Court enter an order
1.

Mandating Defendants to sell the property pursuant to the terms in the Contract;

2.

Enjoining them from selling the Property to any other party;

3.

For their damages as proven at trial;

4.

For their attorney fees and costs;
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5.

In the alternate that the Court grant judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the
Defendants in such amount to be proven at trial is reasonable compensation for the
damages, actual, consequential and incidental, sustained by Plaintiffs

6.

Together with punitive damages to prevent these Defendants and other so situated from
engaging in such conduct and

7.

Such other relief as this Court deems reasonable and fair.
Dated: January 20,2005
dvinR,
CERTIFICATION

I, certify that I am over age 18, not a party to the foregoing, and that a true and correct
copy of the FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT was sent postage prepaid to the below listed
persons on January 20, 2005
Clark Allred
363 East Main St Ste 201
Vernal, Utah 84066

Alvin R. Lum
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ALVIN R LUNDGREN (#5506)
ALVIN R LUNDGREN, L C
5105WOLDHWYSTE200

c-KEE, CLERK

MT. GREEN, UT 84050

TEL (801) 876-4422
Fax (801) 876-4411
Attorney for Plaintiffs

-.DEPUTY

IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH
TY ELDRIDGE and MARTINA
ELDRIDGE

ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM
CASE NO 040800079

Plaintiffs
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON
v.

JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY
FARNSWORTH
Defendant
Plaintiffs Ty and Martina Eldridge appear through counsel Alvin R. Lundgren and
ANSWER the Counterclaim as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs admit Counterclaim paragraph 1.

2.

Plaintiffs admit Counterclaim paragraph 2, and further answer that the contract placed
duties on both parties to perform.

3.

Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 3.

4.

Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 4.

5.

Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 5.

6.

Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 6.

7.

Plaintiffs admit Counterclaim paragraph 7.

8.

Plaintiffs admit Counterclaim paragraph 8.
1

9.

Plaintiffs deny that Counterclaim paragraph 9 is the statement of the Court, and state that
the Court record speaks for itsself.

10.

Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 10.

11.

Plaintiffs deny the inferences of Counterclaim paragraph 11 and admit only that they have
not removed the lis pendens.

12.

Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 12.

13.

Plaintiffs admit Counterclaim paragraph 13 to the extent that Defendants requested that
the lis pendens be removed.

14.

Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 14 that they have removed a request for specific
performance.

15.

Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 15, and state by specific allegation that Plaintiffs
still desire to purchase the property.

16.

Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 16.

17.

Plaintiffs admit Counterclaim paragraph 17.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

1.

Defendants have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

2.

The agreements between the parties, including the contract of August 2004 and
amendments thereto create an enforceable contract and preclude the right of Defendants
to raise their counterclaim.

3.

The Defendants are still bound to the agreements between the parties based on the
doctrines of promissory estoppel, laches, detrimental reliance, negligent
misrepresentation, and fraud.
2

4.

Plaintiffs agreed to fully perform the terms of the August 2004 contract.

5.

Plaintiffs tendered full performance of the terms of the August 2004 contract.

6.

Defendants' own conduct excuses Plaintiffs from the strict performance of the August
2004 contract without amendments.

7.

Defendants' own conduct prevented the Plaintiffs from strict performance of the August
2004 contract.

8.

Defendants' anticipatory repudiation of the strict terms of the August 2004 contract,
together with their statements inducing reliance by the Plaintiffs formed an amended
contract which is enforcable.

9.

Defendants are not entitled to retention of the earnest money deposit because of their acts
misleading the Plaintiffs.

10.

Defendants knew that the Plaintiffs would perform either the strict terms of the August
2004 contract or the amended terms, however, Defendants' greed led them to conspire
against the Plaintiffs when Defendants learned they could sell the property for more
money.

11.

Plaintiffs renew and reassert their right to specific performance. The amended complaint
set forth additional causes of action, and was not a dismissal of the earlier causes of
action.

12.

Defendants appear with unclean hands and are not entitled to the relief they request.

13.

Defendants' conduct constitutes a waiver of their right to terminate the agreements
between the Plaintiffs and Defendants.

3

Dated: March 14, 2005

a

Alvin R. Lumfefi
CERTIFICATION
I, certify that I am over age 18, not a party to the foregoing, and that a true and correct
copy of the PLAINTIFFS ANSWER TO THE DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM TO
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT was sent postage prepaid to the below listed
persons on March 14,2005
Clark Allred
363 East Main St Ste 201
Vernal, Utah 84066

Alvin R:
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REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
This hi atooaJiybinding contract. Utah ia» roquiras rsa! asfcite U C M M K to * * I h t etam-&*er and Setter, howswir, * * y sg*e«toalter or daiete
its proviskHta or to U N * dHfrrwrt fwm. .1 /ou M i * * j * * : lax advice, coreufl /our attorney or tax advisor
p EARNEST JIIONCr n e C S P T ^ __

j

p,^
} V j K C ^ > ^ M c L v - y ^ L - ' r H f ^ i i ^ J ' . ' ^ ^ ' ^ f t t ^ j b pugj-ase the Property
described beicw
^eicvv ate
ate aeceby
oeceby fivers
fivers to
tome
tne Brokerage,
Brcter&ge,as
as Carnes:
Carnes; Money,
Money, tne
tr ancunt cf 5 j ^ O Q Q — j n the rorm of
r;-W t^sXC
oftthis offer by ail parties (as defined in Section 23),
£) v v ^ o v-*A.. csW
which, jpon Acceptance of
»d in arardance with statetaw.,^ff** j ,
shS
Recced by % 1 ' A U ^ W ^ LAv^Tllt, ^ J & f W b n
{Date)
% (Signatxire af Ag*naBn>ker acknowledge* receipt or £arr.est Money)
BTOKerage: _ _ _ ^ J S
PhcittNumow
9 * *
OFFSRTOl PURCHASE
\
/
: Q' " \

1. •

^

^

^

^

^

I^OSWTTM

^ Mr^W l ^ * - U H O

*so described « M [ H * \ ^ ^ ^ \ o ^ g S T f . S v V L
'_
^
Cj-y r* ^As
fc6\o^
County cfV)v*oV> * * > > « state c t uiah. Z)p^-K£3 (the T^operty").
1.1 Included Items, Unlesi excluded bsrelr., *::s sale rndudei tf~ f oSoiVirig '-am* *{ presently attacrsd to the Prooerty:
plumbing, hearing, atf cendi^aningftsure*enc equipment oeiling fans: *s.isr s-.eete.-: txna-m spctiarces;ttgntfixtures ans
bulbs; bathrcom futures; curtains, drapertes and ;ccs; wrec* &£ door screens: storm deers a^d windows: w».r*Jcw si'nds;
awntoas; instatedtelevisionantenra: sated&e dishes and system pe/nvinsnily sffasd carpe-is: sificrr.sfcccarace croor opener
and acccmpMyfciE transmitters);fencing;ere tees and shrubs. The foticwinc items shsa also be ir.rii.ded ir. this sale end
conveyed under separate S3* of Sate with 'warranties as :c tale;
_ — _ —
AJt Excluded items. The fciic^inater^ are sxc&dedfr<V?*¥* » * :

W^o W

Y<\ONW

Q\MF**X~C

* cUj^)v^

1.3 Water Rights. Thefcjfcwingwsie/rt^sare inc:L<dee: in this « &
(*C

OrM^LFK>-»

( S O 3XX)

, 'v
\ > > o *r±~~^i+*

f\ ^ J ^ ^ c ^ K A ^
'

_

1.4 Survey. (Check appUcafiia boxes)' A survey [ } WILL J«£W!LL NOT be prepared by a licensee sprayer. The
Sur/ey WorK w3l be: [ ] Prcperty comers staked I ] Boundary Survey [ ] Bouncary & Imorovements survey [ 1 Other
(spedfyL- Responsibilityforpayment [ ] Buyer [ } Seller { ] 5uyer and Setter share equally. Buyers
obOsaSen to purchase under this Contract [ j IS [ ] IS NOT csnc&onfcd upon Buyer's aparcvai cf the Surrey Wc*. If yes.
the terrnsaK^e attached Survey Addendum apply.
^\A*^
Ct
~r\!~
j
i
.
*
*
*
_
'Z'ZCt
ftKf^&y
**
f)(T~
2. PURCHASE PRICE. The pLichaaaPriceformePrcpeny is S ' : y = * ^ T ^ g 1 ^
" ->%> I ^ C u ^ *y
tA Method of Payment Tne Purchase Ptice wtil be paid as follows:
S_l\ ° ^ ^ >
^
$ ^^tO'ao

$ ~
~
^ ~-. "
>
$ _ Z Z Z r r r _
S ^ ^ f ^ ^

3

^

Pa^e t of (; pages

(a) Ezniest Money Depoait Under certain conditicn** deacxibed in Ais Contract, THIS
DEPOSIT WAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE.
(b) New Low* 3uyeragrsaK *o app-u fcr 3 «ew Ic^.i a* pirwcrf Ir Sec^ci 2.3. auyerwiR sppry •'cr
one or mora of the following leans: f ] CONVENTIONAL I f >MA I ]Vy^
J^OTHER{specfy} C ^ v ^ u t ^ ^ A i ^
J
If an FHA/VA loan applies, see attached FKAA/A L oan Addendum.
If the loan istoincaide any particular terms, then cneck be-low urn give derails:
[ I SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS
J
(c) Loan Assumption (s^e aztachefS *5.5u*npacn AcScandtm if accLcabie)
<d) Selfer Ffnandnn 'see atsached 5e!**r ^nanrrc Adcectcum dr appiicaoie}
{e) Other {specify)
(f) Balance of Purchase Ffice /n Cash at SettUrnent
PURCHASE PR1C5L Total of Srw (a) tnrough Jf)
S^tter*$ tttfttafa^f^ ^

U*

Date 5 / ^ / ^

euyer's initials Z 7 ^ '

Date

^/^l/o^

7 /

P^nxi * : £ j - R^al Estate Purshw*C^tr^-.i - £*m Piiodng, !r.c. rn.. 3fll-i77.363fl

M4.<ui

* u 9 . 2b 2004 l i : 4 2 A M F2

FPK NO.

FROM

f ?n

"

2-3

S)CiS S ^ c ^
* condtaonad uocn fc*ar quaUfyms for * e applicatje!ban(s)
la)
S ~ S c e d "Section 2.-&) or (c) (the W )
Thia a n d * * k ratanad to as ^ . . ^ « ^ J ^ £ :
9 ,
(b) t ] Buyer's eb^jafimiJ purchase she P ^ ^
Section 2.^
does net apply.
to?PB^?J X t i ^ N o later than the Application Deadline referenced in s a c * * 24{a), Buyer shall apply for the
S a r n S w S y U ^ o c c w a only wten Buyer has: (i) completed. a«Md, ana delivered to thefendernha
ifiEdaoS
ffi^p^tetion
aSd documents required by the Lender and (a) paid ^ ^ ^ ^ r
i iSuirid^/ the Lender layer agreestodiaarKytforfcto obtain tte Lean. Buyer wd promptly provide tne Lender
with anv additional documentation as required by fre tender.
S r p ^ 2 5 K f Loan Application is denied, * Buyer receives ^ w i r.aft»frcm* * Lend*-** * e Lender cces
& S £ ± t a S { r ? o S S n i a r ) , B u y e r a t a i L n o a t e r *an * ^ - ^ * ^ ^
^ l £ fLyar cr SaSar may, within three calendar days ater Seoefa receiptor s ^ R M ^ M
2 S E 3
o^i-cv^n«v)8«te«^ctheroarcy. in theater* of a^anctf laton w t o e r ^ Section 2.3(b): (}; :f the Lear Oenia;
K ^ i v ^
* * Earnest Money pepotuUhall
^ e ^ ^ ^ B u y e r ? a f if the Lean Denial was received by Sfcy^ attefthst date. Buyer agreestoforfeit, and Seder
£ S ? t o ^ ffutfVaiCRalya mmedy, the Earna* M O M * a* Hquidatad damage, A M m " i g a a
ww^S^hblBe^
Canceflation
pursuant to the pto/isions cf any Other section of mis Ccraact shtsi be gcver-ed by such ether provisions.

2A Appraisal of Property. Buyer's ebligaScn to purchasers PiapertRft l^BNOTconcSfionadupc^toPfop^
ntnEkigfornotlaaathanttia AnchaaafPrtce. Iftteaffniaal censor, a g p n A * * e p ^ ^ ^ g ! 5 ^ ^ ^
tfS^rchase Price, Buyer may cancel th* Contact by providing wntten ncecetoSefler no later than three caWidar days
ISrSSSrS^tfS^
the appraised value, in the event of such cancetta*cn, * e earnest Money OepcsS shaft
STeteased to Buyer. A failure to cancal as provided in CUs Section 2.« shaft ce veered a raw of the appraisal
condition by Buyer.
3 SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. Secernent shea Uke dace en the Se£ementl)eacrinta referenced in Section 24(d), or
on a date upen which Buyer and Seller 2gree in writjna.fcSetHe^e-f'shall ocor enly when all of be rcBcwrg have been
completed- (a) auyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each other or »tne escrow/dosing office alt documents
r « i ^ by tte Ccnbact by the L e n ^
brBuyer under these documents (exceptforthe proceeds erf any new loan) h^we been deir»^s^ by BuTertoSdter or to ^
escrowfclcsing office in the form of coflecsed or cleared funds: and (c) any monies requiredtobe paid by Seller under tnese
documents have been delivered by SettertoBuyer cr to the escrow/dosing offce m the form of collected cr Geared tunds.
Seller and Buyer shall each pay cne-talf 04) of the fee charged $v th& escrcv//cicsir>g office fcr Ha services in the
settfementfctesing process, Traeeand assessmentstor:he current year, mr^ : ana invest on assumed cbfigaticnsshsfi be
prorated at Settlement as setforthin this Section Tsfent deposits (including, but net limited to, security deposits, cleaning
deposits and prepaid rents) shall be paid or credited by SeHertD Buyer at Settlement Prorations set forth in this Sec&n shsii
be made as of the Settlement DeatfffirKscatsnatfersncBdi'noecflcn
Suchwiffing could include the setSement statement Ti^lransartc^warfeconsiQered closed when Settlement has been
completed, and when aB of thefcflovwhghave been competed: (i) the proceeds of any new loan have been deSvered by the
Lender to Seller or to the escrow/ctastng office; and (50 the appiicafcie Closing documents nave been recorded in tne offte
of the county recorder. The ecSona described in part? (T> and (TO cf the preying sentence ^a!l be completed wthirt four
calendar days of Settlement
houre [ 1 ft days after Closing;
4. POSSESSION- Seilar £h3i! defiver *ysica! pess^ssksn to Bcye:wl^in; f } J
[ ] Other (specify)
"
5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At tne signing of this Contract:
[

] Sellers initiate

the Listing Agent,

[

] Buyers Initials

V4 X

The Selling Agent _
The Listing Broker. (

\k\^

The Selling Broker,

^m
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Seller's \niB*j&j-^J-

represents [ } S^i\^ [ j Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent,
, represents [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer [ } both Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent;
^ represents f ] Seller [ J Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent;
_ represer.:s \ ] Seller £ J Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent
Date S/>f/fc^

Form #122 - R*al Estate Purcnaet Catnnict - Gem'Pnnong, Inc. r* - 801-^770613

Buyer's initials / D£-

Cste &f*7lcH
t«Q!$M

FH3M :

FH><

id. :

.iu«. 26 33»34 li:43vV1 P3

6. TITLE INSURANCE. At Settlement, deter agrees to pay for a stantord-coverage cwr;ef s pcKcy of title insurance insuring
Buyer in the amount of the Purchase Price.
7 SELLER DISCLOSURES, No laier than ths Seter Disclosure Deadline referer,::ed in Secdcn 24(GJ. Sefier sha« provide
to K e r S i fbflowing documents which are ccilecSveJy referred to as the, "Seller Closures':
(a) a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and dated oy Saler;
(b) a commitmenttorthe policy ofritteinsurance;
i'c{ a copy of any leases affecting the Proper?/ no; eapifins pnor lo closing:
(d) written notice of any daims ar«d/cr conditions knowr to Seller re-iatrng to environmental problems anc building cr
zorung code violates; .jijnd
(e) Other (specify).
8, BUYERS RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED OK EVALUATIONS AMD INSPECTIONS. Bjyef$ obligation to purcivase under
^.this Contract (check applicable boxes):
,-..... ~ ^
-*
.. • o - -*
S F b a IS I K I S NOT conditioned -^pen Buyers approval or the center.! of a^ r*e SaJar ^scfcsures referenced Jn Sscaer.,:
i^sJM !IS
S IS NOT conditicnec uccn 8c^*Ts acc^ai of a physasri condition irspe-rscn of >he Property;
« ^ I 1 S J P ^ 1 3 WOTconditioned upon Buyer's eppravai of tne following te*U itftf evaiuaacrsofifcs Proper^: (specify)
if any of the above Hem* ere checked m the affirmative, then Sections a. 1. 8-2,8.3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise, they do not apply.
The items chedced in the affirmative above are collectively referred to as {he "Evaluations & Inspections:' Unless cthefwise
provided in this Contract the Evaluations & Inspections shall be rate forfayBuyer and shall be conducted sy individuals or
entities at Buyers chrics. Seller agrees tc cooperate with the Evaluations & inspector* and witn the wask-through inspection
under Section 11.
3.1 Evaluations & inspections Deadline. No later tnan tne Evsiusiicns & In$cect?cns Deadline referenced in Secton
24(c) Suyer shall* (a) complete oil Evaluations 4 inspections; and (b) determine if ire Equations & inspections are
acceptable to Buyer.
3.2 Right to Cancel or Object. If Buyer determines that the Evaluations & nspecirens are unacceptable, Buyer may,
no later than the Evaluations & Inspections CeadEne, efthe-;. (a) oancai tr.is Ccntrac: oy providing wntten notice to Seller,
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit snafI be released tc Buyer, or (b) provice Seiier with written t-ictice of objectors.
63 Failure to Respond* If by the expjraacn of the Evaluations & inspections Deadline, Buyer dce£ MCC (a) cancel tnis:
Contract as provided in Section 8.2; or (b) aeiiver a written ejection tc SeiJer regarding me Evaluations & IrioecScns. 5;e
Evaluations & Inspections shall be deemed approved by Buyer.
6 4 Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written objections to Setter, Buver and Seiier shall ha*e seven calendar davs
titer Setofs receipt of Buyer's objections (tne "Response Period"} in whi£5jc agree In writing uoon the manner of resolving
Buyer's objections. SeSer may, but shall not berequiredto, resolve Buyer's" objections. If Buyer and Seller have not acreed
In wWng upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections. 3jyermarY csnes; t^rs Contract by providing written notice ioSeiter
no later than three calendar days after sxpfratton cf the Response Pa-iod; ^r:$?z>jpca tns Earnest Money Deposit shall be
released to Buyer, fftnis Contract is not canceled by Buyer uncer *his Secac* i5. A. Suyers objections shafl be deemed waived
by Buyer, This waiver shall not affect those items warranted in Secion 10.
9. ADDITIONAL TH?«S. "There [ ] ARE 1 ^ A R £ N 0 T ^MmdAtothis Contract containing additional terrr.s. If there are,
the terms of *he following addenda are incorporated into this Czntract by this reference: [ ] Addendum No.
[ ] Survey Addendum [ ] Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum
{ J Laad*6ased Paint Acfciendurn (in some transactions this add&ndum is required by taw\
[ J Other fspedfy) _
[
10. SELLER WARRANTIES A REPRESENTATIONS.
- 10.1 Condition of Title. Seller represents that Seller nas fea Stle to me -rc-perty and wfil convey good and marketable
* e tc Buyer at Closing by general warranty deed, unless the sals is being ?rade pursuanttoa real estate contract whicn
provides for m-e to pass at a later date. In that case, tide will be conveyeo U: scccni3nce wfth the previsions of that contract
Buyer agrees, however,toaccept tftle to the Property subjects thefoitewinc rr.acters cf recoid: essefr^rts, deed restnetions.
CC&R's (ineaning covensrrts, ccndlticrts and restrictions)., and 1cr.ts-of«,v<iv: anc subj»c::c the contents of the Ccmnrtner^:
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Seller's

toM^fef^Cj-

Date^y^

Buyer's Inltels / ^ ^ -

p at e

t»lsr7k^

:
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for TitJ* insurance as a g r ^ to by Buyfer una*' Secucn c. Buyer also agrees to take tfie Property supject to existing leases
affectina the Property ana not expimg pricrts Closing. B e y * agrees to oe res*.cn*Ue for taxes, assessments. Homeowners
association dueTufliBes. and other servieae provided » the Property after Closing. Except for any soan(s} spectoliy
assumed DV Buyer under Section 2.1,'c). Seller will cause to be paid off by Closing ell mortgages. T^t deeds judgments,
^ h a h i e ' s fiens. ta* Bans and warrants. Seder wtit cause to be paid current by dosing a!! assessments and homeowners
association dues.
1C.2 Condition of Prooerty. Sailer warrants that *ne Property tv.il be:-. :r.«followingc^ndmc^ ON THE DATE SELLER
DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER:
, ^
(a) me Prcoeny shall be cruom-dean and free of debris ar.d personal oeJcn^ncs. Any Se*ier or tenant mcv»ng-related
damage to the Property shan be repaired at Sellers expense;
it
fb) the hearing, cooling. elec&icaJ. plumbing and sprWder systems and fixtures, and the epp:>ance* andfireplaceswill
be in working order and tit for tnesr tntendexfpurposes;
(c) the roof endfoundationshall be free of leaks know, to Seller.
(d) any private well or septic tank serving the Property 3hafi have ^pUc^xie permits, and shall be -r. wcrkrnc oroer and
fitter Its intended purpose; and
...
(e) the Property and improvements, i^duding the iandscapinc, wri ~e in :rs s?~s gen*w ccncscn as * e y ware on the
date of Acceptance.
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may, upen reasonable notice and at a reasonable time,
conduct a "waifc-torougrf inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property is "as n&presented," meaning that the
items referenced in Sections 1.1,8.4 anc 10.2 ftr.e items") are respectively present, repaired/changeo es agreed and in the
warranted condition. If"the items are net as representee. Seller wot, prior to Statement, replace, correct or repak the i»ms
or, with ttie consent of Buyer (and Lenderftaopiicsbfe), escrow sn amount at Sedsemeni to orevkte for the same. The tenure
reconduct a walkthrough snspeccon. or tc daim that an item is not 2s represented, shati not constitute s waiver by Buyer of
therighttc receive, on the cate of possession, the items as represented.
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. SeSer agrees that from the date of Acceptance untit the date of Closing, none of
the Honouring shall occur without the prior written consent of Buyer: (a) nc changes in any existing lasses shall be made; (b)
no new teases shaft be entered into: (c) no substantial alterations cr improvements to the Property snaH be made or
undertaken; end (d) no furtherfinancialencumbrances to :he Property shall Ze msde.
13* AUTHORITY OP SIGNERS. Jf Buyer or Seller is a corporation. partr:arshio. teas, esisce. limited iiafcrfry company, or other
entity, the person executing this Contract on He oehe.f warrants his cr hei &»thctty to & so aid vs btnd "Buyer and Se3er.
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contrac: together with its adtenca. any attacned exhibits and Setter Disclosures.
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prtcr negotiations.
representations, werranfles, undertendings cr contracts between the parties. This CorSnact canr.ct -e changed excect ov
written agreement of the parties.
15. DfSFUTE RESOLUTION. The partes agree that any dispute, vcisog prior to cr sf.er Cbsina reefed to this Contract
[ ] S H A L L p ^ MAY (upon mutual agreement of the parties} rtrsibes^omiffeeromediascn. If the paries agreetomediation,
the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a mediation provider rrt-rjaity agreed upon bv n s partes. Each cam/
agrees tD bear its own costs of mediation, if madiason Sails, me other procedures snd remedies available under this Contract
shall apply. Nothing in this Section 15 shall prohibit any party from seeking emergency eouiiabie rai;ef pending mediation.
16. DEFAULT. If Suyer deieuits. Seiler may elect either to retain the eamesi Monev Deoofet as aqufdaiad damages, or to
return it and sue Suyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies avefisble a: iaw. If $*&*: defaults, in
addition to return of me Earnest Money Deposit. Suyec may elect ether tc accec? (rem Seiler a sum eax& to » e Earnest
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller 50 scectfcalJy *rizL<z# tr.\s Contract cr pursue ctner remedies
available at law. if Buyer ejects to accept llquidatsd damages, Sefier agrees tc p&?' the -i<;uidateci d^meoe^s >a Buyer upon
demand. !t ie agreed that denial of a Lost: Appfca&en made by the Buyer is not a default and is oovernec"by Secson 2.3(b i.
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18. NOTICES. Exceot as provided in Section 23. a;! notices requirec under this Contract must be: (a) ir writing; (b) signed
by the party giving notice; and (c) rec&vedi by the other psny or the cthe- partys ageni no later thsr. the applicable ctete
referenced in this Contract
19. ABROGATION. Exceptfonhap.cv!3icnbnfSecticn« iC 1 1Q.2 15 &&".*? and express warranties made in this Contract
the provisions oftfilsContract snail not sppiy after Ocsiny.
20. RISK OF LOSS. Ali risk of teas to the Property, inducing or.ysicai carnage or destrucScn to the Property or its
improvements 6ue to any cause except ordinary wear andtearand loss caused by a taking »n eminent cemain.. shall be borne
bv Sailer until the transactors is closed

term "dsvs" snail mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning en the dayfollowingthe event whicr. trigger* the timing
requirement $.a.f Acceptance^ racaipt of the SeJJer Disclosure*, etc.). Pencrma.'KS dsaes and 5n:es referenced herein shall
not be binding upon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to th;s Contrac, except as otherwise agreed
to in writing by such non-party.
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed ccpy of this Contract, any
addenda and counteroffers, and ttia rauans.-rrssicr cf any s-gr.sc fax snail be the same as delivery of an original. This
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers ?ney b$ exedneo b counterparts.
23. ACCEPTANCE- "Acceptance" occurs when Seller cr Buyer, respc ncirg to an oifer or counteroffer of the ether, fa) signs
the offer or counterofter where noted to indieare accaptaroe; and (b) communicates tc the ether psrty cr tc the ether party's
agent mat the ofmr or counteroffer has been signed as required.
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Suyer and SeSer agree that the following ceadtaes shatt apply tc this Contract
(a) Application Deadline
(b) SetterDfedoaureDeadfine

^^^CT^ I ^

(c) Evaluations * Inspections Deadline

^ ^ y T .

(d) Settlement Deadline
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^~Q^ \

3 H , 1-.o-o^
2*M ^X Q O ^

. (Date)
jDate)
mate^

(Date\

25* OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE, ouyef offerstopurchasaJtha Pi c^peiVcni^eabS'^etfefTnsancccriGdons If
SeJIer does not accept this offer by: Hyg£> [ J AM *&$?fA Mountain Tinte on ^ N ^ n ^ f e a t e i . th.s offer shall lapseand the Brokerage shaftreturnthe Earnest Money DeposittoBuyer.
'
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(Buyers' Names} (PLEASE PRINT}
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ACCEPTANCErt^UfrrEROFFERmEJECnOM
CHECK ONE:
MACCEPTANCE OF OFFERTO PURCHASE: Setter Accepts theforegoingoffer on the terms and conditions specified
above,
r l COUNTEROFFER: Setter presents for Buye* Acceptance thetermsof Buyert Offer subjed to^heexceDtionso^
l J
-t as specified in the attached ADDENDUM NO

-t_^.

,

%hh

Signature)
*
(Patd) (Tune)
fSe»efs Signature}
^TMSA
L - fnJlm<*s*fiTH
3*5*-5frgP>. U f r S / W r
(Sellers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT)
(Nofce Address)

_

' ( D a t e )
(Time)
U4Set <fOH » K *
ffhone)

[ ] REJECTION: Setter Rejects theforegoingoffer.
(Seller'sSignature)

(Date) (Time)

IHM

(SeBertsSignature)

(Dale) (Time)"
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DOCUMENT RECEIPT
Statetawrequires BroHer to furnish Buyer and SeHer with copies of this Contract bearing all signatures. (Fit in applicable
section below.)
A. I acknowledgereceiofcofafinalcopy of the foregoingftxttraclbearing ail signatures:

/to

P.

€<Ud0&

g»-of

^TfOAj^

<%eL)cJ*

tf^-y-nc/

(Buj^Sigriature)7

(Date)

(Buyers Signature)

" ( D a t e )

elte^ Signature)
iSeiif

(pMr

(Setters Signature)

(Bate)

VIPI personalty <^sed afinalcopy of the
delivered on

foreg^
] faxed [ } mated [ jhand
(Date), post*^ prepaid. tolhe»[ ] Setter [ ] Buyer.

Sent/Defivered by (specify).
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FILED
DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

JAN t 1 2006
JOANNE MoKCZ.CLCnK

BY
Qtr
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR \*
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEPUTY

TY ELDRIDGE and MARINA
ELDRIDGE,
RULING and ORDER
Plaintiffs,

vs.
CASE NO. 040800079

JAMES L. FARNSWORTH, DAVID
FARNSWORTH, and GREGORY
FARNSWORTH,

JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion for
summary judgment. That motion was filed with the Court on
August 26, 2005f and was accompanied by a supporting memorandum.
The Plaintiffs filed a memo in opposition to that motion on November 01, 2005. The Plaintiffs' opposition memo also included
Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. The Court notes
that it has not yet received a request for a decision on Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. The Defendants filed
with the Court a reply memo on their motion for summary judgment
on November 14, 2005, which included a request for oral argument
on the motion. The Court entertained oral argument on December
19, 2005, and having received a notice to submit this motion for
decision on November 18, 2005, the Court now issues its ruling
and enters its order on the Defendants' summary judgment motion.
This case started when the parties entered into a real estate purchase contract ("the REPC") on August 24, 2004, which
contract was to close by October 24, 2004. As part of an order
entered on December 20, 2004, the Court has previously made
1
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findings that the Plaintiffs encountered difficulty obtaining
financing for the transaction and the parties began discussing
alternative means to finance the transaction. See Order, pg. 2
(filed December 21, 2004). It appears that the Plaintiffs suggested a lease with an option to purchase ("the Lease Option")
in lieu of obtaining conventional financing to purchase the
property outright.1 The parties began negotiating the terms of
the Lease Option sometime in the middle of September and continued to negotiate beyond the October 24, 2004 closing date specified in the REPC. Ultimately, no lease with an option to purchase was ever signed by the parties and the REPC never closed
within the timeframe established by the REPC. In November 2004,
the Defendants sold the property which was the subject of the
REPC to a third party.
The Plaintiffs brought suit against the Defendants for
breach of contract, seeking: 1) specific performance of the
REPC; 2) an injunction barring the sale of the property; and 3)
damages and costs. The Plaintiffs have subsequently amended
their complaint to include the following causes of action: 1)
waiver; 2) fraud; and 3) promissory estoppel. Based upon those
theories, the Plaintiffs are still seeking specific performance
of the REPC or the Lease Option.2 There are three issues the
Court must address in order to rule upon the Defendants' summary
judgment motion: 1) the statute of frauds as it relates to
Plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim; 2) the Plaintiffs' fraud
claim; and 3) waiver issues. Each will be addressed in turn.

1

Conventional financing was specified in the REPC. See "Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment," Exhibit C (filed August 26,
2005) .
2

In their Second Amended Complaint, a copy of which is attached to Plaintiffs' "Motion to Amend the Pleadings to Conform with the Evidence," filed on
December 13, 2005, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to "order the Defendants to
enter into, complete and honor the lease option agreement" OR "alternately
allow the Plaintiffs, to complete the purchase agreement with conventional financing. "
2
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I. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS and PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
Statutes of frauds are intended to bar enforcement of certain agreements that the law requires to be memorialized in
writing- The relevant statute of frauds reads:
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in
lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party
by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized in writing.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (2005). Both of the contracts at issue
in this action, 1) the REPC which was entered into by the parties in august 2004 and 2) the Lease Option which was never executed between the parties, are required by the express language
of the statute to be memorialized in writing to be enforceable.
Because the REPC was in writing, it satisfied the statute
of frauds and was therefore an enforceable agreement between the
parties. However, neither of the parties to the REPC performed
under the terms of that agreement.3 It appears that once the
Plaintiffs encountered difficulty obtaining the conventional financing specified in the REPC, and began negotiating the Lease
Option instead, the REPC was abandoned by both parties. Either
way, it is clear from the record that the date for settlement
under the REPC passed without full performance by either party.
While the parties are free to sue each other for defaulting under the REPC, seeking specific performance (an equitable remedy)
requires "clean hands,7' see LHIW, Inc. v. De Lorean, 753 P.2d
961, 963 (Utah 1988), which, due to non-performance, neither of
the parties possesses under the REPC.
Furthermore, because the Lease Option was never reduced to
writing and signed by the Defendants, it cannot satisfy the
statute of frauds and therefore is unenforceable. The Plain3

The Defendants apparently did not provide seller disclosures or title commitments. See "Plaintiffs' Cross Motion," pg. 3 (filed November 01, 2005).
Similarly, the Plaintiffs never tendered the purchase price.
See "Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment," pg. 4 (filed
August 26, 2005).
3
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tiffs argue that the Lease Option should be enforced regardless
of the statute of frauds based upon a theory of promissory estoppel. The Utah Supreme Court has defined promissory estoppel,
stating:
[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or
a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may
be limited as justice requires.
Tolboe Constr. Co. v. Staker Paving & Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 843f
845 (Utah 1984) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90
(1981)). Under this definition, the Plaintiffs would be entitled to the relief they seek if they could establish a promise,
reasonable reliance, and injustice.
However, there are limits to the doctrine of promissory estoppel when real property is involved.
These limits have been
addressed by the Utah courts. In support of their-motion for
summary judgment, Defendants cite F.C. Stanale v. Earnst Home
Centers, 948 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1997). In Stanale, the Utah
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of "whether promissory estoppel precludes [a defendant] from asserting the statute of
frauds as a defense." Stanale, 948 P.2d at 360. This issue is
a matter of law, properly decided by this Court on summary judgment. Id. The Stanale court stated,
in situations involving the purchase or lease of real property, [] Utah cases have narrowly circumscribed the application of promissory estoppel to the statute of frauds. A
defendant is estopped from asserting the statute of frauds
as a defense only when he or she has expressly and unambiguously waived the right to do so.
Stanale, 948 P.2d at 360-61 (emphasis added). Moreover, a mere
refusal to perform an oral agreement within the statute of
frauds, however, is not such fraud as will justify a court in
disregarding the statute of frauds even though it results in
hardship to the plaintiff. See id. at 362.
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In this case, the Plaintiffs are asking this Court to re[uire the Defendants to perform under an oral agreement (the
jease Option). As applied to this case, Stanqle instructs that
:his Court cannot disregard the statute of frauds, even though
_t appears that the Plaintiffs may suffer some hardship as a result of such judgment. If this Court were to to accept the
Plaintiffs' estoppel argument,
parties to a contract negotiation could not rely on the
protections afforded by the statute of frauds, thereby
eviscerating it. Moreover, contract negotiators would never
know at what point mere negotiations became a binding contract. Parties to contract negotiations should be entitled
to rely on the statute of frauds absent a clear manifestation of intent to claim no reliance. A party concerned
about the assertion of the statute of frauds could easily
protect itself by demanding written commitments before acting in reliance on the negotiations.
Id. at 365.
The Court finds that Stanqle controls in this case. At no
time did the Defendants' conduct "clearly manifest an intention
that [they] would not assert the statute of frauds." Id. Regardless of the fact that no written lease was ever memorialized, and the fact that both parties had apparently abandoned
the REPC sometime in September 2004, the Plaintiffs gambled that
the Lease Option negotiations would be successfully concluded.
Even if this Court found that the Defendants assured the Plaintiffs that they would enter into the Lease Option with the
Plaintiffs, "a mere promise to execute a written contract and a
subsequent refusal to do so is insufficient to create an estoppel, although reliance is placed on such a promise and damage is
sustained as a consequence of the refusal.'' Ld. To be clear,
promissory estoppel bars a defendant from asserting the statute
of frauds as a defense only where the party has clearly and unequivocally represented that it would not use it as a defense.
See id. at 365-66. Accordingly, because the Defendants did not
represent that they would not assert the statute of frauds as a
defense, the Defendants are not estopped from doing so. This
holds true even though the Defendants refused to enter into the
Lease Option, which they had negotiated in lieu of the REPC.
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Because the Defendants are not barred from asserting the statute
of frauds as a defense, and because the Lease Option was within
the statute of frauds, the same is void because it was not in
writing. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (2005).
II. FRAUD
To establish fraud under Utah law, the plaintiff must prove
by clear and convincing evidence each of the following elements:
(1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing material fact (3) which was false, (4)which
the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon
which to base such representation, (5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity,
(7) did in fact rely upon the representation, and (8) was
thereby induced to act upon it, (9) to his injury and damage.
See Franco v. the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
2001 UT 25, 533. In addition, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
require that all averments of fraud be stated with particularity. URCP Rule 9(a)(3); see also Wright and Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1297, at 590 (1990).
First, the Plaintiffs have made general allegations of
fraud. Plaintiffs have claimed that the "Defendants misled the
Plaintiffs into believing that the Defendants preferred a lease
option," knowing that if they could delay closing on the property under the REPC, Plaintiffs would default and the Defendants
could then accept a more lucrative offer from another party.
See "Second Amended Complaint," pg. 4 (permission to amend
granted at oral argument on December 19, 2005). These allegations of fraud are insufficient under Rule 9 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, as they do not possess the requisite particularity required by statute.
The Plaintiffs also allege specific instances of fraud, but
only regarding events which transpired after the October 24,
2004 REPC closing deadline. These specific instances of alleged
fraud involved a "fabricated" realtor commission, which the
6
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Plaintiffs argue was fabricated by Defendants to avoid having
the Plaintiffs demand closing on the REPC. See "Plaintiffs'
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, at pg. 12 (filed November 01,
2005). Under Utah law, to be fraudulent, a representation must
concern a "presently existing material fact." See Franco, 2001
UT 25, 533. After October 24, 2004, any fraudulent representations allegedly made by the Defendants would be immaterial to
the REPC, since its closing date had already passed and the parties had not agreed, in writing, to an extension of any of the
deadlines specified in the REPC.
Second, "fraud, generally, cannot be predicated upon the
failure to perform a promise or contract which is unenforceable
under the statute of frauds, for the promissor has not, in a legal sense, made a contract; and therefore, he has the right,
both in law and equity, to refuse to perform." Stanqle, 948
P.2d at 362. This means that any claim of fraud predicated upon
the Lease Option, or representations made regarding the Lease
Option, are insufficient as a matter of law, because the Lease
Option is void under the statute of frauds.
Additionally, the Court notes that the Plaintiffs have argued that, as part of the Lease Option negotiations, Defendant
James Farnsworth "made suggestions to modify the Lease Option
Agreement." See "Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment," at pg. 8 (filed November 01, 2005). The Plaintiffs indicate that these modifications were suggested on October 9, 2004.
Id. Plaintiffs argue that
the only logical explanation is that Jim was acting in good
faith to bring about the terms of the Lease Option to a
fair and final agreement. Unless Jim had a bona fide intention to pursue the Lease Option, there would have been
no reason to suggest a change in a term which would benefit the Eldridges.
Id. The Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways, arguing in one
breath that negotiating the Lease Option was a ploy to avoid a
demand for performance of the REPC AND that the Defendants were
sincere in their desire to find Lease Option terms which would
be amenable to both parties. Such arguments appear to this
Court to be diametrically opposed; either the Defendants were
7
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negotiating the Lease Option fraudulently or they were negotiating with good faith. Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds
that the Plaintiffs fraud claims are insufficient as a matter of
law,
III. WAIVER
"Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a.known right.
To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit
or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to
relinquish it." Soterfs, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993). In this case, both parties had rights against the other party by virtue of the REPC.
Those rights are independent of the proposed Lease Option which
never materialized and never provided any rights to the Plaintiffs or the Defendants.
The Plaintiffs acknowledge that "the Defendants had a right
to rely on the REPC." "Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment," pg. 15. The Plaintiffs also acknowledge that "when
the parties agreed to proceed with the Lease Option, they waived
their right to proceed with the REPC...they relinquished their
right to the REPC..." Id. The Court is of the opinion that
both parties abandoned the REPC sometime in September 2004. In
doing so, both parties would have intentionally relinquished
known rights under the REPC. Regardless, the fact that the parties had waived rights under the REPC does not in any way make
the Lease Option a binding agreement between these parties. The
fact of the matter is that even if the Defendants intentionally
relinquished all of their rights under the REPC, the Lease Option was never memorialized in writing and signed by the Defendants. Therefore, the Plaintiffs' waiver argument is also insufficient as a matter of law.

ORDER
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Additionally, even though the
Court has not received a request for a decision on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, that motion is hereby DE8
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NIED. This is a direct result of granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment and is done now in an effort to resolve the matter and to ensure consistent rulings in this matter.
Dated this

//>^dav of

ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

9

OF

9

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 040800079 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

By Hand
Dated this

/ /

NAME
ALVIN R LUNDGREN
ATTORNEY PLA
5015 W OLD HWY STE 200
MT GREEN, UT 84050
CLARK B ALLRED

day o

Deputy Court Clerk

Pacre 1 (last)

Tab 15

•29-2006 WED 01:17 PM VERNAL 8TH DIST COURT

FAX NO. 435 789 0564

P. 02
FILED

DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

MAR 2 S 2006
jeSTJN&M^EE, CLERK

BYV-\ryS~~ .DEPUTY
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TY ELDRIDGE and MARINA
ELDRIDGE,

1
HOLING and ORDER

Plaintiffs,

'

vs.
j
JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY FARNSWORTH,
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This matter is before the Court on the following motions:
1) Plaintiffs' "Motion to Reconsider,".filed with the Court on
January 30, 2006; 2) Plaintiffs' "Motion to Extend the Time to
Appeal/' filed with the Court on February 14, 2006; 3) Plaintiffs' "Objections to the Order Submitted by Defendants Without
Notice or Motion Dated January 12, 2006," filed with the Court
on January 18, 2006; and 45 Defendants' "Motion to Award Fees
and Costs/' filed with the Court on January 18, 2006, The Court
has reviewed these motions and the memoranda in support of, and
in opposition to, each respective motion. The Court has also
reviewed the Plaintiffs' objections to the Defendants' proposed
order. Having received notice to -submit these motions for decision, and being informed in the matter, the Court will now address each of the motions and the objections in turn.
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER
While the Court does have discretion in determining whether
to reconsider an order so long as no final judgment has entered,
see Brookslde Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 518 (citing U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.C. Gen,/ Inc», 1999 UT App 303, 555;
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This matter is before the Court on the following motions:
1) Plaintiffs' "Motion to Reconsider/' filed with the Court on
January 30, 2006; 2) Plaintiffs' "Motion to Extend the Time to
Appeal," filed with the Court on February 14f 2006; 3) Plaintiffs' "Objections to the Order Submitted by Defendants Without
Notice or Motion Dated January 12, 2006," filed with the Court
on January 18, 2006; and 4) Defendants' "Motion to Award Fees
and Costs," filed with the Court on January 18, 2006, The Court
has reviewed these motions and the memoranda in support of, and
in opposition to, each respective motion. The Court has also
reviewed the Plaintiffs' objections to the Defendants' proposed
order. Having received notice to submit these motions for decision, and being informed in the matter, the Court will now address each of the motions and the objections in turn,
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER
While the Court does have discretion in determining whether
to reconsider an order so long as no final judgment has entered,
see Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 518 (citing U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.C. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, 555;

Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b)), the Utah Supreme Court has pointed out
t h a t such motions are not recognized by the r u l e s of procedure
in c i v i l cases and has discouraged the f i l i n g of such motions.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize motions
to reconsider. Although we have discouraged these motions,
they have proliferated in civil actions to the extent that
they have become the cheatgrass of the l i t i g a t i o n landscape. We acknowledge that the extraordinary circumstance
may arise when i t is appropriate to request a t r i a l court
to reconsider a ruling. These occasions are rare, however,
and we encourage attorneys to reverse the trend to make motions to reconsider routine.
Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, 518 n.5 ( c i t a t i o n s omitted). The
Utah Supreme Court notes t h a t t h e r e a r e , on r a r e occasion, ext r a o r d i n a r y circumstances warranting a request for a t r i a l court
t o reconsider a r u l i n g . However, the Court cannot see, and the
P l a i n t i f f s have f a i l e d to present, any reason as t o why t h e s e
p a r t i c u l a r circumstances are extraordinary such t h a t t h e i r mot i o n t o reconsider should be granted. Therefore, t h i s Court
w i l l not e n t e r t a i n the P l a i n t i f f s ' motion t o reconsider as i t
r e l a t e s t o any issue already e x p l i c i t l y addressed by the Court
in i t s January 11, 2006 r u l i n g .
In t h a t r u l i n g , the Court addressed each cause of a c t i o n
i d e n t i f i e d in P l a i n t i f f s ' "Second Amended Complaint." 1 The Court
granted P l a i n t i f f s ' motion to f i l e the amended complaint at o r a l
argument on December 19, 2005, and signed an order on t h a t mot i o n January 11, 2006. "Once a p a r t y has amended a pleading,
the amended pleading supersedes the o r i g i n a l pleading, and the
o r i g i n a l pleading performs no function in the c a s e . " Campbell
v. Debry, 2001 UT App 397, 517 n.4 ( c i t i n g 6 Federal P r a c t i c e &
1

The P l a i n t i f f s second amended complaint also sought " a l t e r n a t e r e c o v e r y / '
arguing that i t would be "unconscionable for the Defendants to p r o f i t from
t h e i r i n t e n t i o n a l d e c e i t . " Id. at pg. 6. The Court did not e x p l i c i t l y address t h i s in i t s January 11, 2006 r u l i n g . However, a review of the record
shows nothing material upon which to make a finding of i n t e n t i o n a l deceit on
the part of the Defendants. The Court has already ruled t h a t , as a matter of
law, the P l a i n t i f f s ' fraud claims f a i l . By doing so, the Court intended to
include in t h a t ruling the P l a i n t i f f s ' claims for " i n t e n t i o n a l d e c e i t . " Further, a review of the record indicates t h a t the P l a i n t i f f s have f a i l e d t o argue anything in support of t h e i r claim for a l t e r n a t e recovery.

Procedure, Wright, Miller & Kane § 1476 (1990); see also Moore!s
Federal Practice, Civil § 15.17(3) ("An amended pleading that is
complete in itself and does not reference or adopt any portion
of the prior pleading supersedes the prior pleading.'')). Therefore, any cause of action contained in the original complaint or
the first amended complaint, but not contained in the Second
Amended Complaint, "performs no function in the case." Campbell, 2001 UT App 397, 117 n.4.
Having addressed each of the causes of action in the second
amended complaint explicitly, the Court will not revisit them in
any detail. In addition to the issues explicitly ruled upon by
the Court, there are also certain issues raised by the Plaintiffs in their motion to reconsider which, as a result of granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment, have been implicitly ruled upon by the Court. In order to bring clarity to
those issues, the Court will briefly explicate for the benefit
of the complaining party.
The Plaintiffs' argue that the Court's January 11, 2006
ruling "summarily dismissed the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment without explanation." See Plaintiffs' "Memorandum in
Support of Their Motion to Reconsider," pg. 2 (filed January 30,
2006). The Plaintiffs argue that they are
entitled to an explanation of the Courtfs reasons for denying their motion, including each issue addressed by the
Plaintiffs, not raised in the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, including Plaintiffs' motion for specific
performance; [sic] and Plaintiffs' motion to deny Defendants' request to find the lis pendens a wrongful lien.
Id. The Court will discuss damages, specific performance, and
the lis pendens.
Before discussing damages and specific performance individually, the Court wishes to raise the following general point
as it relates to both damages and specific performance. The
Utah Supreme Court has ruled that
[n] either party to an agreement can be said to be in default (and thus susceptible to a judgment for damages or a
decree for specific performance) until the other party has

tendered his own performance. In other words, a party must
make a tender of his own agreed performance in order to put
the other party in default.

Kelley v. Leudacia Financial Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah
1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Because
there is no indication that either of the parties tendered their
own agreed performance under the REPC, neither the Plaintiffs or
the Defendants are in a position to compel specific performance
or recover damages. The Court is persuaded by the Defendants'
argument on this point. See Defendants' "Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider," pg. 4 thru 11 (filed
February 10, 2006).
A. DAMAGES
In the Plaintiffs' second amended complaint, they seek
"reasonable compensation for the damages, actual, consequential,
and incidental, sustained by Plaintiffs" and "punitive damages."
Plaintiffs' "Second Amended Complaint," pg. 7. The Court, in
its January 11, 2006 ruling, already ruled upon the Plaintiffs'
estoppel, fraud and waiver claims. Therefore, because those are
the only causes of action pled by the second amended complaint,
there remains nothing upon which the Court could base an award
of damages.
In their original complaint, the Plaintiffs did plead
breach of contract. However, as already noted, the later
amended pleadings superseded the original complaint. Because
the latest amended pleading did not include any action for
breach of contract, nor did it incorporate any reference to the
earlier complaints, that cause of action was deemed by this
Court to have been abandoned. Further, it would be incongruous
to grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment (which addressed all claims upon which an award of damages could be
based) and then award damages to the Plaintiffs. Therefore, by
granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court
had implicitly denied the Plaintiffs an award of damages, and,
for the sake of perfect clarity, explicitly denies Plaintiffs
request for damages at this time.

B. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
As the Court noted in its January 11, 2006 ruling, the REPC
was an enforceable agreement and satisfied the statute of
frauds. However, sometime in the middle of September 2004, the
parties abandoned that agreement. Neither party performed their
obligations under the REPC. Therefore, due to non-performance,
the parties waived their rights under that contract.
The Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to specific
performance on this contract, invoking either equitable specific
performance or specific performance as outlined in the REPC.
The Court has already addressed both of these arguments in its
January 11, 2006 ruling, but will briefly re-visit the issue.
First, the REPC, which created a contractual right to specific
performance, was abandoned by the parties. Therefore, it cannot
serve as a basis upon which this Court can grant specific performance. Second, because neither of the parties performed under the REPC, neither are in a position to seek equitable remedies. Therefore, equitable specific performance is not an option. Finally, the Lease Option was never memorialized in writing as required by law. Therefore, it cannot be specifically
enforced. As this Court views the situation, there is no avenue
by which to grant specific performance in this case.
It is appropriate at this point to clarify a point made by
the Court in its January 11, 2006 ruling. In discussing specific performance, the Court stated, "...the parties are free to
sue each other for defaulting under the REPC..." Ruling, pg.
3. In making this statement, the Court was contemplating a
separate lawsuit for breach of contract. Indeed, as already
stated, the original complaint in this action included a claim
for breach of contract. That claim, again as already stated,
was not included in later amended pleadings, therefore it was
deemed by the Court to have been abandoned. The Plaintiffs have
indicated that u[t]his Court recognized the issue in its judgment on the motions for summary judgment in stating this issue
was preserved for trial." See Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Reply Memorandum, filed February 14, 2006 pg.l. The
Plaintiffs misunderstand the Court's ruling. To be clear, the
breach action was not included in the second amended complaint.
Therefore, when the Court said the parties were free to sue each
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other for breach, that contemplated a separate action for breach
of contract- The Court did not, at any time, state that the issue was preserved for trial.
C. THE LIS PENDENS
The lis pendens is the primary subject of the Plaintiffs'
objections to the Defendants' proposed order which followed the
Courts' January 11, 2006 ruling. The Plaintiffs have pointed
out that the Court did not address the lis pendens in its January 11, 2006 ruling. The Court concedes this point and recognizes the need to rule upon this issue in order to conclude the
matter.
The Defendants have argued that the lis pendens constitutes
a wrongful lien. The Defendants argue that the lis pendens has
been wrongful from the date on which the Court made findings and
dissolved the TRO in this matter. The Court reminds the Defendants that at the hearing on November 29, 2004, the Court was
specifically addressing the case in light of the TRO which had
been entered. The Court was not addressing the merits of the
underlying causes of action at that time.
Therefore, the Court is of the opinion that the lis pendens
has not, at any time in this matter, been wrongful. The fact of
the matter is that litigation has been pending during the entire
time that the lis pendens has been in place. The lis pendens
"charges the public with notice of outstanding claims and causes
one who deals with property involved in pending litigation to do
so at his peril." Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d
1244 (Utah 1979). The Court believes that the lis pendens has
been lawfully in place, notifying the public of pending litigation. Therefore, the Court will not order the removal of the
lis pendens. Similarly, the Court will not award the Defendants
any damages, costs or fees as they relate to the lis pendens.
The Court also reminds the parties that the lis pendens can
lawfully remain in place after this Court issues final judgment
in the matter, pending any forthcoming appeal. See Hidden Meadows, 590 P.2d at 1248.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO APPEAL
Upon review of this motion, the Court is convinced that
this motion is unnecessary at this time, as a final judgment has
not yet issued. Even though the Court's January 11, 2006 ruling
was caption "Ruling and Order" and contained a paragraph titled
"Order," neither of the parties have treated that as a final
judgment. The Defendants' submitted a proposed order to the
Court, which, as of yet, the Court has not signed. Submitting
this proposed order to the Court indicates to the Court that the
Defendants did not view the Court's ruling as a final order in
the matter. Therefore, the Court finds that no final judgment
has entered and therefore the Plaintiffs' time to appeal has not
yet begun to expire. As a result, because this issue is not
ripe for decision, the Court will dismiss the motion.
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AWARD FEES AND COSTS
As Defendants have correctly stated, attorney fees are only
awarded if permitted by statute or contract. No statute awards
attorney fees in a matter such as this, except for the portion
of this matter involving the TRO and the lis pendens. The Court
is of the opinion that the Defendants should be awarded the fees
incurred in defending against the TRO. As for the lis pendens,
fees are only recoverable in the event that the lis pendens was
wrongful. The Court has ruled that the lis pendens was not
wrongful, therefore there can be no recovery under that statute.
Having addressed the relevant statutes, the Court now turns
to the contract between the parties. The REPC specifically addresses attorney fees. While this was, at one time, an enforceable contract between these parties, that contract cannot serve
as a basis for the award of fees in this matter. The Court has
found that the parties abandoned the REPC and relinquished their
rights thereunder. Indeed, it is for this reason, in large
part, that the Court granted the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment. It would be incongruous to say that the parties abandoned the REPC, but the Defendants can recover their fees under
that same contract.
Therefore, no attorney fees will be awarded to the Defendants other than those fees incurred as a result of the TRO.

Because the Court finds that the REPC had been abandoned by both
parties sometime in September 2004, the provision of the REPC
awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party in the event of
litigation to enforce the REPC is no longer enforceable.
Finally, the Defendants, as the prevailing party in this
matter, will be awarded their costs of suit.
ORDER
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: that Plaintiffs' motion to
reconsider is DENIED (noting that the Court finds no basis for
an award of damages or specific performance for the Plaintiffs);
that Plaintiffs' motion to extend time for appeal is DISMISSED
as not ripe for decision; that the Defendants' motion for fees
and costs is GRANTED IN PART, but only as to 1) the recovery of
attorney fees for the portion of this case involving the TRO and
2) an award of their costs of suit as the prevailing party; and
that the lis pendens is not wrongful and should not be removed
during the pendency of this litigation, including during any
pending appeal.
Dated this

40\

day of SHdhiJA

, 2006,

BY THE CO

N R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Tab 16

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TY ELDRIDGE and MARINA
ELDRIDGE,

j
RULING

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY FARNSWORTH,

CASE NO. 040800079
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs'"Motion to
Conform the Complaint to the Evidence," filed with the Court on
March 14, 2006, and accompanied by supporting memorandum and a
proposed "Third Amended Complaint." The Defendants filed an opposition memorandum on March 24, 2006. The Plaintiffs filed a
response to the Defendants' opposition on April 05, 2006. On
that same day, the Court received a notice to submit the motion
for decision. Having reviewed the motion and related memoranda,
the Court now rules upon the motion.
The motion seeks for a court order amending (for a third
time) the Plaintiffs' complaint to include a multitude of issues
as identified by the motion, including: 1) specific performance;
2) damages; 3) attorney fees / costs; 4) breach of contract; 5)
fraud; 6) waiver; 7) promissory estoppel; 8) punitive damages;
9) covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and 10) intentional
/ negligent misrepresentation. Before addressing the merits of
the Plaintiffs' motion, the Court points out that previous rulings have already explicitly addressed each and every issue
identified by the Plaintiffs' motion, except for the issues of

the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and intentional /
negligent misrepresentation.
The Plaintiffs, in making their motion, rely on Rules 8(f)
and 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(f)
states, "All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." The Court recognizes that pleadings are to be
construed as to do substantial justice. However, in this case,
the issue is not construing a pleading (i.e., the second amended
complaint, as the operative pleading), but rather the issue is
whether to allow amendment to a pleading for a third time, after
summary judgment for the opposing party has issued, to include
new causes of action not included in previous pleadings. For
that reason, the Court finds that Rule 8(f) is inapposite to the
motion before the Court.
Unlike Rule 8(f), Rule 15(b) is arguably relevant to the
motion before the Court. Rule 15(b) states,
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at
any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does
not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it
is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court
may allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation
of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and
the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits.
The court shall
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting
party to meet such evidence.
The Court finds that case law interpreting Rule 15(b) as it pertains to lawsuits disposed of at the summary judgment phase is
scant. The plain reading of the rule suggests to this Court, as
has been held in other jurisdictions, that Rule 15(b) applies
only where the case has proceeded to actual trial. See Crawford
v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1995); Blue Cross Blue Shield
of Ala, v. Weitz, 913 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1990). The rule it-

self employs the words "tried" and "the trial." The language of
the rule and the persuasive authority from other jurisdictions
lends credence to the proposition that Rule 15(b) is only implicated when the case proceeds to trial. This motion would be
easily resolved in favor of the Defendants if the Court were to
find Rule 15(b) not applicable to cases decided on summary judgment. That said, the parties have identified Hallstrom v. Buhler, 378 P.2d 355 (Utah 1963), which applies Rule 15(b) to a
case decided on summary judgment, but that case does not explicitly address Rule 15(b)'s applicability to cases decided on summary judgment. For purposes of this ruling, and against reservations to the contrary, the Court will assume that Rule 15(b)
does apply in cases decided on summary judgment, thus giving the
Plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt- Even making such an assumption, the Court is not convinced that the rule requires the
Court to allow the Plaintiffs to amend their complaint for a
third time.
The Court finds that the Defendants have repeatedly objected to Plaintiffs' submission of matters outside of the
pleadings for the Court's consideration. See Defendants' "Mem.
in Opp. to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider," at 11 (objecting
to covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Defendants' "Reply
Mem. in Supp. of Motion for Summary Judgment," at 7 (objecting
to misrepresentation); Defendants' "Reply Mem. in Supp. of Defendants' Motion to Award Fees and Costs," at 1 (objecting to
breach of contract). Having objected to the issues, the Court
cannot find that the issues were tried by the express or implied
consent of the parties, and therefore the Court is not required
to allow amendment of the complaint. Rather, these issues, being specifically objected to, implicate the third sentence of
Rule 15(b). See Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin., 974 P.2d
288, 291 (Utah 1999). Under that part of the rule, allowing the
Plaintiffs to amend the complaint is subject to the discretion
of the trial court. The Court "may" allow the pleading to be
amended if: 1) presentation of the merits of the action are
thereby subserved and 2) if the objecting party fails to satisfy
the Court that the admission of such evidence would be prejudicial to the objecting party.

In this case, the Court finds that neither requirement is
met. First, allowing the Plaintiff to amend the complaint will
not facilitate presentation on the merits, which have already
been fully adjudicated at this late point by the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. Second, the Defendants have satisfied the Court that prejudice would result if
the Court were to allow the Plaintiffs to amend the complaint
for a third time and after summary judgment has entered.
The Plaintiffs have offered this Court no explanation as to
why these new claims were not included in the First Amended Complaint or in the Second Amended Complaint. Twice the Plaintiffs
have amended their complaint (once by right and once by permission of the Court) and, having issued final judgment on the
amended complaint, the Plaintiffs now seek to shift to new theories hoping that one such theory will lead the Court to find in
their favor. In the opinion of this Court, that is not the purpose of any of the rules relied upon by the Plaintiffs in their
motion to conform. The parties have prepared the case, including conducting discovery and arguing motions, based upon the
first and second amended complaints. At this late time in the
case, it would be clearly prejudicial to the Defendants to allow
the Plaintiffs once again to amend their complaint. The Defendants have not prepared their case with these new causes of action in mind, but have diligently objected to the introduction
of issues outside of the pleadings. To allow the Plaintiffs to
continually refine their strategy, both after summary judgment
motions were filed and after judgment was entered on such motions, would work an injustice on the Defendants. Therefore,
the Court will deny the Plaintiffs' motion to conform.
Finally, having addressed the only two new causes of action
contained in the proposed third amended complaint, the Court
wishes to once again briefly address the issue of breach of contract. In the January 11, 2006 ruling, this Court, in discussing specific performance, stated that "While the parties are
free to sue each other for defaulting under the REPC, seeking
specific performance (an equitable remedy) requires 'clean
hands,' which, due to non-performance, neither of the parties
possesses under the REPC." January 11, 2006 Ruling, at pg. 3.
The Plaintiffs understood this to mean that the issue of breach
A of

^

of contract was reserved for trial. To clarify the Court's position on this issue, the Court, in the March 29, 2006 ruling,
stated that "In making [the statement above], the Court was contemplating a separate lawsuit for breach of contract" because
the Court believed that the Plaintiffs, by not including the
original breach of contract claim in either of the amended complaints, had abandoned that particular cause of action. Upon
further reflection, this Court is of the opinion that a separate
lawsuit on breach of contract would be unavailing to either
party for, in large part, the very reason that this Court
granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court
has found that the parties abandoned the' REPC sometime in September 2004 and that both parties waived the rights that were
enforceable by virtue of that agreement. Therefore, the Court
was wrong when it stated that the parties were free to sue each
other for defaulting under the REPC. That agreement, abandoned
by both parties, became unenforceable and neither party can pursue an action for breach of that contract.
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the Plaintiffs' "Motion to Conform the Complaint to the Evidence" is DENIED.
Dated this

/K~

day of

"%^

, 2006,

JOHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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1
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' "Motion for
Stay of Execution of the Court's Orders and for Approval of the
Plaintiff's Supersedeas Bond," filed May 10, 2006, and accompanied by supporting memorandum. The Defendants filed their memorandum in opposition to the motion on May 23, 2006. The Plaintiffs filed their reply memorandum June 01, 2006, and that reply
was accompanied by a notice to submit the motion for decision.
Having reviewed the motion and related memoranda, the Court now
rules upon the motion.
The Plaintiffs' motion requests that: 1) the Court stay
execution on its January 11, 2006 and March 29, 2006 orders and
2) approve the $500, tendered by the Plaintiffs to the Court
with the motion, as sufficient supersedeas bond in this matter.
Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in part,
When an appeal is taken, the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such stay is otherwise
prohibited by law or these rules.

Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62(d). Because the Plaintiffs have filed
an appeal, and because there is no indication that staying the
execution of the Court's orders is prohibited by law or the
rules, the Court will grant the motion to stay. Having made
that determination, the Court must now address the issue of the
supersedeas bond, which the Court will require for the stay to
issue.
Rule 62(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs
the form of a supersedeas bond, stating in part,
A supersedeas bond given under Subsection (d) may be either
a commercial bond having a surety authorized to transact
insurance business under Title 31A, or a personal bond having one or more sureties who are residents of Utah having a
collective net worth of at least twice the amount of the
bond, exclusive of property exempt from execution."
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62(i)(l). Rule 62(i) continues by stating,
"Upon motion and good cause shown, the court may permit a deposit of money in court or other security to be given in lieu of
giving a supersedeas bond under Subsection (d)." Utah R. Civ.
P. Rule 62 (i) (2). In this case, the Plaintiffs indicate that
they have tendered a $500 cash bond and allege that this amount
is sufficient for the supersedeas bond.1 After reviewing the
rule, it appears that the Plaintiffs are mingling Rule 62 (i) (1)
and Rule 62 (i) (2). The plain language of the rule indicates
that the appellant may either file a supersedeas bond (commercial or personal) OR request that the Court waive the bond requirement and accept a cash deposit in lieu of the bond. Here,
the Plaintiffs have deposited $500 with the Court and are asking
the Court to find that this is sufficient as the supersedeas
bond contemplated by Rule 62(d). The Court will find that the
$500 deposit is insufficient for purposes of the bond requirement of Rule 62(d) and will require the Plaintiffs to post a
bond consistent with Rule 62 (i) (1). The $500 deposit is not approved and will be released back to the Plaintiffs upon request.
1

Plaintiffs contend that the $500 cash bond is sufficient to cover the supersedeas bond and to serve as guarantee for the lis pendens. The lis pendens
is not a matter under consideration for purposes of this motion. Therefore,
the Court will not address whether the $500 is sufficient guarantee for the
lis pendens at this time.
2
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The question remaining is what amount is sufficient for the
supersedeas bond in this matter. Rule 62(j), which governs the
determination of the amount of a supersedeas bond, states in
part:
Except as provided in subsection (j)(2), a court shall set
the supersedeas bond in an amount that adequately protects
the judgment creditor against loss or damage occasioned by
the appeal and assures payment in the event judgment is affirmed. In setting the amount, the court may consider any
relevant factor....
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62(j)(l). The Utah Supreme Court, quoting
American Jurisprudence, Second, has stated,
The purpose of a supersedeas bond is to protect nonappealing parties by maintaining the status quo during the
appeal and insuring that those who have obtained the judgment under review will not be prejudiced by a stay of the
judgment pending final determination of the appeal.
Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, 139 (quoting 5
Am. Jur. 2d APPELLATE REVIEW, § 441 (1995)).
In this case, the Defendants are in the position of "judgment creditor" for purposes of Rule 62. It is the duty of this
Court to require of the Plaintiffs, as the appealing party, a
bond in an amount "that adequately protects the [Defendants]
against loss or damage occasioned by the appeal" and to maintain
the status quo while the Court's judgment is stayed pending appeal. The Court notes that the longer this matter is drawn out,
the more likely it is that events will transpire making the nowcontemplated sale of the underlying property to Gibson an impossibility. In the event that such events do transpire, the Defendants would suffer losses associated with losing Gibson as a
buyer. In light of this possibility, the Defendants have requested that the Court set the bond at $450,000.00, to cover the
entire agreed-upon purchase price and interest on that amount.
The Court is not convinced that the Defendants would be unable
to find a new buyer for the underlying property. In other
words, even if the current agreement with Gibson falls apart,
the Defendants' ultimate damages will not be the loss of the entire sale price. That said, should the now-contemplated sale
3
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fail due to circumstances occasioned by the appeal, the Defendants will certainly suffer some prejudice as a result of the
stay. Therefore, the Court will set the bond at $100,000.00,
which amount will cover any foreseeable losses to the Defendants
as a result of the stay issued by this Court, including changes
in market conditions, costs of retaining the property pending
the appeal, and other related losses as may be established by
the Defendants.
ORDER
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' "Motion for
Stay of the Execution of the Court's Orders and for Approval of
the Plaintiffs' Supersedeas Bond" is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART:
1) the motion is GRANTED as to the Plaintiffs' motion for a
stay of the Court's orders in this matter, contingent on
the Plaintiffs securing, .and submitting for court approval,
a supersedeas bond in the amount of $100,000.00, in accordance with Rule 62 (i) (1) and Rule 62 (i) (4) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure; and
2) the motion is DENIED as to the request for an approval
of the $500 as the supersedeas bond; the $500 shall be returned to the Plaintiffs upon Plaintiffs' request.
Dated this

<£/

day of

\J^1A^C^

t 2006.

BY THE COURT:

ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

A

m?

A

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 040800079 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this Q(p

NAME
CLARK B ALLRED
ATTORNEY DEF
363 E MAIN ST STE 201
VERNAL, UT 84078
ALVIN R LUNDGREN
ATTORNEY PLA
5015 W OLD HWY STE 200
MT GREEN UT 84050

day of

Deputy Oouft ^Slerk

Tab 18

FILED
DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

AUG 1 6 2006
JQANN^Mc^EE, CLERK

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TY ELDRIDGE and MARINA
ELDRIDGE,
RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiffs,

vs.
JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY FARNSWORTH, i

CASE NO. 040800079
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' "Motion to
Release Lis Pendens," filed April 25, 2006, and accompanied by
supporting memorandum. The Plaintiffs filed an objection to the
motion on May 04, 2006. The Defendants' reply memorandum in
support was filed May 12, 2006. On July 18, 2006, the Court received a notice to submit the motion for decision. The Court
has reviewed the motion, the related memoranda, and the prior
rulings in this case, and, having received a request for decision, now rules upon the motion. For the reasons that follow,
the Court will grant the motion in part.
The Defendants argue that the lis pendens should be released pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2.5(3), which reads:
(3) A court shall order a notice released if: (a) the court
receives a motion to release under Subsection (2); and (b)
the court finds that the claimant has not established by a
preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the
real property claim that is the subject of the notice.
The Court first notes that while it has addressed the lis pendens in other rulings related to this case, this is the first
1 of 4

time a motion for release has been filed. The Court has ruled
that the lis pendens did not constitute a wrongful lien and has
cited to Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah
1979) to support the proposition that the lis pendens could stay
in place pending the Plaintiffs' appeal. See "Ruling and Order," p. 6 (filed March 29, 2006). In the March 29 ruling, the
Court stated that "the Court will not order removal of the lis
pendens." id. The Court further ordered that "the lis pendens
is not wrongful and should not be removed during the pendency of
this litigation, including during any pending appeal.7' Id. at
8. In taking that position on the issue of the lis pendens, the
Court was considering it in the context of finding the lis pendens to not be wrongful. In other words, the Court's refusal to
order the release of the lis pendens was due to the Court's
finding that the lis pendens was not wrongful and could therefore lawfully remain in place.
The Defendants' motion to release presents the Court with a
new issue to consider. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-40-2.5(3), it would appear that the Court has no choice but
to release the lis pendens at this time. The statute requires
(1) a motion to be filed and (2) a finding by the Court that the
"claimant" (as defined by the statute, see Utah Code Ann. §
78-40-2.5(1)(a)) has not established the probable validity of
the underlying real property claim. Both of these criteria are
met at this time. The Defendants have filed a motion, satisfying the first requirement. Furthermore, the Court has granted
the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, indicating that the
Plaintiffs' have failed to establish probability of validity of
the underlying property claim by a preponderance of the evidence, satisfying the second requirement.
The Plaintiffs argue that, should the Court decide to leave
the lis pendens in place, the Court may require a "guarantee"
(as defined by the statute, see Utah Code Ann. §
78-40-2.5(1)(b)) as a condition of maintaining the notice. As
the Court reads the statute, and as previously stated, the Court
does not have a choice as to whether to leave the lis pendens in
place once the requirements of § 78-40-2.5(3) are met. The
Court does not construe the statute to allow the Court to ignore
the mandatory "shall" language of § 78-40-2.5(3) by requiring a
2 of 4
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ORDER
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
the Defendant's motion is GRANTED IN PART: 1) the notice of lis
pendens is ordered to be released forthwith and 2) the Defendants request for costs and fees on the motion is DENIED.
Dated this

iV-

day of

ftuflfjref

2006,

BY THE COURT:

JOHN R. AND:
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FARNSWORTH, GREGORY
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Direct Examination by MR. LUNDGREN:
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) Case No. 04080079
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 17th day of
June, 2005, that the deposition of JAMES FARNSWORTH,
produced as a witness herein at the instance of the
plaintiffs herein, in the above-entitled action now
pending in the above-named court, was taken before
DEBRA A. DIBBLE, a Registered Professional Reporter in
and for the State of Utah, commencing at the hour of
10:00 a.m. of said day, at the DUCHESNE COUNTY
COURTHOUSE, 21554 West 9000 South, Duchesne, Utah.
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A P P E A R A N C E S

1

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

MR. LUNDGREN:

This is the time and place

3
4
5
6

Alvin R. Lundgren
Attorneys at Law
5015 W. Old Highway
suite 200
Mountain Green, Utah 84050
(801) 876-4422

3

appointed pursuant to notice, Utah Rules of Civil

4

Procedure, for the deposition of James Farnsworth.

5

Mr. James Farnsworth is present, and his

6

attorney Clark Allred.

7

present, with their attorney Alvin Lundgren.

The plaintiffs are also

17

1 89

8

1

9

MR. CLARK:

Before we start, a couple of

things.

10
FOR THE DEFENDANT:

10

111
112
113
114

Clark B. Allred
ALLRED £ McCLELLAN
Attorneys at Law
363 East Main Street
Suite 201
Vernal UT 84078
(435) 789-7800

I notice we have the tape recorder, the VCR,

11

and a reporter.

12

except I think the official record of this deposition

I have an objection to being here,

i

13

should be with the reporter's taking.

14

have no objection to just for personal use, but I

15

would, if anybody intends them to be available for

16

court use.

The other two, I

115
116

jl7
ALSO PRESENT:

17

Where we have a reporter here, so.
I don't know what the intent is.

18

119

Ty and Marina Eldridge
Karen Lundgren
Justin Allred

18
19

MR. LUNDGREN:

Well, your objection is duly

noted.

20
20

MR. CLARK:

Is the intent any other than

21
21

that?

22

22

MR. LUNDGREN:

Well, it may or may not be

23
23

used in court.

24

possible evidence in court.

25

you're certainly entitled to object, and we'll let the

We reserve the right to raise it as a

24

And if we do raise it,

25
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judge make a decision.
MR. CLARK: Well, okay. There's a basis on
how you do video depositions, and we have not followed
that procedure at all.
MR. LUNDGREN: Well MR. CLARK: And where we have an official
reporter, I don't think it's appropriate, and it
violates your rule to have more than one record.
MR. LUNDGREN: You're so entitled to object.
MR. CLARK: Also, there are individuals here
we haven't identified on the record.
My son is with me, and - just because I
have to take him on to Salt Lake.
I don't know who the blonde lady is.
MR. LUNDGREN: My legal assistant, Karen, is
with me.
MR. CLARK: Okay.
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Mr. Farnsworth, have you
ever had your deposition taken before?
A. No.
Q. The first thing we're going to do is have
you sworn in by the recorder.
JAMES FARNSWORTH
having first been duly sworn, was examined and testified
as follows:

1
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Page 6
1
2

3
4
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9
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12
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14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
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23
24
25

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. LUNDGREN:

Q. I'm sure your attorney has talked to you a
little bit about the purpose behind a deposition, and
what happens here.
Just as a reminder, this is your sworn
statement. You are under oath under penalty of perjury
to tell the truth here.
This is somewhat an informal proceeding, and
that any time you need to take a break, or if you need
any sort of time to consult with your attorney, you are
entitled to do so.
Do you understand that?
A. (Witness nods.)
Q. You also are required to answer your
questions with yes or no. The recorder cannot put down
a nod, or an uh-huh, or something of that nature.
A. Okay. Yes.
Q. And not to be picky, but I'd rather have you
say yes or no than yeah, because sometimes yeah can be
misinterpreted. And it just makes her job easier, and
it makes my job easier, and your attorney's job as
well.
Are you now taking any sort of medications,
or ~ of any kind that would affect your ability to

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
| 25

answer questions today?
A. No.
Q. Are you ill, or sick, or under any sort of
disability, either mentally, emotionally, or
physically, that would affect your ability to attend
this deposition?
A. No.
Q. I want to start out and just get a little
bit of information about you, Mr. Farnsworth, because I
don't know you. I'd like to find out a little bit
about you.
Where were you raised?
A. I was raised in the Mormon colonies in
Mexico.
Q. I'll bet that was an exciting and
interesting experience.
What is your educational background?
A. I've been to college for two years.
Q. Whichr college did yotrgo to?
A. I went to Eastern Arizona Junior College,
and Utah Valley College — state college, I guess now.
Q. And what is the last year you attended
school?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Well, give me a rough estimate?
Page8|
A. '88, '89.
Q. When were you born?
A. 1960.
Q. And what date?
A. July the 6th.
Q. And you were born in Mexico?
A. No. Tucson, Arizona.
Q. What is your current employment?
A. Maxway Trucking.
Q. And what do you do for Maxway?
A. Driver.
Q. How long have you been employed there?
A. Since 1983.
Q. Where do you currently live?
A. Where do I currently live?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Lake Shore, Utah.
Q. How long have you lived in Lake Shore?
A. Since 2000.
Q. Where did you live prior to that?
A. Orem.
Q. How long did you live in Orem?
A. Seven or eight years, I guess.
Q. Okay.
Do you own your current home?

1
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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A. Well, it's financed through the bank.
Q. You're purchasing it?
A. Mm-hmm. (Witness nods.)
Q. And did you own the home in Orem, or are you
purchasing it?
A. No. We're financing it through the purchasing it.
Q. Other than these two residences, do you own
any other real estate?
A. No.
Q;-other than these two, have you owned any
other, or been purchasing any other real estate in the
past?
A. No.
Well, I guess you'd have to say that I owned
the ranch here, that we're in this whole deal over, for
a while, I guess. But other than that, no.
Q. Have you ever been arrested for any crime?
A

rrr
12
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Q. How old are you now?
A. 44.
Q. How old is David?
A.. 52. And Greg should be about 50.
Q. When your father left it to you, did he
leave it to you in a will, or a trust, or how did it
pass - how did title pass?
A. He just left us as co-executors of his
estate. All three of us.
Q. Did he have a trust?
ATNO

Q. So he left a will?

A. Yes.
13
14
Q. And did the property go through probate?
A. Yes.
15
16
Q. Who - you said you all three are
17 co-executors of the estate?
18
Lio—

Van_

rly^

-|i9~
A. ies^
20
Q. What crime?
21
A. Not paying a speeding ticket.
22
Q. Other than a traffic kite, anything else?
23
A. No.
24
Q. Are you related to the plaintiff, Ty
J25 Eldridge?

A. (Witness nods.)
QTTO eruiwi-- any oneijryuu nrcnarge^oi uic

20 group?
21
A. No.
Q. You share the responsibility equally?
22
A. Yes.
23
Q. When did you make the decision to sell the
24
25 property?
Page 10

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A. I don't know.
Q. Tell me how you come about to have an
interest in the property which is the subject of this
lawsuit.
A. It was my father's ranch.
Q. And how did you come to have an interest in
it?
A. I don't quite understand your question. I
mean -Q. Your father's ranch, you have a legal
interest in it now. What happened that you obtained
the legal interest in it from your father?
A. Oh. He died.
Q. And what year did he dye?
A. What are we? I guess 2003, or 2002.
Probably 2002, because I guess we're going on three
years here in the fall.
Q. Okay.
Did your father leave it to you?
A. To me and my two brothers.
Q. What are your brothers' names?
A. David and Greg.
Q. Are these younger brothers or older
brothers?
A. Older.
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Page 12
A. I don't recall exactly. Soon after he
passed away.
Q. Once you made the decision to sell the
property, how did you make that known to the general
public?
A. We listed it on the internet.
Q. Is that all you did?
A. After a while of being listed on the
internet, then we signed up — or listed it with a real
estate agent.
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 1
was marked for identification.)
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Let me show you what has
been marked as Exhibit 1.
Can you identify that document for me?
A. As far as I know it looks like a ~ the real
estate listing there, with Gerald Wilkinson.
Q. Does your signature appear on this page?
A. Yes.
Q. And which one is it at the bottom?
A. The top one of the three.
Q. Do you recognize the other two signatures?
A. Yes.
Q. And whose are they?
A. They're my two brothers.
T k
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Q. And is the second one David's?
A. Yes.
Q. And is the bottom one A. Greg's? Yes, as far as I can tell.
Q. There's some handwriting at the bottom. Can
you read that for me?
A. Where it says addendum?
Q. I believe that's what it says.
A. Yeah. It says, If the owners find a buyer
for this propertyL that total commission paid to the
listing agents will be three percent of the sale price.
Q. And this is a correct copy of the original
document you signed?
A. As far as I know.
Q. Did you list it with any other agent?
A. After - I don't remember the exact dates,
but after this went for a while we did, I guess, what's
called a co-listing with another agent named Allen
Wade.
Q. Let me show you what's going to be marked
Exhibit 2.
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 2
was marked for identification.)
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Can you identify
Exhibit 2?
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A. My brother had this one in his possession,
but I think I've seen it once. It looks like it's it would be the co-listing agreement.
Q. Is this the co-listing to which you were
referring?
A. Yes.
Q. Let me direct your attention to page two of
this document. There are two pages in it only.
A. Mm-hmm.
Q. And there's some signatures at the bottom.
Can you identify those signatures for me?
A. The one that's mine and my brothers I can.
Q. There are three lines with - which appear
to have signatures on them. Which signature is yours?
A. Mine is the one that says J. Farnsworth. It
would be the second signature from the - well, this
one right here.
Q. All right.
A. Second from the top, I guess.
Q. And the signature that just appears above
your name, do you recognize that?
A. That's my brother David, yeah.
Q. In addition to this you had an ad that has
appeared on the internet?
A. Yes.
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Q. When did you first have contact with
Mr. Eldridge?
A. I don't remember the exact date. Sometime,
I think, in the first part of August. Middle of August
maybe. I don'tQ. And I'm going to represent to you that that
was about August 5th.
Do you remember what the first contact
consisted of? What he said to you?
A. Not - well, I'm - not exactly. I couldn't
quote it. I'm sure it was something to his interest to
purchase the ranch.
Q. And do you recall what your response was to
him?
A. Not exactly.
Q. Did you describe the ranch to him?
A. You know, I don't remember the conversation
exactly. I'm sure I did, if he was interested in it.
I probably told him what I'd told other people that had
called on the phone about it.
That it wasn't a ~ just as we'd start out,
that it wasn't a money-making ranch. And then probably
just a little bit about the ~ you know, the layout of
it, I guess. How big it was probably. Maybe. I —
but I don't remember the conversation that well.
Page 161
Q. Do you recall whether or not you gave him
directions to the ranch?
A. I don't - not in the first conversation —
At some point in time I gave him directions.
I don't know now if it was that first contact or not.
Q. And I'll represent to you that there was a
second call about the 7th of August. It could have
been that call? Would that sound right to you?
A. It could have been, yeah.
Q. Let me show you Exhibit 3.
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 3
was marked for identification.)
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Can you recognize this
exhibit, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. And what is that?
A. It's a - I don't know exactly what you call
it, but an aerial plat, or something like that. Of the
acres that involves the ranch.
Q. Did you send a copy of that to Mr. Eldridge?
A. I don't remember if we sent it, or hand gave
it to him, or what. But it came from me to him.
Q. There's a date at the top of this, which
appears to be a facsimile transmission. It says
August 8th, '04.
J
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Could that be about the approximate time
1
2 that document was sent to Mr. Eldridge?
A. Yes.
3
Q. Let me show you what has been marked as
4
5 Exhibit 4.
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 4
6
was marked for identification.)
7
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Do you recognize that
8
9 document?
A. No, but I know what it is. I mean.
10
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Q. What is it?
A. It looks like a fax cover sheet.
Q. Do you recognize the signature at the bottom
of that page?
A. Yes.
Q. And whose signature is that?
A. My wife's.
Q. And there's an address at the upper
left-hand cornei^o£ thi^ covei^sheetIs that your home address?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you know whether or not your wife may
have sent real property tax notices, irrigation and
water share information, and utility information to
Mr. Farnsworth?
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on Sunday, August 5th?
A. I don't recall ever meeting him on Sunday at
the ranch.
Q. No, that wasn't my question. Let me - and
if you don't understand exactly what I'm asking, make
sure I keep it clear for you. Because I'm not trying
to confuse you.
A. All right.
Q. Do you recall whether or not about August
12th, that Mr. Eldridge would have called you and asked

flT

you to meet him up at the rancJTon Sunday, August l~5~th?

12
A. I don't recall it the way you're telling me.
Q. Do you recall that you may have responded to
13
14 him that you could not meet up there on a Sunday,
15 because you were elders quorum president?
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A. To Mr. Eldridge?
1
2
Q. To Mr. Eldridge? Thank you.
3
A. I think so.
4
Q. There's a date on this document of
5 8-10-2004. Would that have been about the time this
6 document was sent?
7
A. I don't dispute it.
8
Q. You don't have any reason to believe that
9 it's not accurate?
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A. Yeah. No.
In fact, do you know what? There's some
writing on the top of here. This
www.westernlandrealty.com. That's not mine or my
wife's writing. I think that's probably put on there
at some other time.
Q. All right. Thank you.
After this information was faxed to
Mr. Eldridge, do you recall whether or not he got back
in touch with you again?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. Did he request permission to go up at the
ranch and look at it?
A. At some point in time he did, yeah.
Q. But whether or not he called you on or about
August 12th, requesting that you meet him at the ranch

A. Yeah. That - I recall something like that.

16

17 I think I gave him a key and he ~ so he could go
18 himself.
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yr~Are"you,~inriaet7_an eiders quorum
president?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall whether or not he asked
whether or not your brothers could meet up there on a
Sunday?
A. I don't recall.
Page 20
Q. Do you recall whether or not you told him
that your brother could not, because he was a bishop?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Do you have a brother that was a bishop at
that time?
A. Yes.
Q. Which one?
A. David.
Q. On or about August 12th, do you recall
talking to Mr. Eldridge about the fact that there was a
real estate sign on the property?
A. I don't recall the exact conversation.
Q. Has there been a real estate sign on the
property?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall whether or not you made any
comments to Mr. Eldridge whether or not a realtor was
presently involved?
A. No, I don't recall.
Q. You indicated that you offered Mr. Eldridge
a key.
A. Yes.
Q. Is that correct?
Did you make arrangements to meet and give
him the key?
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A. Yes.
Q. Did you talk with Mr. Eldridge at this time
about whether or not you might have been related to
him?
A. At some point in time we did. I don't know
if that was the time or not.
Q. What was the substance of that conversation,
as you recall it?
A. I don't recall it that well, other than
he Your client knows better than I would,
because he's the one that approached the subject.
It seems like maybe he said something about
us having a common ancestor. And that's about all I
remember about it.
Q. Do you remember when you met Mr. Eldridge to
give him a key to the ranch?
A. To the best of my recollection, it was in
Heber.
Q. Do you remember what day that was?
A. No.
Q. Was it a weekday, or a weekend?
A. I couldn't say for sure. I think it was
Sunday, but I'm not positive.
Q. Do you remember at that meeting whether or
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not you give Mr. Eldridge copies of the originals of
the tax and water information at that time?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall at that time whether or not
you offered to allow the Eldridges to stay overnight at
the ranch?
A. We may have. I didn't object to them
staying there if they wanted, so.
Q. Do you recall the next conversation you had
with Mr. Eldridge?
A. No.
Q. Did there come a time, shortly thereafter,
where Mr. Eldridge called you and offered to make a
ranch on the property?
Excuse me. Let me rephrase that. I think I
stumbled there.
Did a time, shortly after, occur where
Mr. Eldridge called you stating that he wanted to make
an offer on the property?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember how long after that it was?
A. No.
Q. Couple days? Couple weeks?
A. Seems more like a couple of weeks.
Q. But you don't recall the date?

n « ~ ~ ^1
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A. I don't recall.
Q. Do you recall that you went to Mexico in
August?
A. Yes.
Q. And what part of Mexico - what part of
August did you go to Mexico?
A. I don't remember the dates.
Q. Do you recall telling Mr. Eldridge that he
had to wait until you got back from Mexico to make an
offer?
A. No, I don't recall that.
Q. Do you recall telling Mr. Eldridge that
you've not yet talked to your brothers about him making
an offer?
A. I don't recall that.
Q. Do you recall whether or not you told
Mr. Eldridge that you were going - that you had
already turned down an offer for 325,000?
A. Yes.
Q. Who made that $325,000 offer, do you recall?
A. No.
Q. Do you have copies of that offer?
A. It was just over the phone.
Q. Do you recall that on or about August 22nd,
that you called Ty and talked to him about the price on
Page 24
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the property?
A. I haven't kept records of my phone
conversations, so when you ask me to put an exact date
to something, it's hard for me to answer in the
affirmative.
Q. Well, let me rephrase the question, because,
again, I'm not trying to trick you up here. I'm just
trying to find out what you know.
On or about the 22nd of August, sometime
after your return from Mexico, do you recall talking to
Mr. Eldridge?
A. I don't recall the time. But yes, I recall
talking to him about it, sure.
Q. And was that right after you returned from
Mexico?
A. I believe so.
Q. Okay.
And did you call him?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Did you talk about the price with
Mr. Eldridge?
A. At some point in time, we did.
Q. Did you talk with him about the equipment on
the property?
A. At some point in time, yes.
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Q. Did you talk to him about a refrigerator?
1 including that the riding lawnmower would not be there?
A. At some point in time, we did.
2
A. We had a conversation that was talked about
3 some of the things that you just mentioned, yes.
Q. What was the conversation about the
4
Q. And was the riding mower part of that
refrigerator?
5 agreement?
A. To the best of my recollection, if 6
A. Of the original agreement?
Was the refrigerator gone, then, Ty, or
7
Q. Yes.
what?
8
A. No.
MR. CLARK: You just need to answer the
9
Q. Was an adjustment made for the riding
questions.
10 lawnmower?
THE WITNESS: Then the refrigerator I
A. Yes.
Mip5^e~w&~lms^
to nave anotnefone TTl
12
Q. What kind of an adjustment?
re - in its place.
13
A. We decided to take a thousand dollars off
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) And did you offer to do
14 the asking price.
that?
15
Q. So the actual asking price would have been
A. Yes.
16 $339,000?
Q. And did you offer to make available other
17
A. After we took the — yes.
personal property?
18
Q. And you, or one of your family members,
Do you understand what I mean when I say
419—wotrid~remove-the riding lawnmowerfronrthe ranch?"
"personal property?"
20
A. No.
A. Yes.
21
Q. Along with some other property?
Q. Did you offer to make other personal
22
A. No. That never - no.
property available to Ty and Marina, that was on the
23
Q. Explain to me how that would work.
ranch?
A. Some of it.
24
A. We were just talking - we were just
Q. Do you remember the price to which you
25 negotiating terms. We didn't ever talk about who was
Page 261
agreed to in this first conversation?
1
A. Yes.
2
Q. And how much was that?
3
A. 340,000.
4
Q. Did you offer to prepare a real estate
5
purchase contract?
6
A. I don't recall.
; 7
Q. Did you ever prepare a real estate purchase
8
contract?
9
A. No.
10
Q. Do you know who prepared the first real
11
estate purchase contract?
12
A. No.
13
Well, it was — I suppose it was either
14
Mr. Eldridge or his wife.
15
Q. Do you recall talking to Mr. Eldridge
16
shortly after that, and again, you were discussing some
17
of the personal property on the ranch, and a
18
conversation may have included comments by Marina that 19
the riding mower was not included?
20
A. Ask me that again?
21
Q. Shortly after this date, where you were
22
discussing the $340,000 price with Mr. Eldridge, do you
23
recall having a conversation with Ty, talking about
24
some of the items that would not be on the property,
25
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going to remove this, or that, or the other.
Q. All right.
But the riding lawnmower was not going to be
included in the price of the ranch.
A. The riding The riding lawnmower was not to be included
in the price of the ranch? Is that what you —
Q. Yeah. They were not going to buy the riding
lawnmower with the ranch, were they?
A. That's right.
Q. And there were a few other items they were
not going to purchase. Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Let me show you what has been marked as
Exhibit 5.
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 5
was marked for identification.)
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Have you seen this
document before, Mr. Farnsworth?
A. Yes.
Q. And what is that?
A. Real estate purchase contract.
Q. Do you recognize the handwriting on this
first page?
A. Some of it.
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1
Q. Is any of that yours?
2
A. Yeah.
3
Q. Which of the handwritten items on that first
4
page are in your handwriting?
5
A. I had to add this Marina J. Eldridge, this
6
part that says Basin Land and Title, and down here
7
where it says conventional. And then wherever it's
8
initialed by me.
9
Q. Do you know who prepared the rest of it?
10
A. I don't know for sure. I'm assuming it's Ty
|il
or his wife.
12
I mean, they recognize their own
13
handwriting. I mean, have them look at it.
14
Q. Let me direct your attention to the last
15
page of this document, Exhibit 5.
Is that your signature?
16
17
A. My signature is on here twice.
18
Q. Okay.
19
Is it possible that the person that prepared
this document, other than where your handwriting is, 20
21
was a friend of yours?
A. No.
22
Q. Were you, on August 24th of 2004, authorized 23
by your brothers to accept this offer?
24
A. No. I don't recall the exact date.
25
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Q. Well, look at the last page of this
document, Mr. Farnsworth. And there's a date next to
your signatures. What is that date?
A. August the 24th.
Q. On August 24th of 2004, were you authorized
to accept this purchase offer on behalf of yourself and
your brothers?
A. I believe so.
Q. And how did you obtain that authorization?
A. By showing them a copy of it and consulting
with them.
Q. Have your brothers ever objected to this
offer? Or your acceptance of this offer?
A. They — I don't — they may have had some
objections, but not in the overall.
Q. Do you recall when they gave you specific
authority to sign this offer?
A. No.
Q. You don't recall whether you talked to them
on the 24th and showed them a copy of this, and they
gave you verbal authorization at that time, or A. Like I said, I don't remember the exact
date.
Q. Do you remember signing this document?
A. Yes.
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Q. Do you remember what time of day you signed
it?
A. No.
Q. Do you remember how long before you actually
signed this document that you discussed it with your
brothers?
A. No.
Q. What was included in this contract? What
were the Eldridges buying? What was your understanding
with them, what they were purchasing?
A. The 280 acres, and the farm equipment, and
items of personal property that would be left behind by
us, that would be decided by us as brothers which they
were going to be.
Q. Give me some idea of what you thought those
items would be that would be left behind?
A. Bedding, some beds, dishes. That's probably
about it.
Enough for them to be able to live in the
house there, without - that's about it.
Q. Was furniture included in that?
A. Furniture, yeah.
Q. Was any farm equipment included in that?
A. I just said farm equipment.
Q. What kind of farm equipment existed on the
Page 32
farm at that time?
A. There was a swather, and a bailer, and a
stack wagon. There might have been another piece or
two, but that was basically it.
Q. Any tractors?
A. No.
Q. Any motorized equipment?
A. No. Well, the swather is motorized.
Q. Any irrigation equipment?
A. The irrigation equipment is supposed to stay
with the ranch.
Q. Give me some idea of how much irrigation
equipment was there.
A. Two motorized wheel lines.
Q. What length were they?
A. I don't know.
Q. Approximately?
A. I don't know. They went down the length of
the field. However long that is.
Q. Well, I'm not familiar with your property.
See if you can give me some estimate.
You know, there - was it about 100-foot
length? Was it about 200-foot length? Was it a
500-foot length? I don't know.
A. Oh, that's maybe - what is it? 150 yards,
|
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my best guess.
Q. Okay. Each of them about the same length?
A. One was a little longer than the other one.
Q. Other than what you've mentioned, any other
equipment or personal property that would have
remained?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. Did you talk about leaving any ATVs, three
wheel errs, four wheelers?
A. There was two ATVS that we would leave,
(^Anymotorcycles?
A. There was a couple old motorcycles that we'd
leave too.
Q. Okay.
Now that we're talking about this, does this
refresh your memory? Is there anything else that you
were planning on leaving?
A. Not that I recall. I'm not saying we were
going to — we didn^t go^ through: and da a& inventory o n every nut and bolt that was on the place, and what we
were going to take and what we weren't.
Q. I understand. I'm just talking about
significant equipment.
I Understand, I wasn't there. You were there.
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280 acres, and the stuff in the house, that we were
going to remove at our discretion.
So there was never any exact ~ he was
asking me this over the phone. I'm in Provo when I'm
telling this. I can't recall every single thing at the
time. That's why the thing between him and I was, we'd
take whatever — out of the house - all of the items
that are out of the house that was personal property,
and it was going to be our discretion as to what it was
going to be.
QTBut you had discussed with him that you were
going to leave these three-wheelers and the irrigation
equipment, and the farm equipment, and some of the
household stuff. Is that correct?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Was that your intention, to leave that with
him?
A. He requested that.
Q_ And did you—
A. Well, we never talked about any of the
irrigation equipment, if I remember right, but he
requested that the four-wheelers be left there.
Q. And did you agree to that?
A. Yes.
Q. And was that all to be included in the

Page 34
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I'm trying to understand what you knew, and what your
1 $339,000?
understanding was.
2
A. Yes.
A. Well, I gave a statement of what we talked
3
Q. And even though that property is not
about with him already about it.
4 mentioned on this agreement, was it your intention to
Q. Okay.
5 honor that agreement with Mr. Eldridge?
Now, I noticed that none of what you've been
6
A. Yes. To the way I stated it, yes.
talking about is listed in the real estate purchase
7
Q. And did you expect that Mr. Eldridge could
contract, or perhaps you can point to me where the
8 rely upon your promise that you would deliver that?
personal property is discussed on the real estate
9
A. Yes.
purchase contract.
10
MR. LUNDGREN: Did you get a copy of that
A. Well, I 11 Exhibit 5?
I'm not understanding your question. You
12
MR. CLARK: Yes.
want it listed what we were going to remove? Or what
13
MR. LUNDGREN: Let's take a break for a
we were going to leave?
14 short second, please.
Q. Well, a list of what was — personal
15
(Whereupon, a break was taken.)
property that was included in the sale. Is there a
16
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Let me bring your
list of the personal property that was going to be
17 attention back to Exhibit 5, Mr. Farnsworth.
included in the sale that's on this real estate
18
Let me direct your attention to the third
purchase contract?
19 page of this real estate purchase agreement.
A. No. I don't think so.
20
Paragraph seven talks about seller
Q. Was this property included in the sales
21 disclosures.
price of $339,000?
|22
A. Mm-hmm.
A. Maybe this will help you clear things up.
23
Q. Did you ever provide any seller disclosures
It's basically what I said before. We were
24 to Mr. Eldridge?
going to leave the farm equipment, and then there's
25
A. No.

DEPOMAX REPORTING SERVICES. TNC (XM\ IIK-HK*

T ^ o r r o *\1

Donra

^.^

Multi-Page
Page 37
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Up
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. Did you ever provide a title commitment to
Mr. Eldridge?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Did you ever provide any information to
Mr. Eldridge about any lessees that were using the
property? That is people to whom you had given
permission to use the property?
A. I think I told him — I'm sure - I would
have had to have told him about the guy we had leasing
it from us at the time.
Q. And who was that guy?
A. Kent Bastian.
Q. And when did you tell them about Kent
Bastian?
A. I don't remember.
Q. What did you tell them about Kent Bastian's
agreement?
A. Just that he ran some cows on there and cut
the hay.
Q. Now, I understand that you think you may
have told him that. Any idea of when, or where you
told him that?
A. N o .
Q. Any idea of who else would have been around
during that conversation? That could have heard that?

agreement?
A. Y e s .
Q. D i d y o u expect M r . Bastian t o abide b y the
terms o f that agreement?
A. Y e s .
Q. D i d he?
A. Y e s .
Q. D o y o u recall, o n or about the 1st o f
September, whether or n o t M r . Eldridge called y o u to
inspect the personal property at the ranch?
A. Except for the date. I ' m not reaTsure o n
1
the date, but h e did — w e had a conversation about the
personal property o n the ranch.
Q. And did y o u meet M r . Eldridge at the ranch
t o s h o w h i m the personal property at the ranch?
A. Y e s .
Q. D o y o u recall whether or n o t that m a y have
been around Labor D a y ?
A: N o . --'••-Q. D o y o u recall the date at all?
A. N o .
Q. D o y o u recall w h o w a s there at the ranch
besides y o u and T y Eldridge?
A. N o .
Q. D o y o u recall whether o r n o t M r s . Eldridge
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A. N o .
Q. Is there a written agreement with
Mr. Bastian?
A. N o .
Q. It's an oral agreement?
A. Yes.
Q. How long has Mr. Bastian been running cattle
on the farm?
A. He — that was his second season of doing
it.
Q. What was the terms of that agreement?
A. $2,500 for it.
Q. Mr. Bastian paid you $2,500 for each year
that he run the cattle on the property?
A. Yes.
Q. And he was allowed to cut and keep the hay?
A. Yes.
Q. And that was an oral agreement?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever change that oral agreement with
Mr. Bastian?
A. It was just when the agreement with him,
that when we -- that the place was for sale. And when
we sold it, that then he would have to remove his cows.
Q. Did you abide by the terms of that
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was present?
A. N o . She may have been, but I — just
because I don't recall doesn't mean she wasn't there.
Q. Do you recall whether or not there was
anyone else there?
A. I don't.
Q. D o you recall what happened when you met him
at the ranch?
A. If it's the time I'm thinking about, then we
just walked around and basically pointed out a couple
of items, to remove some of the confusion that we had
about the personal property.
Q. And did you come to agreement on what would
be removed?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you share any other information about
the ranch, or the water system?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. Was there ever a time when you showed
Mr. Eldridge the water system?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it on this occasion, or some other
occasion, or do you know?
A. I don't recall the occasion.
Q. D o you recall, on or about September 9th -
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1 and I know you don't recall any dates, but about the
1
A. No. That's none of my business.
2 first part o f September, whether or not y o u had a
2
Q. Do you recall, on or about this time, that
3 conversation with T y regarding the progress of him
3 Mr. Eldridge may have suggested some form of owner
4 financing?
4 obtaining financing?
5
A. I recall him suggesting some form of owner
5
A. Y e s . Yeah, as y o u prefaced it without the
6 dates. I recall a conversation with h i m about his
6 financing.
7
Q. What was your response?
7
financing.
8
A.
That we didn't want to do it.
8
Q. D o you recall whether or not y o u agreed to
9
Q. Do you recall calling Mr. Famsworth, on or
9 help h i m look for financing?
10 about September 19th, to talk to him about a lease
10
A. Y e s .
TTi option?
[11
Qf.DTd~you help him?
12
A. No.
12
A. Actually, no.
13
Q. Do you recall talking to him on or about
13
Q. D i d you make any inquiries about financing?
14 that date?
14
A. N o .
15
A. No.
15
Well, as far as it pertains to helping him,
16
Q. If I were to show you in your phone records
16 no.
17 that there is a record of a telephone call from your
17
Q. D i d you make any inquiries about financing
18 phone to his on September 19th, could you tell me what
18 the ranch?
-1£—occurred in that conversation?
19
A. No.
20
A. No.
20
Q. D i d y o u talk to any financial institutions
Q. Do you remember telling Mr. Farnsworth that
21 about h o w financing would be arranged o n the ranch? 21
22 you, in fact, liked the idea of a lease option because
22
A. N o t in the context o f that conversation.
23 of the interest that you would be earning?
23 Later on I did inquire, but it's related to his lease
24
MR. CLARK: I think you meant Mr. Eldridge.
24 thing.
MR. LUNDGREN: Excuse me.
25
Q. O n or about the middle o f September, do you J25
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remember having a conversation with Mr. Eldridge, where 1
both of you discussed that the down payment would have
2
to be about $75,000, and not $34,000?
3
A. Ask me again?
4
5
Q. On or about the middle of September - and
I'm not holding you to any specific date, I'm just
6
trying to keep this in some timeline.
7
A. Okay.
8
Q. Do you remember having a conversation with
9
Mr. Eldridge, where both you and Mr. Eldridge
10
11
learned — had learned and understood that about
12
$75,000 would be required as a down payment instead of
13
the $34,000 set - that you had been talking about
14
before?
15
A. Do you mean that they were — his people
16
that he was talking to to get financing from required
17
the 75?
18
Q. Mm-hmm.
19
A. Yes, I remember something like that.
Q. Do you remember talking with Mr. Eldridge at
! 20
that time about him using other property he owned for
21
collateral?
22
A. No.
23
Q. Do you remember telling him that he should
24
not borrow money against other property he owned?
25
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Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Substitute Mr. Eldridge
in there. I misspoke.
A. (Witness confers with counsel.)
Yes.
Q. Tell me what you remember about this
conversation.
A. Well, the conversation was Mr. Eldridge. Is
the way I remember it, he couldn't get financing
anywhere else. This is the only option he had
available to him was to have us finance him.
So we preferred the straight cash offer all
along. So when I made a comment like that, it was
just -- this is ~
It was not in the ~
That comment was made in the context of it
was the lesser of the evils. It wasn't that I
preferred that option over anything else and I was
excited about getting interest, it just made it so it
wasn't as bad. My preference all along would have been
for him to just buy it outright.
Q. Understanding that your perception was that
you preferred the cash, did you continue to talk to
Mr. Eldridge about a lease option, or some other form
of owner financing?

A. Yes.
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Q. Do you recall talking about whether or not
Mr. Eldridge could take advantage of a 1031 exchange?
A. Yes. Well, that was ~ he - that was his
idea. I remember having the conversation with him.
Q. Did there come a time where you agreed to
discuss the terms with Mr. Eldridge about the lease
option?
A. Yes.
But you're not implying there that we agreed
to do a lease option and then we decided to discuss the
terms after, are you?
Q. Well, I'm not making any implications at
all. I'm just asking you questions, Mr. Farnsworth.
A. Well, there was never like a lease option in
place and then we agreed to do the terms. We agreed to
talk about terms about it, but we didn't agree — terms
were going to be agreed to before the lease option was
agreed on.
Q. Okay.
And what terms did you agree upon?
A. Well, I think we agreed upon the period of
time.
Q. And what period of time was that?
A. The best of my recollection, it was going to
run for three years.
Page 46
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Q. All right.
Did you agree on any other terms?
A. I'd have to look at the thing. See, we may
have agreed on some. There's some we didn't.
Q. Did you agree on any sort of a down payment,
or purchase price for the option? Any sort of
percentage of the purchase price you wanted?
A. No.
Q. Did you agree about any sort of an interest
rate?
A. No.
Q. Did you agree about any sort of monthly
payment?
A. No.
These were discussed, we didn't agree on
them.
Q. What was discussed in terms of the down
payment or lease option price?
A. Well, Mr. Eldridge ended up sending over
a - his offer, where, if I recall right, he had ten
percent down. I don't remember exactly what the
interest rate was. And then there's a monthly payment
that he offered in there.
Q. Do you remember talking - prior to him
sending this document to you, can you remember talking
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with him about how much down payment?
A. Yes.
Q. And how much was discussed?
A. He wanted to give ~ I think it ends up
being about ten percent.
Q. Okay.
How much did you want?
A. 20.
Q. Did you talk about an interest rate?
A. Yeah, we did.
Q. And howmuch was discussed?
A. It seemed like Mr. Eldridge wanted something
like around two - between two and three percent.
Q. And how much did you want?
A. We wanted - well, we weren't exactly
sure — hadn't really arrived on the fixed amount, but
something a little bit better than what the bank would
give you.
Q. Da you recall telling Mr. Eldridge that you
would charge him less than what banks charged, but more
than what you could get for a CD or a bank savings
rate?
A. I remember mentioning that to him, but I
didn't tell him that that's what we were going to do.
Q. Okay.
Page 48

1
Do you remember how much you actually
2 offered to him in terms of interest rate?
3
A. No.
4
Q. Do you recall suggesting a monthly payment
5 for this three-year option?
6
A. Whether he suggested it or I 7
You phrase your question and it makes it
8 seem like I'm the one that suggested it. There was 9 we discussed --1 don't know who was the person that
10 initiated or whose idea it was. I think it was more
11 your clients' than mine.
12
Q. Do you remember talking to Ty, in which
13 there were two suggestions on the lease? One which
14 was ten thousand ~ ten percent down, $1,500 per month
15 interest, or a second option at ten percent down,
16 $1,750 a month, with $250 a month to go to principal?
17
A. You need to phrase your questions in the
18 right context.
19
These were just terms we were negotiating.
20 You ask me like as if do I recall this thing like as if
21 I'd agreed upon it. We hadn't agreed upon any of this.
22 We had conversations on these things.
23
Q. Do you remember discussing these two
24 specific offers?
25
A. I seem - yeah. I don't know the exact -
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1
don't hold me to the exact numbers, but I remember
2
discussing something along those lines, yeah.
3
Q. Do you recall Ty talking to you and
4
suggesting that a down payment of ten percent, with
5
$1,675 a month paid, with 25 percent to go to
6
principal?
7
A. I seem - I recall — I don't remember the
8
25 percent going to principal I'm not sure on.
9
Q. Do you remember telling him you were going
10
to talk to your brothers and get back to Ty?
A. Yes.
11
Q. Did you talk to your brothers?
12
A. Yes.
13
Q. And what did you agree upon with your
14
brothers?
15
A. They didn't seem like it was a good enough
16
offer.
17
Q. Do you recall talking to Mr. Eldridge and
18
stating that he wanteds runfiv^horses-on-the-ranch- \l9.
during the lease period?
20
A. Yes.
21
Q. Do you recall asking Ty to draw up a lease
22
agreement? Lease option?
23
A. No.
24
* * *
25

Ever since we decided to look at the
possibility of doing this, I told Mr. Eldridge on more
than one occasion that we'd be consulting with people
on how to - how it ought to look.
Q. And who did you consult with?
A. His name is Doug Westbrook.
Q. Where is Mr. Westbrook?
A. St. George.
Q. Who else did you talk to?
A. I talked to a guy who's a real estate agent
in St. George. I just met him in passing, so I don't
know his name.
Q. Okay.
A. And my brothers consulted with a girl who
works at a title company. Name's Raquel Dunn.
Q. Do you know Raquel?
A. I've met her once, but I don't know her
personally.
Qr But dithyotmot taHt tcrher?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever show Exhibit 6 to
Mr. Westbrook?
A. I don't recall. I don't think so.
•
Q. And did you ever talk to Mr. Westbrook about
these particular terms?

Page 50
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 6
1
was marked for identification.)
2
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Let me show you what has
3
been marked as Exhibit 6.
4
Do you recognize that document?
5
6
A. Yes.
Q. Can you tell me what it is?
7
A. It's his offer to lease with an option.
8
Q. And can you tell me when, or about what time
9
you first saw it?
10
A. We were in the middle of October.
: 11
Q. Do you recall calling Mr. Eldridge the 1st
12
of October, asking about the lease option and
13
requesting him to send up to you a form?
14
A. No.
15
Q. Do you recall thefirstpart of October,
16
somewhere around the 7th, where you called Ty Eldridge, 17
where you discussed adding an addendum to this lease
18
option that would cover the personal property?
19
A. No.
20
Q. Do you remember talking with Mr. Eldridge
21
and telling him that you wanted to talk to a friend of
22
yours about the terms of the lease option?
23
A. I - we had a conversation about that, but
24
not exactly the way you've stated it.
25
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A. You know, I ~ now that I - I think I did
show him this, yes.
Q. Do you recall when you showed him?
A. Not exactly. I couldn't say exactly.
Q. The month of October?
A. Yeah, it was in the month of October.
Q. First part of October? Last part of
October?
A. No. The last part of October.
Q. Let me show you what's been marked as
Exhibit No. 7.
j
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 7
was marked for identification.)
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Have you seen Exhibit 7
before?
A. Yes.
1
Q. When did you first see Exhibit 7?
A. I think he sent this over with the lease
agreement. Or the ~ his offer there.
Q. Do you recall talking with Mr. Eldridge
about changing any of the terms with this residential
lease option to purchase?
A. Yes.
Q. Exhibit 6?
Which term did you change?
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A. Didn't change any of them. I just talked to
him about it.
Q. Which term did you talk to Mr. Eldridge
about changing?
A. Oh, I think there was one in there where
the - I guess there's a default period that seemed
detrimental to him, that we thought should be changed.
It seemed like there was something else. I
can't ~
Oh. I think I discussed with him a fact
about - that we wanted it to be such that we could
sell this, like how you sell a loan, or sell the paper.
Q. Okay.
Anything else you discussed about changing?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. Did you talk with Mr. Eldridge about the
start date of this agreement?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall the discussion about that?^
A. Vaguely. Just when it was supposed to take
effect. If he ~ we ended up doing it, when he wanted
it to start.
Q. Other than what we've talked about, do you
recall discussing any other changes with Mr. Eldridge
after you received this?
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the ranch?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you make arrangements for him to get
the key?
A. Yes.
Q. Where did you put the key?
A. I think I hid it outside on the porch of my
house.
Q. Do you recall, at that time, whether or not
Mr. Eldridge also asked you for information on title?
"XrYesT
Q. Do you recall talking to him about an
abstract?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you offer to give him an abstract your
father had had?
A. I told him I might let him look at it, yeah.
Q. Did you ever let him look at it?
A. No.
Q. Did he ask for the abstract or other title
informations more than once?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Do you recall talking to Mr. Eldridge about
contacting an escrow company to handle payments under
the lease option, if it was entered into?
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1
A. Yes.
A. Not after we received it.
Q. Okay.
2
Q. Tell me about that conversation.
Do you recall, after you had received this,
3
A. Just asked him if we entered into this, if
receiving any telephone calls from Mr. Eldridge
4 he wanted to have us being the ones that he sent the
requesting to get together to close?
5 check directly to, or if he wanted to have an escrow
A. Not to close.
6 company handle it, because it wasn't specified in his
Q. What conversations do you remember with
7 document here.
Mr. Eldridge after this date?
8
Q. And what was his response?
A. I got a call from him where he was inquired
9
A. He didn't have a — he - well, we talked
as to our disposition on signing the thing.
10 about both. Both things. I don't think he'd made up
Q. And do you know about when that might have
II his mind 100 percent either about what to do with it.
been?
12
Q. Did he tell you whether or not he would
A. Sometime in the end of October.
13 contact an escrow company?
Q. Okay.
14
A. I don't recall.
And what was the substance of that
15
Q. Do you recall talking to him at this time
conversation?
16 about whether or not you were selling some of the
A. He was just interested to know what we'd
17 horses that were on the ranch?
kind of thought about going ahead and signing onto it.
18
A. No, I don't remember talking to him about
Q. And your response?
19 that.
A. Oh, we still were considering it, and
20
Q. Do you recall whether or not he asked to buy
looking it over ourselves.
121 one of the horses on the ranch?
Q. Okay.
22
A. Yes.
Do you recall, somewhere around the middle
23
Q. Which horse did he want to buy?
or end of October, where Mr. Eldridge called and asked
24
A. We had a gray mare out there that —
for a key to take his ranch -- to take his parents to
25
Q. Did you suggest a purchase price for the
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horse?
A. I don't remember if I suggested it or if he
did.
Q. What was the price that was discussed?
A. $500.
Q. Did he ever offer you $500 for the horse?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you accept it?
A. N o .
Q. D o you recall talking to Mr. Eldridge, on or
about tne Z4to ot October, aboufTy going back up to
the ranch and doing work on the ranch?
A. N o .
Q. D o you know whether or not Mr. and
Mrs. Eldridge ever did any work on the ranch?
A. Yes.
Q. What did they do?
A. They went out there and winterize weatherized-a&cM-houser-I^origfflat ofchranchrhouse
a little bit! I think put up a piece or two I'm not sure exactly what they did, but,
yeah, they did a little bit of work.
Q. Did you ever tell Mr. Eldridge not to do
work on that?
A. Yes.
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the lease option?
A. I don't recall that. I mean, I may have,
but I don't recall the exact way you've stated it
there.
I mean, I - he knew all along that w e w e r e
consulting with - about it, s o . A s far as an exact
conversation like that, I don't recall.
Q. W a s it at or near this time when y o u talked
to T y about the fact that he could not tear d o w n the
corrals o n the ranch? Assigning certain bills to
Mr. Eldridge he had to pay? That y o u could - just
let m e finish.
That y o u could sell the note?
A. I'm not sure o n the timeframe. Those things
were discussed over the period o f this negotiation,
yeah.
Q. D o y o u recall whether or not y o u agreed t o
close o n or about the 28th at this time?
— A . I can't ~Tior^doifthave"any^rec0ltectiDn
of that, because that conversation A s k m e that again.
Q. O n or about this time, do y o u recall, during
this.same conversation, talking about closing o n the
lease option about the 28th?
A. N e v e r talked at all, ever, about closing.
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Q. When did you tell him that?
1
A. After I found out he did it the first time.
2
Q. Did you ever tell the Bastians that you had
3
sold or leased the ranch effective November 1st, and
4
tell the Bastian's to remove their cows?
5
A. Only part of that. ItoldBastian
6
originally, when we signed the original purchase
7
agreement with Eldridge, that it had sold, as far as,
8
you know, we had signed a contract, and he was going to
9
have to remove them.
10
Q. When did you tell that to Mr. Bastian?
11
A. I don't remember. Somewhere not too long
12
after w e signed the original real estate contract.
13
Q. So in — somewhere in August or early
14
September?
15
A. Probably September.
16
Q. Did you ever tell the Bastians to remove
17
their property by November 1st?
18
A. I told them to remove them. I don't
19
remember the exact date.
20
Q. D o you recall, on or about the end of
21
October, somewhere around the 26th, whether you called j 22
Mr. Eldridge and left a message stating that you wanted
j 23
Ty to call you back, that you were on your way to St.
24
George to talk to a friend regarding the final draft of
25
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Q. Okay.
On or about the 28th, do you recall talking
to Mr. Eldridge about - and telling him that there was
a problem with a realtor?
A. What was the date?
Q. On or about the 28th of October, 2004?
A. On or about? Yes.
Q. What was the problem with the realtor?
A. When we co-listed with the ~ when we went
to re-list with Mr. Wilkinson for the last time, we
decided to co-list it with another agent. And when
they - I'm not sure, because my - the other agents,
my brother dealt with him, and I think he's the one
that drew up the document.
And when they drew it up, we talked about,
to the best of my recollection, that it was just as
usual. Another six-month term. Well, they, somewhere
in their involvement, wrote in 12 months, in the
contract.
Q. Are you talking about Exhibit 2?
A. Yeah. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Is this his?
Q. How is it that it came to your attention
that this was a problem on the 28th of October?
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A. We were reviewing some of the documents, and
looking over Mr. Eldridge's offer, and my brother read
through that again and saw that.
Q. Did you have a conversation with
Mr. Eldridge, where the Farnsworths would just lease
him the ranch until the end of the 12-month listing,
and then add the option if there was a problem with
Mr. Wade?
A. We didn't ever say we'd do that. The
subject was discuss. It wasn't like something we said
we were going to do.
Q. Well, that wasn't my question. My question
was —
A. Well, your questions are kind of lengthy.
Maybe if you kept them a little shorter I could keep
track of it.
Q. If you have a problem understanding my
questions, I want you to ask me to rephrase it or reask
it. I don't want you to be confused, okay?
Is that okay with you?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have a conversation with
Mr. Eldridge, in which you discussed with Mr. Eldridge
that he could lease the property for 12 months, and
then add the option if there was a problem with

Page 63
1 willing to pay half the commission.
2
This is all at the same time there, when w e
3 were at the ranch.
4
Q. Okay.
5
And what was your response?
6
A. That that was going to get to the bottom of
7 the situation first.
8
Q. Did you ever tell Mr. Eldridge that you and
9 your brothers would not agree to take less than the
10 agreed price?
11
A. Yes.
12
Q. And did Mr. Eldridge offer to pay the full
13 real estate fee?
14
A. I don't recall.
15
Q. D o you recall whether or not you told
16 Mr. Eldridge that the realtors did not deserve any fee,
17 and you were going to contact an attorney?
18
A. I remember thinking that w e were going to —
t9--dependmg^oirhow^^wentrwe ? deonsui^^^attorney if
20 we felt we needed to, to see what our options were.
21
Q. Did y o u ever consult an attorney?
22
A. Not about that.
23
Q. On or about this time, did Mr. Eldridge call
24 you and express a desire to g o back up to the ranch?
25
A. N o .

Page 6 2
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Q. Do you recall talking to Mr. Eldridge on or
about this time that you felt bad about the promises
you had made, and didn't want to make any more?
A. You're quoting me there, and the quote is
not accurate.
Q. Well, tell me what happened. What did you
tell Mr. Eldridge?
A. I told Mr. Eldridge that I felt bad that
this thing had came up at the last minute, and we were
not even able to counteroffer him, is what the context
of it was. It was like dead in the water until we had
this thing sorted out.
Q. Did not Mr. Eldridge tell you he was willing
to pay the rest of the realtor fees so there wouldn't
be any problems?
A. Well, that implies that that was the only
problem, and that wasn't the only problem.
Q. What was the other problem?
A. Just all of the other problems that we
didn't like that we've already discussed that were in
his lease option.
Q. Well, I remember talking about the lease
option, and the one he sent you, and you listed some
problems with that. There were no other problems, were
there? Other than the ones we talked about?

Mr. Wade?
A. No.
Q. Tell me about the conversation that you
earlier agreed that happened.
A. We were discussing this situation. And we
thought that that might be an option, if the real
estate agents were being - if we felt that they were
doing this in bad faith.
Q. Okay.
Do you recall that shortly after this,
probably the next day or so, that you had another
conversation with Mr. Eldridge, where you told him that
you were not making progress with the realtors, and
Mr. Eldridge offered to pay half of the real estate
agreement?
A. That's not the conversation the way I recall
it was all in the same day.
Q. Tell me about the conversation as you recall
it.
A. We mentioned to him that we had came across
this situation with the real estate agreement.
That we needed to get it resolved before we
did anything else.
And he said that he didn't want to let a
real estate commission hold up the deal. That he was
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1 documents where he discussed about how it was
A. I just answered your question. You never
2 advantageous to have it purchased separately.
asked me - well, I'd have to go back and review the
3
Q. Have you seen those documents?
questions, but we had reasons we didn't sign these
4
A. I'd have to look back through them and find
lease option.
5 them.
Q. All right. What were the reasons?
6
Q. Do you have those documents?
A. Not enough down payment. He wanted to
7
A. Hold on a minute.
sublet it. He changed the interest. Even on his own
8
Q. I'd like to see those, please.
down payment that he wanted to pay, which we didn't
9
THE WITNESS: Clark, do you have where he's
ever agree to. Then he decided that he wanted to have
110 giving all of his - all of his conversations that we
the farm equipment taken out of that price of money,
bfl ever had?
which in essence lowers the down payment even more.
12
MR. CLARK: Let's take a break for a moment
And13 while we're sorting out what we're looking for.
Q. Well, let's go back to Exhibit No. 6, and
14
MR. LUNDGREN: Let's go off the record for a
let's see if we have a clear understanding here.
15 minute.
Do you have that in front of you, sir?
16
(Whereupon, a break was taken.)
A. Mm-hmm.
17
(BY MR. LUNDGREN) Do you have that document
Q. And how much down payment was he going to
18 to which you're referring to?
offer you?
19
Ar-Yesi
-A—Tenpereent^tf tremember.
Q. Well, is it on line three?
20
Q. Would you show that document to me, please,
A. I don't think so. I think line three says
21 Mr. Famsworth?
the ranch.
22
A. This is the conversation that I'm talking
Q. On page one of the lease agreement 23 about, right? You can read it upside down.
MR. CLARK: I think you're - I think the
24
Q. Why don't you just read me the section
25 t h a t third line down, but there's a number three that he's
Page 68
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looking at.
MR. LUNDGREN: Not paragraph three, sir.
The third line from the top.
THE WITNESS: Oh. Okay.
20 - yeah. That's ~ that would represent,
give or take, ten percent.
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) And how much was that?
A. Ten percent.
Q. $24,000?
A. Mm-hmm.
Q. And was he going to be paying something for
the equipment? Look at Exhibit No. 7.
A. Yeah. He wanted this equipment to be bought
and paid for out of that $24,000.
Q. Well, doesn't that say $10,000 for the
following items?
A. Yeah, but he wanted it to come out of the
24,000.
Q. Where is that expressed?
A. It's not. It was talked about between him
and I. He didn't want to give any more.
He didn't want - like, if he failed on his
thing, he didn't want us to be able to get the
equipment back. He wanted to be that - that to be
purchased separately. And he's got it in his own

1

MR. CLARK: Let's identify it.

2

MR. LUNDGREN: I'm going to.

3
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Let's identify the
4 document first, Mr. Famsworth.
5
A. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' First
6 Discovery Request.
7
Q. And there's a date on one of those pages.
8 Would you recite the date of that? Signature date.
9 To the end of the document.
10
MR. CLARK: Back here.
111
It's not dated. Over here it is.
12
THE WITNESS: It looks like - that's your
13 writing. Can you read it?
14
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MR. LUNDGREN: It looks like it's

March 23rd, 2005?
THE WITNESS: Okay.
MR. LUNDGREN: That's taken off the
certificate of mailing.
" MR; CLARK: That's the certificate of"
mailing.
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) And you're reciting from
this document, Mr. Famsworth, and what you're reciting
is this information supplied by Mr. Eldridge?
A. No, it's not necessarily information
supplied by him, it's just a part of the negotiation we
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Page 77 ]
1
A. David.
A. I think I took some books, if I remember
2
I think one of his kids was there.
right.
3
Mr. and Mrs. Eldridge I think had a friend
I don't remember what my brother took, but
4 there.
he took some stuff.
5
And I - well, I don't recall for sure. I
Q. Did you have a conversation about - with
6
think
one
of my kids might have been there, but I can't
Mrs. Eldridge, where you asked her if it was okay if
7 remember.
you took those books because you vanted to start a
8
Q. Did you, at this time, winterize the
bookstore?
9 irrigation system?
A. No.
10
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
MR. ELDRIDGE: I think it was a library.
11
Q. Mr. Eldridge accompany you on that'/
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Did you tell
12
A. Yes.
Mrs. Eldridge that you took those books because you 13
Q. Did you show him how to winterize it?
wanted to start a library?
14
A. Yes.
A. I just wanted the books to be in my home,
15
Q. Did you talk to him about a faulty valve
because they had been in my home all the time I was 16 there, saying that it needed to be replaced?
growing up.
17
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
18
Q. Did you ask Mr. Eldridge, on this occasion,
Bid-yotrask-Mr&r Eldridge-ifshe-hadrany
[*9—whedle^oi^no^you-th€«lghtthe-view^fromfeeFan^l
objection whether or not you took them?
20 house was worth $400,000?
A. No, I don't think I asked if she had any
21
A. I don't recall that.
objection.
22
Q. Was there any question on your mind, on this
Q. What did you ask her?
23 visit, whether or not the Eldridges wanted to acquire
A. I think I might have asked her if she wanted
24 the ranch?
part of them, that I may not have wanted.
25
A. They - now ask me again?
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Page 78
Q. At this time did Mr. Eldridge offer to pay
for the horse?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he hand you a check for $500?
A. No.
Q. Did you — did he indicate that he had a
$500 check to give to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you accept it?
A. No.
Q. Did you offer to breed Mr. Eldridge's - or
the horse that Mr. Eldridge wanted to buy for nothing?
A. If we would have trans ~ had that
transaction, yes.
Q. Did you tell Ms. Eldridge at this time that
you were going to contact an attorney on Monday
regarding the real estate problem? Real estate agent
problem?
A. I told her that we were going to — if we
felt it was necessary, that we'd contact an attorney,
and do so in a timely fashion.
Q. Who else was at the property besides
yourself and Mr. and Mrs. Eldridge?
A. My brother was there, and I thinl Q. Which brother?

P o r r o 7 7 _ D o ma Qfl

1
Q. Is there any question in your mind, at this
2 time, on the 30th, whether or not the Eldridges wanted
3 to acquire the ranch?
4
A. No.
5
Q. You knew that they wanted the ranch?
6
A. That they wanted to acquire it, yes.
7
MR. LUNDGREN: Can we take a break for
8 lunch?
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
_[25

MR. CLARK: All right.

(Whereupon, a break was taken.)
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) We're back on the record.
As I understand your testimony,
Mr. Farnsworth, we had been talking about your visit to
the ranch on October 30th, when the Eldridges were
there, and others. That you had a conversation with
them about contacting an attorney regarding your real
estate problem. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And the problem was about the fact that
there was a question on the real estate commission?
A. No, the duration of the listing.
Q. The duration of the listing. Let me direct
your attention back to Exhibit No. 2.
In the upperright-handcorner of Exhibit
No. 2, can you read what's written there?
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A. Mm-hmm.
Q. Would you read that for me, please?
A. Per phone conversation with Allen on 10-29
at 10:30 a.m., we owe him nothing on the sale or lease
of the ranch.
I can't read the rest of it.
Q. Do you know whose initials that are?
A. Those are -- they look like my brother's.
Q. And that would be your brother David?
A. Uh-huh.
Qr-Didiri dial solve Ure~question about the Didn't David solve the question about the
length of the real estate commission on the 29th of
October, at 10:30 a.m.?
A. He may have. I didn't know about it yet.
Q. He didn't say anything to you about it on
the 29th?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. Did he say anything-ta-3tf)u^bQ»t-it^m-4:he
30th?
A. I don't remember the exact date when he told
me that he'd had the conversation.
Q. Here was obviously a matter of a concern.
Why would he have waited to tell you?
A. You'll have to ask him.

Page 83

1 reflects to be telephone calls on your cell phone
2 number from the period of approximately August 5th
3 through November 15th, I think the date is.
4
What is your cell phone number, sir?
5
A. 404-1898.
6
Q. And that's area code 801?
7
A. Mm-hmm. Yes.
8
Q. And on the cover page of this document
9 you'll see that it says, in the upper right-hand side,
10 this is a telecommunication services call detail for
11 area - phone number area code 801-404-1898, which you
12 say is your telephone number. Is that correct?
113
A. Yes.
14
Q. Now, unfortunately this is very small print,
15 so I'm going to ask you to indulge with me.
16
But would you forward through that document,
17 and the calls are listed in the chronological order, to
18 the - towards the end you'll see in the upper
-Ht9—left=faand cuiaei, calls siarrin^wlth number 476:
120
Each call line has a number.
21
A. Okay.
22
Q. Okay?
23
Did you find that page that starts with 476?
24
A. Yes.
25
Q.I want you to go down and tell me who you

Page 82
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Q. Is it possible that he told you prior to
1 spoke with at line 479 on October 29th at 4:57 p.m.?
going up to the ranch on the 30th, or while you were at
2
A. I haven't any idea. Let me see, what one do
the ranch on the 30th?
3 you want? 479?
A. No.
4
Q. 479.
Q. That's not possible?
5
And if you look in the column under, it says
A. I guess it's possible.
6 number ~ it says telephone number. Is that your
Q. Well, what date do you think he told you
7 brother's telephone number? David?
that he had resolved the problem with Mr. Wade?
8
A. I don't know his number by memory. So it
A. Sometime right around there. On or about,
9 may be. I couldn't verify it. It may be.
you know.
10
Q. And if you look down there, you're going to
Q. Did you talk to David on the 29th?
11 see telephone interchanges between your telephone
A. Go ahead. Excuse me, I didn't hear your
12 number and 836-9058 on lines 479, 480, 481, 486, 487,
last question.
13 all on the 29th.
Q. Did you talk to David on the 29th?
14
Is it possible that you had this many
A. Not that I recall.
15 conversations, or attempted conversations with your
Q. Did you talk to him on the 30th?
| 16 brother on the 9th?
A. I saw him out at the ranch.
,117
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
18
Q. Is it possible that on the 29th that he told
I have given your attorney a copy of this
19 you that he had spoken to David - or excuse me, Allen
document earlier, which I'd like to mark as an exhibit.
20 Wade that morning and resolved the real estate problem?
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 8
21
A. No, because I didn't know that it was solved
was marked for identification.)
22 when I was out there on the 30th.
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Mr. Farnsworth, I'm going
23
We had - well, never mind. That wasn't
to represent to you that this is a document which I
24 your question.
obtained by subpoena from Nextel Corporation, which
25
Q. Did you know, on October 30th, that another
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1 offer had been presented on the ranch?
1
2
2
A. Yes.
3
3
Q. When did you find out about that offer?
4
4
A. The evening of the 28th.
5
5
Q. When did you tell Mr. Eldridge, when you
6
6 had - that you had received another offer?
7
7
A. I don't recall. It's somewhere in our
8
8 responses to you though.
9
9
Q. Did you tell Mr. Eldridge on the 30th that
ho
Ji(L__yoahad xeceived_aa^Qffer...on the 28th?_
11
11
A. I don't recall telling him.
12
12
Q. Did you tell Mr. Eldridge, on the 30th, that
13
13 others were mad at you?
14
14
A. No.
15
15
Q. While you were winterizing the ranch, and
16 Mr. Eldridge was with you, did he pay close attention 16
17
17 to the winterizing process?
18
118
A. Did he?
19
119
Q7Yes7"
20
20
A. I don't know. You may better ask him.
21
Q. Did | 21
22
A. I was winterizing things. I wasn't looking
j 22
123 at him.
i 23
24
24
Q. He was with you?
25
A. He was with me.
J125

with an option.
Q. Did he tell you any details about that
offer?
A. I don't recall. He gave me the guy's number
for me to call the person.
Q. And you have that number?
A. Not with me.
Q. Can you get it?
A. Yes.
Q._ And_what: was that person's name?
A. Shane Gardner.
Q. And when you spoke with Mr. Gardner, what
did you tell him about the lease?
A. About his offer?
Q. Yes.
A. I asked him what his offer was.
Q. What was his offer?
A. An offer of a lease with an option to
purchased ~
~
I don't remember it exact terms, but I think
he offered 50,000 down. And if I remember right, he
wanted to extend it over four years.
Yeah.
Q. Did he talk about an interest rate?
A. No. Not that I remember.

Page 861
Q. Asking questions?
1
2
A. A few.
Q. You were explaining to him what you were
3
doing?
4
A. Yeah.
5
Q. At any time prior to October 30th, did you
6
ever tell Mr. or Mrs. Eldridge, that as far as you and
7
your brothers were concerned, that there was no deal
8
between you and the Eldridges, or something comparable? 9
A. No.
10
Q. How was the — how did you learn about the
11
offer on the 28th?
12
A. Mr. Wilkinson called me on the phone.
13
Q. How many offers did he tell you he had?
14
A. He had two.
15
Q. Prior to your conversation with him on the
16
28th, how long before that had it been before you
17
talked to Mr. Wilkerson?
18
A. I don't recall.
19
Q. Had it been just one or two days?
[20
A. Yeah. It had been just like - sometime the
121
first part of the week.
J22
Q. And what was that conversation concerning?
23
A. He had had somebody that was interest 24
another person that was interested in leasing the place
25
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Q. What was the purchase price he was offering?
A. I think it was 350.
Q. And what did you tell Mr. Gardner?
A. I told him we'd think about it and get back
with him.
Q. And did you?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did you get back to him? What did
you say?
A. I told him that we — if I remember right, I
think we wanted 70,000 down, and for the thing to
extend over a period of three years.
And then I questioned him a lot about the
avail — if he actually had the money, or if it was
going to be one of these things where he says he has
the money and can't produce it. So I was concerned
about if he could actually come up with his down
payment.
Q. Did you tell him what interest rate you
wanted?
A. I don't recall if I did or not.
Q. Did you tell him whether or not $350,000 was
acceptable?
I
A. Not ~ well, that would imply that I
accepted the whole thing.
I
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No, I didn't tell him the 350 was
acceptable. I told him we'd look at his offer.
Q. You said you wanted $70,000 down, and you
wanted three years. Did you want more than $350,000?
A. That would have been a ~ could have been a
starting point for a negotiation with him.
Q. Did Mr. Gardner ever present to you a
written offer with those terms?
A. No.
Q. How was the conversations with
Mr. Gardner - wnat nappened with those?
A. I called him back when we found out this
problem with the real estate agent. That it was listed
for longer than we had anticipated.
And he just said get back with me when you
know what you want to do.
Q. Did you ever talk to him after that?
A. Mm-hmm.
f\
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A. I don't recall if it was before or after, I
just remember telling — we'd made up our mind that
this is the way we were going to go. I let him know.
Q. Okay.
Did you tell Mr. Gardner, before or after
October 30th, about the real estate agent problem?
A. If I recall the date right, it was on
October the 30th.
Q. Well, if it wasn't on October 30th, and I'll
represent to you that I don't see that on your call
report here, when would - would it have been the 31st7
or would it have been the 29th?
A. I've told you throughout this whole
proceeding. I don't recall the exact date of a phone
call.
Q. I understand. I'm just trying ~
A. I just told you I made the phone calls on or
about sometime around then.
C\

1Q

pry-

20
A. Told him that we'd accepted one of the other
21 offers.
22
Q. What other offer had you accepted?
23
A. The one from Byron Gibson.
24
Q. How long - when - you told him some time
25 after you accepted the offer from Byron Gibson. When
did you accept his offer?
A. I don't — can't remember right off the top
of my head. I'd have to look at the contract. If
you've got it there, that's whatever date we signed it.
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 9
was marked for identification.)
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Let me show you what has
been marked as Exhibit No. 9.
Can you identify that document?
MR. CLARK: This appears to me to be several
documents.
MR. LUNDGREN: Exhibit 9,1 will represent
to you, is several documents that relate ~
A. Well, this one on the top is called ~
reads, a Buyer Due Diligence Checklist. Two pages
later there is a Real Estate Purchase Contract.
Q. Is that the Real Estate Purchase Contract
with Mr. Gibson that you were just speaking about?
A. I think so.
Q. Can you find for me what date that was
accepted?
A. November the 12th.
Q. And so you had a conversation with
Mr. Gardner sometime after November 12th, and told him
that you'd accepted this deal?

•

20
Did you tell the Farnsworths that you had
21 received an offer from Gardner?
22
A. Tell the who?
23
Q> Excuse me. Did you tell the Eldridges that
24 you'd received a call from Gardner ~
A. No.
25
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Q. ~ making an offer on the lease?
A. .No.
Q. Were your brothers aware of that?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you tell Mr. Eldridge that you had
another offer on the property?
A. I don't remember the exact date.
Q. Well, you said you didn't tell him on the
30th. And I'll represent to you that October 30th is a
Saturday.
A. If you want to take the time for me to look
at your client ~ if your client remembers the date,
and I don't dispute it. It's in the documents
somewhere.
Q. If I was going to represent to you that it
was November 8th, you would not disagree with that?
A. I wouldn't like assert that that's when it
was, because I don't remember exactly when it was, but
it ~ I wouldn't have any reason to - it couldn't have
been that day.
Q. And talking about that conversation with
Mr. Eldridge, what did you tell him?
A. I told him that we'd received an offer to
purchase the place from ~ I don't think I told him
who, but I just - I was referring to the Gibson offer.
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Q. And did you talk with Mr. Eldridge about
what his position should be at that point?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you tell him?
A. He wanted to try to match the offer.
Interest.
Q. Okay.
A. But he had indicated to me throughout all of
the negotiations that he was just on the razors edge
financially to be able to afford it at the price he'd
offered, and now we're talking $60,666 more.
So I counseled him to don't put yourself in
financial trouble. If you want - because he told me
that in order to get the money he was going to have to
go to a loan shark. And so I told him, You'd be smart,
since, you know, he'd indicated to me throughout the
course of this thing how difficult it was going to be
for him financially. So I told him, Don't put yourself
inthat position.-Just make an offer that you think
you can afford, and sit in the back-up position.
Because these offers, they have a tend — it's not
uncommon at all for them to not pan out. Especially
right at the start.
Q. Did Mr. Eldridge tell you at that time you'd
do anything to get the ranch?
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A. Yes.
Q. Let me check my math here, but I think six
percent of $400,000 is what, $24,000? Is that
correct?
A. Fine with me. I haven't figured it out.
Q. And if that's correct, then you would
receive, out of that down payment, about $26,000. Is
that correct?
A. If that's what the math is, I don't have any
problem with it.
Q;
^
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A. I don't know. They had somebody set up to
finance them.
Well, they had some group of ~ I shouldn't
say I don't know. I don't remember exactly, and I
never double checked it or saw it in writing. But they
had financing lined up somehow.
Q. Let me direct your attention to the bottom
of that Real Estate Purchase Contract on the first page
there.
And there's some handwriting down there.
Just above paragraph 2.2 at the very bottom?
A. Mm-hmm.
Q. Does that indicate that they were going to
pay you five percent interest?
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A. No.
1
A. Yeah, if this was the - I mean, that's what
Q. Did you tell him you'd talk to your brothers
2 this contract says, if I read the language right.
and see what they could do to help out the Eldridges?
3
If I can read the writing.
A. No.
4
Q. Did you discuss that with your brothers?
Q. Did you tell Mr. Eldridge whether or not any
5
A. I suppose. You know, we went through this
realtors were involved?
6 contract.
A. I can't remember if I told him that or not.
7
Q. Did you and your brothers agree to these
Q. Did you offer to Mr. Eldridge, that if he
8 terms?
came up with somewhere around $390,000 in cash, that
9
A. Yes. And we signed it, yeah.
you would sell the ranch to him without the personal
10
Q. I want you to turn back to the end of this
property, but he had to do that within two days?
11 particular section of documents.
A. Yes.
12
A. Well, do you know what? We had several
Q. How did Mr. Eldridge respond?
13 addendums that went with this.
A. He said he'd try.
14
Q. Let's go through the addendums in a minute?
Q. Let me direct your attention to Exhibit 9.
15
A. All right.
And let's talk about the terms of the Real Estate
16
Q. But I want to see if that's your signature
Purchase Contract.
!117 accepting - making acknowledgment that you'd seen
How much down payment were they going to
i 18 this, and going to make a counteroffer.
pay?
19
A. What page are you on?
A. I'll have to look through. I think it was
20
Q. Well 50,000. Yeah.
21
A. Or Q. How much commission were you going to pay to
22
Q. This is page one, two —
the real estate people?
23
A. You're on the last of the contract?
A. Six percent.
24
Q. - three, four, five. Page six of that
Q. On the $400,000?
25 contract.

ITAUIU'A

agV

Page 97

Page 991

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
TTl
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
p
20
21
22
23
24
|25

A. Yeah. And what was the question?
Q. Is that your signature?
A. Yes.
Q. And then there's addendum to this contract?
A. Yes.
Q. Who drafted this addendum?
MR. CLARK: W h i c h o n e ?
MR. LUNDGREN: A d d e n d u m N o . 1?
THE WITNESS: To the best of my
recollection, it was drafted by Mr. Wilkerson.
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) A n d did~Ke~^
A. And I probably con - I consulted with him,
you know, before he wrote it up.
Q. You consulted with him. Did you direct him
to make this counteroffer? Or addendum?
A. No. We j u s t Q. Well, let me make it —
A. Well, it's an adden - there's Q. Who imtiated-Addendum-Nor-t?
A. Let me see.
If I remember right, I think the buyers
initiated Addendum No. 1.
This was their - part of their offer to that gave us two options we could take, is Addendum
No. 1.
^
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Page 98 ]
Q. Okay.
1
Who initiated Addendum No. 2?
2
A. Well, let's see. I'm not sure on Addendum
3
No. 2, if it was one of the ones that they were giving 4
to us like as an offer, or if 2 it got 5
Because we initiated some of them,
6
obviously, but I am not sure if this was one of them. 7
I think this is still them make making an offer for us 8
to accept.
9
Q. Who initiated Addendum No. 3?
10
A. I think Mr. Wilkerson and myself consulted
11
on this.
12
Q. Is that your signature in Addendum No. 3?
13
A. Yes.
14
Q. Do you know what it says at the bottom of
15
that page?
16
A. No. That's not my writing. I don't know
17
what's on there.
18
That, I think, is probably put on there
119
after I signqd it. It just looks like a —
20
I don't understand — I can't read it. I
21
don't know what it is.
22
Q. Does Addendum No. 3 indicate that you accept 23
the terms of their offer, excepting for allowing for a 24
court date?
25

1
A. I believe so.
2
Q. And there's a second Addendum No. 3 on the
3 page after that.
;
4
Can you tell me what that is?
5
A. Just what it says there. Let me see. Just
6 another addendum to deal with the hearing, I think, as
7 the8
Obviously the buyers were concerned of what
9 the outcome of the hearing was going to be.
10
Q. Did you accept that second Addendum No. 3?
TI
A. Yes.
112
Q. Now, there's a third Addendum No. 3 that's
13 typewritten.
14
What can you tell me about it?
15
A. Nothing other than what I've already told
16 you. I mean, it says what it is.
17
Q. Is the language on these third Addendum
18 No. 3 the same as the one that you accepted? Same
49—words, but-type written?
20
A. I think so.
21
Well, let me check. Yeah.
22
There might be a date or something
23 different, but I think in general it's the same one.
124
Q. Now, there's a signature at the bottom of
25 that one you accepted. That is your signature, is that
Page 100
correct?
A. Are you talking about the handwritten
Addendum No. 3?
Q. The handwritten addendum?
A. Yes.
Q. And what is the date?
A. Let's see. 11-4. November the 4th.
Q. So you accepted this offer on November
the 4th, is that correct?
A. Well, that might be an error in spelling o r
something, because I don't think we accepted it until
December the 4th.
Q. W e l l - A. Or Q . I see some things at the top of this that
seem to indicate A. Or, well, do you know what? Maybe — yeah,
we probably did accept this in November. I don't
remember exactly. I know we sent a lot of addendums
back and forth trying to deal with your guys' hearing,
and so.
Q. My question is whether or not you accepted
this addendum and contract on November 4th.
A. Yes.
Q. Yes, you did. Okay.
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Accepting it with Addendum No. 3 included in there.
Q. Which Addendum N o . 3? You have signed two
Addendum N o . 3 s . You signed one o n 11 and I can't read
that date. And you signed one on 11-4. Which one of
these Addendum No. 3s are you referring to?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Please give me your best estimate of what
you're referring to.
A. In m y best estimate it would be the one
that's in the second order here.
Q. The 11-4?
A. Yeah. I would — yeah. That one that says
no contingencies.
Q. Okay.
Now, bear with me, please.
O n November 4th, after you have signed this
document, according to your understanding, could you
have cancelled the deal with Gibson?
.__ - ^ ^ j j j j j g t Q ^ y understandmgTyoucan
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cancel these things any time up until closing.
Q. Okay.
A. And could y o u Q. Go ahead and explain.
A. I just - that's my understanding of real

25 estate law. I don't know that it's correct or not,
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Page 111
A. But don't ask me if I signed something that
didn't mean anything to me.
Q. I'm just trying to understand what's
happening.
So in the spirit of the agreement, as of
11-4, okay? You still could have sold the property to
somebody else?
Somebody would have come in and offered you
half a million dollars, you could have gone ahead and
signed with somebody else for half a million dollars?
A. The way I understand - m y understanding of
it is you're just negotiating, and you haven't signed,
you're welcome to accept from anybody.
Q. So the answer to that question is yes?
A. M y answer is what it was.
Q. Did you ever talk with your brothers about
whether or not it would be kind of nice, or terms of
that nature, that a distant relative could have
acquired the ranch?
A. N o .
Q. D o you know whether o r not Bob West had
any - acquired any interest in this ranch as part of
this deal with Mr. Gibson?
A. I don't know.
Q. Did Mr. Wilkerson disclose to you that he
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but.
Q. That's all I was asking you for was your
understanding.
So when you made the offer to M r . Eldridge,
on about November 8th, you felt like you could get out
of this deal with Gibson, if Eldridge would come up
with the $390,000 in cash?
A. W e didn't have a deal with Gibson. I hadn't
signed the actual contract yet.
Q. That's m y point. So you could have gotten

II

out of - whatever you signed here didn't mean anything

12 until you signed the final contract on the 12th. Is
13 that correct?
14
A. Well, you're putting words in m y mouth.
15
Q. Well, explain it to me.
16
A. If you want me to explain the spirit of this
17 was, in all of the time between when we got the offer
18 and when we signed it was spent getting to an offer
19 that we thought was acceptable.
20
Q. Okay.
21
A. When we reached that, in the spirit of that,
22 that it was an acceptable offer to us, that's when it
!23 was presented to Mr. Eldridge. Before it was signed.
124
Q. Okay.
25
And so as o f -

Page 112

1 may have an interest in the ranch?
2
A. N o . Bob West or Mr. Wilkerson?
3
Q. M y first question was regarding Bob West.
4 M y second question was regarding Mr. Wilkerson. Gerald
5 Wilkerson?
6
A. Did Gerald have interest? Or if Gerald knew
7 Bob had interest?
8
Q. M y question is do you know whether or not
9 Gerald Wilkerson had any interest in the purchase of
10 the ranch, other than acting as a real estate interest?
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A. No, I don't know.
Q. D o you know whether he knew whether Bob West
had any interest in it?
A. I don't know.
Q. Why did you allow the Eldridges to stay the
weekend on the ranch in - October 30th weekend?
A. Because they asked to.
Q. That's it?
A. (Witness nods.)
MR. CLARK: Answer out loud.
THE WITNESS: What?
MR. CLARK: You need to answer out loud.
You nodded your head.
THE WITNESS: Oh. Yes.
Q. (BY MR. L U N D G R E N ) You indicated that Doug
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Westbrook had given you advice about your real estate
transactions, and that Raquel ~ I don't remember her
last name - had talked to your brothers about the real
estate transactions.
Anybody else you spoke to regarding real
estate — the real estate transaction regarding the
ranch?
A. That real estate agent that I named that I
met down in St. George. Well, I didn't name him, but.
Q. You didn't know his name?

Page 1151
A. We discussed that subject. No - whether ~
You're asking me as if we'd reached some
final agreement on this, and no. We discussed the
subject. And then we arrived at that Addendum 9, and
whatever it is, and that's what we went with.
Q. How much had you discussed about receiving
back from the real estate agents?
A. Well, what was when we were trying to reach
an agreement here on how to indemnify the buyer.
That's when the subject came up. That in the unlikely
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case that we lose tins case, we'd give iiun back ins
Did you ask - did you ask me if the
12 money.
But we were going to pay the commission up
purchase sale of the ranch to the Eldridges, or just a
13
sale of the ranch?
14 front. And we weren't going to have that commission to
Q. Regarding the sale of the ranch.
15 pay back the buyer. So we discussed that with the real
A. Just in general?
16 estate agents, what their disposition was on returning
Q. In general.
17 their commissions then.
18
Q. You indicated in your counterclaim that your
A. That's all I - well, I think - I'm sure I
consulted, you know^-wiferMr. Wilkersonrbeeause-he-was-attorney-filed to our amended petition^ thaf^ou-were
the real estate agent, you know.
20 seeking some damages because of the liens that had
Q. Okay.
21 been — lis pendens that had been filed.
A. But aside from that, I can't recall.
22
What are your damages?
A. Well, we don't have the purchase amount that
Q. What was Mr. Wade's arrangement in selling
23
24 we would have had.
the property? He was co-listing agent. What was he
going to be doing?
Q. I'm just going to stop you and explain that.
25

frr

m-

Page 114
A. It's my understanding that Mr. Wilkerson
1
doesn't have access to put a piece of paper on what's
2
called the multiple listing, and Mr. Wade did. And so
3
we thought that that could generate some more interest,
4
or get the ranch out there a little more, if Mr. Wade
5
co-listed with him.
6
We'd been listed with Mr. Wilkerson for a
7
while, I think, and we hadn't got any serious action on
8
it, so we thought it couldn't hurt to try to broaden
9
our possibilities a little bit.
10
Q. Have you provided a seller disclosure to
11
Mr. Gibson, or his group?
12
A. I believe so.
13
Q. I don't have a copy of that disclosure in
14
these documents. Can you - will you ask your attorney
15
to forward me a copy of that disclosure?
16
A. The real estate agent probably should have
17
it. He didn't come with all of the stuff you
18
subpoenaed from him?
19
Q. I don't have a copy of it.
20
A. We can try to find you one, if there's still
21
one that exists.
22
Q. Did either Bob West or Gerald Wilkerson
23
agree to give back part of their commission to you on
24
the sale of the ranch?
1 25
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What purchase amount would you have had?
A. We would have had the 390,000 in its
entirety from them by now, plus the interest.
Q. And — but if you win, you're not going to
have any damages because you're going to get the
$390,000. Correct?
A. Well, we're not making any interest on part
of it right now.
Q. Is the money that's being paid by the
purchasers being held in an interest-bearing account?
A. Yeah, but we didn't get all of the whole
amount of it.
Q. So you believe you've lost some interest?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know how much?
A. No. I haven't computed it yet.
Q. Will you compute that and let your attorney
now how much that is and let me know?
A. We can.
Q. Thank you.
What other damages do you believe you've
suffered?
A. All our expense of coming out here, and our
attorney's fees.
And I could - if you want me to give you a
1
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1
1 list, I can get a long list for you of all of the kind
2
2 of things w e could have done with the financial
3
3 independence that this had provided us — would have
4
4 provided u s with, that w e d o n ' t have now.
5
5
Q. I want you to prepare a list that explains,
6
6 in detail, all of the damages you believe you have
7
7 suffered by virtue of the lis pendens.
8
8
Will you d o that?
9
MR. CLARK: Can we do it this way? Could
9
10 you send me an interrogatory, and then well respond to
10
~j t f
12
12
Yes.
13
13
MR. CLARK: Format wise would b e best.
14
14
THE WITNESS: What did w e ~
15
MR. CLARK: H e ' s going to send m e an
15
16
16 interrogatory like the one y o u ' v e already answered.
17
17 That gives u s a format to respond to.
18
18
MR. LUNDGREN: Let's go off the record.
19—
(Whereupon, a break was taken.) 19
20
MR. CLARK: W e ' r e ready to go back o n the
20
21 record. I want t o raise another objection. T h e video
21
22
22 recorder. I see y o u ' r e leaving it on during breaks. I
23
23 think that's immoral, unethical, and illegal.
24
MR. LUNDGREN: Was it o n during the break?
:24
125
MRS. ELDRIDGE: Yeah. I mean, it's still o n
! 25

"'
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When did you first see this document?
A. The 30th.
Q. Were you notified of - that the offer had
been made prior to the 30th?
A. Well, like I said, h e called me the evening
of the 28th. Said there was t w o offers. So - 1 can't
remember if he said exactly w h o , or what, but And then o n the 30th, h e gave m e these the regionals, both this one and the Byron Gibson.
Q. And the amount of this offer is for how
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1
right now.
2
MR. CLARK: I just think that's really
unethical. And apparently you were unaware of that. 3
MR. LUNDGREN: I w a s u n a w a r e o f t h a t , a n d I
4
don't think that my client realized it was still on. I
5
think she was absorbing the proceedings and simply
6
forgot to turn it off.
7
And I will further stipulate, if there's any
8
confidential attorney-client information on that, it
9
will not be used.
10
MR. CLARK: T h a n k y o u .
11
MR. LUNDGREN: E x h i b i t N o . 10.
12
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 10
13
was marked for identification.)
14
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) L e t m e s h o w y o u w h a t ' s 15
been marked as Exhibit No. 10, Mr. Farnsworth.
116
And although the printing is kind of vague
17
on that, can you identify what that is?
18
A. Real Estate Purchase Contract.
19
Q. Who is making the offer on that?
20
A. Anthony Zufelt.
21
Q. What date was this offer made, do you know? 22
A. I can't read it on this copy here. I think
23
it's the 29th, but I can't read it for sure.
j 24
Q. Okay.
I 25
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A. $401,000.
Q. I ' m curious why you did not accept the one
for $401,000, and you accepted one for 390.
A. Because w e ' d already been down the road with
somebody saying they could get the money and not being
able to come up with it. So the other guy said h e had
his financing lined up, and it wasn't going to be
through abank,~and t h a t h e had it secured. And this
guy was going to have to go try to get it from the
bank.
Q. Let me show you what is going to be marked
Exhibit 11.
(Whereupon, Exhibit N o . 11
was marked for identification.)
Page 120
MR. LUNDGREN: T h i s is t h e o n l y c o p y I h a v e ,
Clark, so we'll have to go with that.
MR. CLARK: O k a y .
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) C a n y o u identify this
Exhibit No. 11?
A. Yeah. Addendum No. 1.
Q. Is that your signature at the bottom of
that?
A. Y e s .
Q. And the date?
A. It's not my writing in the date.
Q. What's the date next to your signature?
A. The 8th of November.
Q. And would you read the terms in the
addendum? The added terms?
A. The added terms in the - okay. I remember
this exhibit. Or this addendum now.
Read the — okay. Seller has accepted
another offer, but willing to make the offer of Zufelt
Farms with a back-up offer, if accepted by Zufelt.
Price to be 400,000. Number two, cash,
close be on the - on 2-15-05. Buyer offer to be
effective only if accepted offer fails after 2-2-05.
No contingencies, straight cash offer.
Q. And did you sign this on or about
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November 11th?
1 choices. A 50,000 at closing, 50,000 in six-months,
A. I don't remember 2 100,000 each year until paid in full at five percent,
Q. Or November 8th? I'm sorry?
3 or cash after January 31st, 2005.
A. I don't remember the exact date, but what
4
So you had a cash offer for $400,000, which
this was was Mr. Zufelt, if I remember it right, wanted
5 would have been paid after January 31, 2005. That
to establish himself in second position in case the
6 doesn't explain why it winds up being 390,000.
first offer fell through. And so this is how - what
7
A. Oh, because I ~ let me see.
was done to do that.
8
Because the - in order to get the 400,000
Q. And so you responded to him that you already
9 total, he didn't want to give anything until he gave
had a deal? You already had ~
[ 10 the 400,000, like at the closing or something like
A. No, 1 didn't ever respond to Mr. ZufelE
[IF that, at January 31st. We wanted to get him secured
Q. Well, you signed this addendum, which states
12 with the 50,000 down. So we said, you give us 50,000
that the seller has accepted another offer. Is that
13 non-refundable to show your good faith, and then we'll
correct?
14 go ahead and take the rest, which would be what? 350,
A. Yes.
15 I guess, at the later date.
Q. Was the original Gibson offer for $400,000?
16
It was in - see, in order to do the 400, he
A. I believe so.
17 didn't want to put anything down. See. So is that
Q. If he offered you $400,000 originally, why
18 could have put us in another deal like we were in with
IIO
/4ir1 if/Aii virln/j tin t*\\rtt\a
^QfV?
.
—— • - • —
hi9—Eldridgrherergonig~over^^
|
1 i y — UlU yOU~Wiiltt Up^dJfcmg^znj:
20
A. Because, like I told you before, Mr. Zufelt
20 back and forth. We were like, Put your money where
21 was going to have to go to the bank, is my
21 your mouth is. You know? If you want to put this,
22 understanding. Or told to me that he was going to have
22 put 50,000 down non-refundable, and we'll knock $10,000
23 to go through the financing process at the bank..
23 off for you.
24
Q. Mr. Gibson offered you $400,000. You wound
24
Q. Okay.
25 up making a deal with Mr. Gibson for $390,000.
25
A. But you put your money up there, then, to
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A. Uh-huh.
Q. Why?
A. Because that — we went for the 390 in order
to not - he offered 400,000, and I think it was going
to be made in - I can't remember exactly, but there
was going to be multiple payments. More than one
payment. So we took $10,000 off to be able to close
the whole deal out on January.
Q. Well, your Addendum No. 9 MR. CLARK: On Exhibit 9? Is that where
we're at?
MR. LUNDGREN: On Exhibit 9. Paragraph one.
It s a y s Well, it may have been I didn't have the
right date. On which a date did you change the
purchase price from 400 to $390,000?
A. I don't know if we changed it on the
addendum or not.
I guess I could go back through and look at
them. I just remember that that was the deal.
Q. That would have been Addendum No. 3, dated
11-4.
Okay.
The original offer was, on the Real Estate
Purchase Contract, 11-9-2004, from Mr. Gibson, gave two
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make sure you're serious.
Q. Thank you.
Anything else?
MR. LUNDGREN: Okay. We're done.
MR. CLARK: Okay.
MR. LUNDGREN: Do you have anything?
MR. CLARK: I don't.
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(Whereupon, the deposition
was concluded at 2:57 p.m.)
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

3
4
5
6
7

)
) SS
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the testimony of
the foregoing witness, in the foregoing cause named, was
taken before me, DEBRA A. DIBBLE, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of
Utah, residing at Woodland, Utah.

8
9

That the said witness was by me, before
examination, duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth in said cause.

10
m
112
13
14

Thar ttieiesxiraony o^sai*^ritness-way
reported by me in Stenotype, and thereafter caused by
me to be transcribed into typewriting, and that a full,
true and correct transcription of said testimony so
taken and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing
transcript, and said witness was examined and said as
in the foregoing annexed transcript.

15
16
17

I further certify that I am not of kin or
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said
cause of action, and that I am not interested in the
event thereof.

18
That in accordance with Rule 30(e), no
request having been made for the witness to read and
19 .^ sign, the original transcript was sealed and delivered
to the taking attorney for safekeeping.
20
21
22

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set
my hand and affixed my Notarial Seal this
of
,2004.

.

23
24

Debra A. Dibble, C.S.R., R.P.R.
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